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ABSTRACT
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT VERSUS 
JOHN HARRISON SURRATT: A STUDY IN ATTITUDES
Thomas Michael Martin 
Old Dominion University, 1996 
Director: Dr. Lorraine M. Lees
The same day on which accused Abraham Lincoln murder conspirator 
Mary Eugenia Surratt was arrested at her Washington, D.C. boardinghouse, her 
son and alleged co-conspirator, John Harrison Surratt, was in a small town in 
northern New York. The arrest of the widow Surratt, however, marks the first of 
a series of points of departure between the destinies of the mother and the son. 
She was destined to follow a path from arrest to trial and execution by means of a 
military commission created by the War Department. John’s circuitous route 
from trans-Atlantic flight to extradition, trial, and dismissal by a civilian court over 
two years after the original conspirators’ trial could hardly have contrasted more 
with his mother’s lot. The delineation between their two legal dramas is clearly 
the 1866 ex parte Milligan decision by the Supreme Court which detoured John 
Surratt’s trial away from the military venue that his mother had experienced.
That case, questioning the jurisdiction of military commissions may account, in 
part, for the son’s eventual release. It does not, however, explain the United 
States government’s laissez faire attitude toward young Surratt during his time as a 
fugitive. This study, using documents ranging from State Department dispatches 
to published trial transcripts and unpublished court papers, demonstrates that
ii
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certain executive branch officials engineered a strategy to indefinitely maintain 
John Surratt’s fugitive status. When this plan failed, it conversely became in the 
best interests of the United States government to convict him and measures were 
taken to insure that end.
111
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To Charlotte K. Martin, the repository and steward of our family’s history, 
and John J. Martin, who assimilated history through chapters of his own design.
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Neither John Harrison Surratt nor any of the six others in attendance knew 
that this was to be the first and only time that they all would ever meet as a 
group. At actor John Wilkes Booth’s urging they gathered at Gautier’s 
Restaurant in Washington D.C. on the evening of 17 March 1865 to discuss 
strategy, tactics, and objectives.1 Overcoming the suspicion, paranoia, and doubt 
stemming from their aborted plot of 17 January to abduct President Lincoln from 
Ford’s Theatre-after which in one writer’s unflattering estimation "they scattered 
like minnows"--the group of conspirators was only now, two months later, 
prepared to again listen to and comment on plans for another attempt to kidnap 
the president.2
By nearly every assessment, Booth was the driving force behind these 
conspiracies.3 One must wonder what thoughts ran through his mind as he
1 Jim Bishop, The Day Lincoln Was Shot (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
Publishers, 1955), 84-86. Not present but later accused of complicity were Dr. 
Samuel Mudd, the Maryland surgeon who later set the leg that Booth injured 
during the assassination, Edward Spangler, a Ford’s Theatre stagehand among the 
apparent legion of sycophantic admirers in Booth’s entourage, and Mary Eugenia 
Surratt, John Surratt’s mother and the owner-proprietor of a Washington 
boardinghouse that served as the unofficial headquarters of the conspiracy.
2 Bishop, The Day Lincoln Was Shot 77.
3 See Vaughn Shelton’s Mask for Treason: The Lincoln Murder Trial 
(Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1965) for a unique view in which Washington 
detective Lafayette Baker, rather than Booth, is portrayed as the mastermind of 
the assassination and in which John Surratt is portrayed as a double agent serving 
both Baker and the Confederate government.
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addressed this eclectic gathering of longtime friends, hand-picked associates and 
several specialists enlisted by key members of the group. Collectively, 
Confederate courier John Harrison Surratt, ex-partisan-ranger Lewis Paine, 
boatman George Atzerodt, former drugstore delivery boy David Herold, produce 
and grain store employee Michael O’Laughlin, and store clerk Sam Arnold may 
have demonstrated all that Booth ever expected of his fellow conspirators. By no 
means a collection of professionals, Booth’s cabal was, by one historian’s 
assessment "a loose, informally organized group, tied together only by devotion to 
the Confederate cause, personal attachment to Booth, and the considerable 
amount of money that the actor paid to house and feed his team in Washington."4 
Lafayette Baker, the chief of Washington’s semi-autonomous National Detectives, 
who later remarked that "Booth found that tragedy in real life could no more be 
enacted without greasy-faced and knock-kneed supernumeraries than upon the 
mimic stage," was even less flattering.5 Such company should have sickened 
Booth, but to Baker he had "become, by resolve, a cut throat himself."6 Booth, 
who to some degree viewed his actions as patriotic necessity, would have taken
4 David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 587. 
Whether or not Donald intentionally prioritized these factors, one Booth 
biographer reverses their order, and, designates the conspiracy members--with the 
exception of John Surratt-as undisguised mercenaries. See Francis Wilson, John 
Wilkes Booth: Fact and Fiction of Lincoln’s Assassination (Boston and New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1929), 26-27.
5 Lafayette Charles Baker, Spies. Traitors and Conspirators of the Late Civil 
War (Philadelphia: J.E. Potter & Company, 1894), 295.
6 Baker, Conspirators. 296.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
exception to such an inclusive and derogatory generalization.7
The exact placement of conspirators John Harrison Surratt and his mother 
Mary Eugenia Surratt on a continuum of culpability was-and remains~a matter of 
speculation. The designation "cut-throat," while arguably fitting for the rank and 
file member of the conspiracy, seems inappropriate for both John Surratt and his 
mother. As owner of the Washington boardinghouse frequented by practically by 
every member of the conspiracy, Mary Surratt is, nevertheless, presently and 
innocuously characterized-with minor variations--as someone whose failings fall 
somewhere between William C. Davis’s "the aging woman whose crime had been 
in renting rooms to conspirators" and Jim Bishops’s "a pious zero with a penchant 
for falling on evil days."8 Unfortunately for widow Surratt, she was not regarded 
so innocently in 1865.
Mary Surratt’s son John, however, is not so easily written off as a second 
tier or serendipitous participant. The bits of circumstantial evidence surrounding 
his participation seem to fit effortlessly into several different scenarios- 
disenchanted, erstwhile member of the conspiracy, part-time topographic
7 Bishop, The Day Lincoln Was Shot. 65. Bishop also includes the desire for 
personal fame and the consequent denigration of Lincoln -- a man Booth despised 
for his political convictions and his role as Commander-in-Chief of the arrogant 
empire to the North -  as motives for Booth’s actions. See also Carl Sandburg, 
Abraham Lincoln: The War Years (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 
1939), 4: 319-321 for the full text of a soul baring and quite maudlin letter written 
by Booth to his sister Asia some time in 1864 and closed tellingly with the phrase 
"A Confederate doing duty upon his own responsibility."
8 Burke Davis, The Long Surrender (New York: Random House, 1985), 86 
and Bishop, The Dav Lincoln Was Shot. 64. See also Donald, Lincoln for a 
similar opinion of Mary Surratt.
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consultant, recruiting officer for Booth, liaison between Booth and the 
Confederate hierarchy in Richmond, active participant exclusively in the abduction 
plots, and principal in the Ford’s Theatre assassination of President Abraham 
Lincoln. There is evidence suggesting each and all of these characterizations. Of 
Surratt’s contemporaries, only Lafayette Baker, oddly enough, with a wealth of 
manpower and, eventually, evidence at his disposal, relegated John Surratt merely 
to the relatively minor role of accessory before the fact. Reminiscing on the then 
developing situation, Baker later remarked, "[young] Surratt does not seem to 
have been a puissant spirit in the scheme. [Booth] was the head and heart of the 
plot; Mrs. Surratt was his anchor, and the rest of the boys were disciples to 
Iscariot and Jezebel. . . . John Surratt knew of the murder and connived at it."9
Vaughn Shelton, by comparison, attributes to John Surratt a central and 
authoritative role in the abduction plots. He sees him as "the catalyst of Booth’s 
kidnap scheme" who acted as a "lantern to which . . . other conspirators, like 
fireflies, were irresistibly drawn." 10 Other historians as well have viewed John 
Surratt as an addition, albeit a reluctant one, to the abduction plot, who was 
eventually drawn in by "Booth’s personal magnetism," by the "brazenness of the 
idea [of abducting the president]" that appealed to his partisan spirit, and by his 
perceived "legality of the act."11 Surratt himself would habitually trot out this
9 Baker, Conspirators. 299.
10 Shelton, Mask. 224.
11 Wilson, John Wilkes Booth. 44 and Bishop, The Day Lincoln Was Shot.
73.
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5veneer of patriotism as justification for his actions. Years later, in fact, he turned 
the tables on a capacity audience in a Maryland assembly hall, and inquired of 
them "Who among you would not have volunteered to abduct [Jefferson]
Davis?"12 Surratt, like Booth, made no apologies for what he perceived to be acts 
of honor and national necessity.
The Surratts were both eventually apprehended, she in April 1865 in 
Washington, D.C., and he over a year and a half later in Alexandria, Egypt. Their 
divergent fates following their arrests were determined in large part by the 
attitudes of certain key officials of the United States government. These officials 
would initially determine which of the two Surratts was the greater prize and 
devise a plan to bring that person to justice. When that scheme failed, they and 
their designees-a military commission sanctioned by the Secretary of Defense- 
continued with the trial and eventual execution of the one in custody. These 
same officials would determine as well that the surviving Surratt-still a fugitive- 
had the potential, due to their perception of his intimacy with the Booth cabal, to 
retroactively raise questions regarding the verdict, if not the constitutional 
foundation for the 1865 military tribunal. In order to avoid that scenario, the 
subsequent strategy of these officials led them to disregard, downplay, and delay 
the response to dispatches from overseas consuls who periodically brought to their 
attention the whereabouts and intentions of the fugitive Surratt. The actions of
12 Anon., "A Remarkable Lecture-John Surratt Tells His Story," Lincoln 
Herald 51 (December 1949): 25. Interestingly, Surratt states that the motive 
behind this 30 December 1870 lecture to a Rockville, Maryland paying audience 
was not "self-justification," nor "self-glorification," but merely "pecuniary necessity."
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these officials were overt enough, in fact, to warrant a subsequent investigation by 
the House Judiciary Committee. When consular enthusiasm overwhelmed 
executive branch obstruction and John Surratt was arrested and extradited, the 
attitude of the United States government underwent a drastic metamorphosis. 
With the alleged conspirator in custody, conviction now became a necessity in 
order to confirm the findings of the military commission that had convicted Mrs. 
Surratt.
The trial of John Surratt, in some respects a retrial of his mother, reflected 
the attitude that the United States government then adopted toward the son. 
Strategically defensive perhaps in its concern over the looming presence of the 
1865 trial, the prosecution’s aggressive tactics to secure a conviction, on the other 
hand, were strictly offensive in nature. Even the extreme lengths to which the 
government went, however, proved insufficient to convince a jury of John Surratt’s 
guilt. When statutes of limitations eventually forced his release, the Surratt 
family’s ordeal was finally over. Who in the United States government made 
these above determinations and the manner of and motives for the actions 
consequent to those determinations is the focus of this study.
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THE SURRATTS AND THE 1865 MILITARY COMMISSION
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The conspirators’ meeting at Gautier’s terminated somewhat less than 
amicably with plans having been set for a second abduction attempt. Scheduled 
for 20 March 1865, the conspirators planned to intercept the president’s carriage 
as it made its way to the Soldier’s Home where, according to Booth’s sources, Mr. 
and Mrs. Lincoln had arranged to attend a play. The plot ended in failure, as did 
its January predecessor, when the Lincolns’ carriage never materialized. Not 
surprisingly, this mishandled and fruitless affair marked the final collective act of 
the group.1 The Amold-O’Laughlin faction retreated to Baltimore and "[John] 
Surratt quit in disgust because he had worked hard and earnestly for the 
Confederacy and he felt that this was an opera bouffe plot."2 Conspirator Lewis 
Paine later explained both John Surratt’s permanent departure from the 
conspiracy and Booth’s subsequent change to a plot to murder Lincoln from his 
insider’s viewpoint. In an eleventh hour soul cleansing prior to his execution 
Paine stated that
Booth, who was the only one in earnest, proposed to kill Lincoln and all of 
the Cabinet. The rest backed out and scattered like a lot of beggars. We 
never heard of Surratt nor of Arnold nor any of them again . . . .  I deserve
1 Bishop, The Day Lincoln Was Shot. 88-89. While the final outcome of the 
abduction was a failure, at least John Surratt appeared impressed with the group’s 
efforts. In his Rockville speech he bragged that "so perfect was our 
communication that *ve were instantly in our saddles [and] on our way to the 
hospital."
2 Ibid., 90.
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8to be killed and so does Booth. The rest were women and babies.3
Some time in the spring of 1865, Booth indeed made the strategic leap 
from plans for Lincoln’s abduction to plans for his murder.4 Booth, ever the 
actor, cast himself in the leading role as Lincoln’s assassin. Paine and Atzerodt, 
designated respectively to kill Secretary of State William H. Seward and Vice- 
President Andrew Johnson, were supposed to coordinate their assaults with 
Booth’s. While Booth may have contemplated the political repercussions of a 
government thrown into chaos by the elimination of its inner circle, one writer 
feels that he more likely wanted to eliminate the man whose post-war plans dared 
to expand social and political horizons of the southern slaves. A reconstructed 
South based on Lincoln’s expressed ideals would present a juxtaposed world order 
anathema to Booth and to others reared on the clearly stratified and strictly 
enforced societal roles regarding America’s unique caste system. Booth’s attack 
on President Lincoln, more a personal political statement than an attempt at
3 Wilson, Booth. 98-99. There is evidence that John Surratt went to 
Richmond as a direct consequence of this fiasco. He apparently was seeking a 
clerkship of some sort there. The trip may also have been a cover for escorting a 
Mrs. Helen Slater to the Confederate capitol with important dispatches. See 
testimony of Louis Weichmann in Benn Pitman, comp., The Assassination of 
President Lincoln and the Trial of the Conspirators: The Courtroom Testimony as 
Originally Compiled (Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1974), 114.
4 Bishop, The Day Lincoln Was Shot. 81. The exact date of Booth’s change 
of strategy is debated. See Sandburg, Lincoln. 4: 330 for his belief that the 
change occurred on the evening of 11 April 1865. See also The War of the 
Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate 
Armies 128 vols. Published under the direction of the Hon. Daniel S. Lamont, 
Secretary of War. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901, 
Series I, 47: 287, and Series II, 8: 853 and 8: 854-855 for dates on which the 
United States government believed Booth may have received sanction for his 
plans from the Confederate government.
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9systemic disruption, was, nevertheless, a challenging enterprise that Booth 
considered well worth the risk.
On the evening of 14 April during which President Lincoln was mortally 
wounded by Booth and Secretary Seward was brutally assaulted by Paine, the 
hierarchy of the American government was indeed temporarily shaken. When the 
ship of state had righted itself the temper of the times called for the meting out of 
swift and sure justice to all those involved in these treasonous acts. Unfortunately 
for conspirators Paine, Atzerodt and Herold who had played major roles in this 
final scheme, a military commission rather than a civilian court was selected to act 
as their judge and jury. The selection of a military commission held even greater 
misfortune for Dr. Samuel Mudd-who allegedly provided medical aid to Booth 
during his post-assassination flight-and Mary Surratt, now judged by history to 
have been merely sentient accessories or perhaps oblivious innocents in the 
assassination plot. An even greater misfortune awaited those who like Arnold and 
O’Laughlin had chosen to let their membership in the Booth brotherhood 
completely lapse only weeks before the assassination. Events of the next months 
would demonstrate that none of the accused would be able to disassociate 
themselves from their past or from the network of conspiracy that dragged even 
the most naive and peripheral along with it.
The variety of military commission that would try the Lincoln conspirators 
was nothing new. It had originally been an expedient of the Mexican War of 
1846-1848 when General Winfield Scott, operating far outside the jurisdiction of 
any American court, created what he felt to be an appropriate venue to try
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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American citizens who transgressed either civil law or the "Laws of War."5 The 
commission that was "appointed by Secretary [of War Edwin M.] Stanton and 
rubber-stamped by President Andrew Johnson as well as by attorney General 
[James] Speed" to try the Lincoln conspirators, for instance, merely followed 
guidelines that had been in operation for well over one hundred years.6 As one 
historian explained these procedures, "in a military court, it was incumbent upon 
the prosecution not only to obtain convictions wherever they were warranted but 
also to present evidence bearing on the accused and to see to it that their rights 
were respected."7 Ideally then, any accused would receive equal parcels of justice 
from either civil courts or military commissions.
There were within the American government, however, conflicting opinions 
on whether these ad hoc tribunals could dispense justice with such equanimity. 
President Johnson, Lincoln’s successor, felt that they were the only proper forum 
for a trial involving a conspiracy against the federal government. Citing Lincoln’s 
September 1862 suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, Johnson saw no harm in 
Lincoln’s-and now his own--denial of the right to a civil proceeding to such
5 Edward Steers, Jr., "Inter Arma Silent Leges: The Military Trial of the 
Lincoln Conspirators," Lincoln Herald 83 (1981): 722.
6 A.A. Hoehling, After the Guns Fell Silent: A Post Appomattox Narrative: 
April 1865 - March 1866 (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1990), 44.
7 Benjamin P. Thomas and Harold M. Hyman, Stanton: The Life and Times 
of Lincoln’s Secretary of War (New York: Knopf, 1962), 424. Apparently the 
United States Supreme court was in accordance with this procedure. In the 
eighty-three years lifespan of military commissions, the Supreme Court had never 
questioned a commission’s authority, only its jurisdiction. See Steers, "Military 
Trial of the Conspirators," 722.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
violators of the common weal. The "rebels, insurgents, aiders and abettors" 
designated in Lincoln’s executive action was an accurate description of the Booth 
conspirators to anyone such as Johnson who, along with Secretary of War Stanton, 
had a preconceived notion of a vast Confederate plot against the Washington 
government, of which Lincoln’s assassination was only a single facet.8 Johnson, as 
chief executive and as an advocate of the commission’s brand of justice, would 
eventually-according to tradition-have to decide whether or not the findings of 
the commission would be implemented, regardless of their severity. Simply put, 
the findings of the commission carried no weight without a president’s signature.
Secretary of War Stanton, the creator of this particular military 
commission, was according to one source, aware that the evidence being collected 
by Judge Advocate Joseph Holt for the trial "might not satisfy the requirements 
for conviction in a civil court."9 Far better then, Stanton apparently reasoned, to 
try the accused conspirators before a military commission where the rules of 
evidence would be less constricting and punishment more likely to be stem and 
swift.10 According to Secretary of the Navy Gideon W elles-no admirer of
8 Beverly Bone, "Edwin Stanton in the Wake of the Lincoln Assassination," 
Lincoln Herald 82, (1980): 515. David Miller Dewitt, in The Judicial Murder of 
Mary E. Surratt (Baltimore: John Murphy & Co., 1895), 5, presents Stanton as 
vengeful, suspicious, and single-minded to the extreme. "He saw, heard, felt and 
cherished every thing that favored [a conspiracy engineered by the Confederate 
hierarchy]," claims Dewitt. "He would see nothing, would hear nothing, and hated 
every thing, that in the slightest degree mitigated against it. Upon this theory he 
began, and upon this theory he prosecuted to the end, every effort for the 
discovery, arrest, trial and punishment of the murderers."
9 Thomas and Hyman, Stanton. 422-423.
10 Ibid., 423.
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Stanton’s—Stanton felt that the need for this form of jurisprudence was "clear and 
positive" and, by means of what Welles called "rash, impulsive, and arbitrary 
measures" was eventually able to draw others of importance into his fold as well.11
Chief among Stanton’s converts to the idea of a military commission was 
Attorney General Speed, someone Welles perceived to be "otherwise inclined" 
toward this form of criminal justice.12 Once convinced, however, Speed shared 
with Judge Advocate Joseph Holt the feeling that a commission was "the only real 
method of eliciting the whole truth."13 It was Speed, in addition, who perceived 
the conspirators as belligerents who had violated the laws of war and, as such, 
could only find justice in a trial conducted by their military peers.14
Stanton selected Holt to present for the government and fellow Ohioan 
and friend John Bingham as one of Holt’s assistants.15 Judge Advocate Holt, a 
significant variable in the equation and someone perhaps concerned with the 
intrusive activities of the press, subsequently advocated a closed door military 
proceeding. This development was seen by the forward looking Secretary of the 
Navy Welles as "another objectionable feature and [one] likely to meet
11 Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles: Secretary of the Naw Under 
Lincoln and Johnson (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1911), 2: 303-304.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., 305.
14 Steers, "Military Trial of the Conspirators," 723.
15 Thomas and Hyman, Stanton. 25, 136, 424. Bingham, according to 
Thomas and Hyman, had previously played a role in Lincoln’s appointment of 
Stanton as Secretary of War in 1862.
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condemnation after the event and excitement have passed off."16 Welles, sensitive 
to the public’s perception of the tr ia l , believed "[i]t would be impolitic, and I 
think unwise and injudicious to shut off all spectators and make a ’Council of Ten’ 
of this commission,"--an admonition that was totally ignored.17
Thomas Mealey Harris, who would eventually take a seat on the 
commission’s panel of nine judges was, not unexpectedly, an advocate of military 
justice in time of war. He never denied that civil courts had been open in 
Washington throughout the war-one of the chief arguments against military 
commissions-but he adroitly qualified their existence and simultaneously provided 
justification for a military court in this particular case. He argued that "the great 
crime (the assassination) had been committed during the existence of a state of 
war and the courts were only able to carry out their function under the protection 
of the arms of he government."18 Continuing, he argued that a civil trial of 
alleged assassins of the country’s president would have no chance of avoiding a 
"miscarriage of justice." He especially foresaw problems with prospective jurors in 
the event of a civil trial. A "jury of partizans [sic]", as he called them, would 
inevitably result whether the panel were of a heterogenous or a homogenous 
nature. The former, he predicted, would surely result in a hung jury and the
16 Welles, Diary, 2: 303.
17 Ibid., 305.
18 Thomas Mealy Harris, The Assassination of Lincoln. A History of the 
Great Conspiracy. Trial of the Conspirators bv a Military Commission and a 
Review of the Trial of John H. Surratt (Boston: American Citizen Co., 1892), 82.
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latter would certainly render a biased judgment.19 Harris would no doubt have
agreed with a July 1865 government paper on the constitutionality of military
commissions which made it clear that
The fact that the civil courts are open does not affect the right of the 
military tribunal to hold [the accused] as a prisoner and to try. The civil 
courts have no more right to prevent the military, in time of war, from 
trying offenders against the laws of war than they have a right to interfere 
with and prevent a battle.20
Those who favored the military commission clearly rationalized that any other
legal venue could not give the government and the people of the United States
the verdict that they all deserved.
Negative opinions of military commissions ranged generally from virulent
to ominous and public perceptions regarding them did not demonstrate
confidence in their professed egalitarian motives and protocols. The most
straightforward statement against them claims simply that the need for martial law
had ended with General Robert E. Lee’s surrender of the main Confederate field
army at Appomattox on 9 April 1865.21 Peace had signalled the return to the
status quo ante and, with it, the end of military commissions. Vaughn Shelton has
an entirely different and much more sinister opinion of them. He explains that
since the raison d ’etre of a military commission was to convict and not to conduct
an unbiased investigation, it follows that substantiation for preconceived notions
becomes the true object of such a trial. Any "ill-fitting" facts are, in his opinion,
19 Ibid.
20 Steers, "Military Trial of the Conspirators," 723.
21 Ibid.
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discarded, altered, or contradicted by witnesses of the government.22
Several contemporaries of Johnson, Stanton, Speed, and Holt were 
convinced that choosing the commission form of justice would do irreparable 
damage to the national fabric. Maryland Congressman Henry Winter Davis, 
writing to President Johnson concerning the imminent trial of the conspirators, 
issued a warning against the use of a military commission to try accused civilians. 
"It is in the very teeth of the express prohibition of the Constitution," he wrote. 
Continuing, he advised Johnson that "[the] only safety is to stop now; delegate the 
accused to the law, & let the courts of the United States satisfy the people that 
the prisoners are either guilty or innocent in law; for the people want justice not 
revenge.23 Nor did Davis visualize public outcry against merely the commission 
itself. Again writing to Johnson, Davis explained that choosing a military 
commission over a civil court would "prove disastrous to yourself, your 
administration & your supporters who may attempt to apologize for it."24 Davis’s 
remarks would, in time, prove to be quite accurate.
Perhaps the most telling and the most significant remarks concerning 
military commissions come directly from those who had the misfortune to be 
subpoenaed to appear before one. Henry Kyd Douglas, a Confederate staff
22 Shelton, Mask for Treason. 8. In fact, one need not pry too deeply into 
this commission’s proceedings to find accusations of suborned and perjured 
testimony that corroborate Shelton’s claims.
23 Gerald S. Henig, Henry Winter Davis: Antebellum and Civil War 
Coneressmen from Maryland (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1973), 245.
24 Leroy P. Graf and Ralph W. Haskins. The Papers of Andrew Johnson 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1967-1983), 8: 65-66.
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officer eventually called before what he called the "Court of Death" trying the 
Lincoln conspirators, spoke in provocative but non-specific terms regarding the 
commission. He was appalled at the high-handed proceedings being conducted 
wherein he claimed that "passion ruled everything." Following his own 
appearance before the commission he remarked that "[i]f Justice ever sat with 
unbandaged, blood-shot eyes, she did on this occasion."25 John Brophy, another 
witness during the same trial, could comment afterwards only on the road not 
taken by the commission’s panel. He felt that the trial of Mrs. Surratt and the 
others should have been—and, by implication was clearly not--conducted "[i]n an 
open, fair, legal, authorized manner, beyond cavil, suspicions and distrust." By 
comparison, he claimed to have seen or to have experienced firsthand at the 1865 
trial commission ". . . violent process against the statute, . . . departure from 
established forms, . . . disregard of venerable precedents, . . . overthrow of 
ordinary tribunals, . . . cramping of evidence, . . . [and] intimidation and cruelties.
. . ."26 To Brophy, the trial by commission in which he was involved had obviously 
been a legal, constitutional, and moral travesty.
Former United States Attorney and sitting Maryland Senator Reverdy 
Johnson, as one of Maiy Surratt’s defense team at the trial of conspirators, 
attacked the commission’s constitutional foundations during his closing arguments. 
The government, in its argument, had earlier attempted to justify the genesis of
25 Henry Kyd Douglas, I Rode With Stonewall (Chapel Hill: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 1940), 341-342.
26 Joseph George, Jr., "The Trial of Mary Surratt: John P. Brophy’s Rare 
Pamphlet," Lincoln Herald 93 (1991): 20.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
17
the commission with the vague phrase from the Constitution giving Congress the 
power to make rules for the government and regulations of the land and naval 
forces. Johnson, with an obvious reference not only to his civilian client Mary 
Surratt but to the other accused conspirators as well, countered that ”[n]o artifice 
of ingenuity can make these [aforementioned] words include those who do not 
belong to the army and navy." He also argued that if the commission could not 
refer to a crime as being uniquely military in nature or could not refer to a 
criminal act by definition and cite its punishment, it must be a civil offense and 
thus be triable only in civil court. He further agonized over the inevitable 
inequities resulting from the commission’s denial of Fifth Amendment guarantees 
of a grand jury to the defendants.27
Among later detractors of the commission, few were as openly abhorrent of 
the entire proceeding than David Miller Dewitt. Commenting on the commission 
in 1895, Dewitt left no room for further interpretation on the matter. "It was 
unconstitutional. It was illegal. It was unjust. It was inhumane. It was unholy.
It was pusillanimous. It was mean. And it was each and all of these in the 
highest or lowest degree. It resembled the acts of savages, and not the deeds of 
civilized men."28 It was into this context of strong, conflicting positions on the 
concept, constitutionality, and fairness of military commissions that Mary Surratt 
and the other Lincoln conspirators would enter.
27 Pitman, Trial of the Conspirators. 251-253. Johnson would later act as an 
attorney for petitioner Lamdin Milligan in the landmark and strikingly similar ex 
parte Milligan case.
28 Dewitt, Judicial Murder. 258.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
18
The trial of the Lincoln murder conspirators began on 9 May 1865 in
Washington D.C. with the reading of the charges and specifications against the
accused. All eight defendants were charged with
maliciously, unlawfully, and traitorously, and in aid of the existing armed 
rebellion against the United States of America . . . combining, 
confederating, and conspiring together with John H. Surratt, John Wilkes 
Booth, Jefferson Davis . . . and others unknown, to kill and murder 
Abraham Lincoln, late . . . President of the United States . . .Andrew 
Johnson, Vice-President of the United States . . . William H. Seward, 
Secretary of State of the United States . . . and Ulysses S. Grant, 
Lieutenant-General of the Army of the United States.29
Individual conspirators were then charged with other associated criminal acts. It
was specified that Mary E. Surratt, for instance, "in further prosecution of said
conspiracy did . . . receive, entertain, harbor, and conceal, aid and assist [the said
conspirators] . . . with intent to aid, abet, and assist them in the execution thereof,
and in escaping from justice after the murder of the said Abraham Lincoln."30 A
nine-member military commission selected by Assistant Adjutant General Edward
D. Townshend and presided over by Major-General David Hunter (who had been
serving on courts-martial since February) listened as the defendants David E.
Herold, George A. Atzerodt, Lewis Paine, Michael O’Laughlin, Edward Spangler,
Samuel Arnold, Mary E. Surratt, and Samuel A. Mudd entered their pleas of "not
guilty."31 As one might expect in a trial conducted by a military commission, all
constitutional and civil libertarian appeals regarding the legality and the
29 Pitman, Trial of the Conspirators. 18-20.
30 Ibid., 20.
31 Ibid., 21.
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jurisdiction of the commission itself were summarily dismissed. Attempts by the 
defense to challenge the jurisdiction of the court based on the civilian status of 
their clients and on the fact that civil courts were both currently operational in 
Washington and had been throughout the war also met with Judge Advocate 
Holt’s stern position to the contrary. Not willing to budge, Holt also denied pleas 
for severance-separate trials for the accused-even in the face of the defense 
attorneys’ arguments that "their [clients’] defense will be greatly prejudiced by a 
joint trial."32
The initial plea phase of the trial having concluded, the formal proceedings 
involving over 150 witnesses opened in earnest on 12 May. The sheer volume of 
testimony did not bode well for the principals in the conspiracy and the manner in 
which it was presented left little room for legal maneuvering. First, the context of 
a grand conspiracy with a strong Richmond-Washington-Montreal axis was 
created. Then with a synergistic flourish, the activities of the individual 
conspirators were introduced into that context and given even greater magnitude. 
The revelations of wide-ranging covert Confederate activities that included plans 
to detonate a bomb at the White House, introduce cholera into Northern cities, 
poison Northern reservoirs, bum New York City, and release by force of arms
32 Harris, Military Commission. 108-109. See also Ervin Leon Jordan, "A 
Painful Case: The Wright-Sanbom Incident in Norfolk, Virginia, July-October, 
1863" (MA Thesis: Old Dominion University, 1979), 21, for the trial and execution 
by military commission of Dr. David M. Wright of Norfolk for the murder of 
Union officer Second Lt. Alonson L. Sanborn. The defense raised similar 
questions regarding jurisdiction, the absence of Fifth Amendment guarantees, 
state versus federal law, military trials of civilian, and habeas corpus liberties. The 
Judge Advocate in this case "derided Wright’s pleas as ’a waste of time’ and said 
they had been tolerated ’as a matter of professional courtesy.’"
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thousands of Confederate prisoners of war from Northern camps established a 
context of hysteria and paranoia that all but guaranteed that objectivity would not 
play a significant role in reaching a verdict.33 Testimony alleging that these 
activities were conducted with the tacit approval of the Confederate government 
or in several instances with its foreknowledge and financial backing only made it 
easier for the prosecution to push their the guilt-by-association strategy. By 
contrast, the attorneys for the hapless defendants involved exclusively or--worse-- 
merely tangentially in the kidnapping or assassination plots found it nearly 
impossible to extricate their clients from the web of general conspiracy being 
systematically presented to the court. Due to the suggestion of this organized 
plan to disrupt the United States government, the accused would be seen as mere 
minions of Jefferson Davis, the fountain from which all treason was thought to 
have welled.
The life of Mary Surratt, arguably the least involved of the conspirators in 
the Booth plots but certainly the only one whose well-being had any direct bearing 
on her son’s subsequent actions, rested squarely on the culpability generated by 
the testimony of Louis Weichmann and John Lloyd. Weichmann, as a boarder at 
Mary Surratt’s Washington, D.C. boardinghouse and John Lloyd, as the tenant of 
the Surratt’s farm outside of Washington, were in a strong position as intimates of 
the Surratt family’s daily activities either to refute or corroborate any question of 
her complicity. Weichmann’s testimony, unfortunately for her, was damning in 
the extreme. He testified to suspicious activities at the Surratt boardinghouse that
33 Pitman, Trial of the Conspirators, testimony of Sanford Conover, 28-31.
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helped to characterize it as a safe place for Confederate blockade runners and 
governmental couriers; he claimed that aliases for conspirators and other visitors 
at the Surratt house were randomly, amateurishly, and clumsily used and 
occasionally changed imparting a disturbing air of nonchalance to the conspiracy; 
he evoked the image of a disconsolate Mrs. Surratt "weeping bitterly" for her son’s 
future following her discovery of his participation in the aborted 20 March 1865 
kidnapping attempt; he testified to carrying messages periodically to Booth from 
Mrs. Surratt regarding what she called "private business"; he detailed the 
appearances--some of them rather frequent-at the Surratt boardinghouse of 
Booth and fellow conspirators Lewis Paine, George Atzerodt, and David Herold; 
and, most damaging, he recounted a trip to John Lloyd’s Surrattsville tavern with 
Mrs. Surratt on the Tuesday prior to the assassination during which she placed 
into Lloyd’s hands a package from Booth that he was instructed to hold for 
personal delivery to the fleeing assassins.34 With Weichmann’s testimony, the 
prosecution had a circumstantial case against Mary Surratt that was far from 
airtight but one that placed her near enough to the epicenter of the conspiracy to 
pose a serious threat to her life. It is not surprising then that John Surratt had a 
vindictive attitude toward Weichmann, a man he labelled as " . . .  my nemesis, a 
man who has done more than any one living or dead to bring disgrace on me and 
my family."35
34 Pitman, Trial of the Conspirators, testimony of Louis Weichmann, 113-
120.
35 Hanson Hiss, "John Surratt’s Story," Washington Post. 3 April 1898.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
As if Weichmann’s disclosures were not incriminating enough, John Lloyd’s 
testimony corroborated both the major and minor details of Weichmann’s 
disclosures and called into serious question Mrs. Surratt’s alibi that had been 
offered to explain her trips to Surrattsville on both the Tuesday prior to and the 
day of the assassination. Lloyd recounted Mrs. Surratts’ inquiry into the status of 
the "shooting irons" that had previously been dropped off and secreted at Lloyd’s 
tavern by her son John. He also told of Mrs. Surratt’s delivery of a package 
containing a field glass to his place on the day of the assassination as well as of 
her request on that day that bottles of whiskey be ready that night. "There will 
be parties here to-night who will call for them," he recalled her saying before she 
and Weichmann began the trip back to Washington.36 Lloyd further pointed 
out that whereas Mary Surratt may have claimed to have journeyed to 
Surrattsville on 14 April with the expressed purpose of speaking with a Mr. Nothe 
concerning an outstanding debt, he himself never did see Mr. Nothe although the 
two were supposedly in the next room.37 Nothe’s testimony later corroborated 
Lloyd’s statement.
While there was other circumstantial testimony regarding Mary Surratt’s 
secessionist leanings, her alleged derogatory remarks about Lincoln, and both the 
Confederate and Booth memorabilia found at her home, no one’s testimony did 
more damage than Weichmann’s and Lloyd’s. Granted, there were, in rebuttal, 
witnesses who painted a much different portrait of the matronly boardinghouse
36 Pitman, Trial of the Conspirators, testimony of John Lloyd, 85-86.
37 Ibid., 116.
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keeper and her activities. Friend, boarders, and hired workers spoke of her 
kindness to Union soldiers, her loyal sentiments, and her Christian lifestyle.38 
Judging from the eventual verdict by the commission, however, few were 
convinced that her overt businesslike propriety was much more than an affected 
facade disguising her covert and treasonous activities.
Due to the absence of John Surratt at the trial, any decision regarding his 
alleged complicity had to be deferred until his capture. This may help explain the 
United States government’s harsh treatment of his captive mother and its 
vacillating attitude towards her fugitive son. There is little doubt, however, that 
Stanton wished John Surratt to be present. When, in the days following the 
assassination, "information indicated that young Surratt had escaped to Canada," 
Stanton grew "despondent from fear" that Surratt like Booth, would escape 
justice.39 Although in absentia, John Surratt, nevertheless, emerges as an 
unchallenged intimate of the Booth conspiracy. Testimony, largely circumstantial, 
linked him to practically every phase of the attempts to abduct and kill the 
President and immersed him deeply in contextual aspects of the treasonous 
activities headquartered at his mother’s boardinghouse. One witness presented 
him as being on such a level of intimacy and trust with Booth as to give his own 
name as reference for Booth. Another, tailor David C. Reed, established Surratt’s 
presence in Washington on the afternoon of assassination. He had taken 
"particular notice of his clothing," he testified, "for it was my business to make
38 Ibid., 135-137.
39 Thomas and Hyman, Stanton. 420.
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clothes." Yet another witness, Joseph M. Dye, claimed that it was Surratt who 
called out the time for the anxious Booth loitering outside Ford’s Theatre on the 
evening of 14 April.40 Sanford Conover, whose testimony had earlier in the trial 
helped to develop the general conspiracy, now established John Surratt as the 
bearer of Lincoln’s death warrant. Conover testified that on 6-7 April 1865 he 
witnessed Surratt delivering dispatches from Richmond to Jacob Thompson, chief 
of Confederate operations in Canada. The incident caused Thompson to remark 
"This makes the thing all right." Conover was sure that this remark was a 
reference to the plot to assassinate United States government officials.41
But its was Louis Weichmann and John Lloyd who again painted the 
darkest details of Surratt’s portrait. Weichmann’s testimony demonstrated the 
depth and breadth of Surratt’s involvement in the conspiracy.42 He sketched the 
menacing and hulking figure of Lewis Paine calling for Surratt several times at the 
Surratt boardinghouse. He recreated an unsettling scene of Surratt and Paine 
"playing with bowie knives" on John’s bed amid an array of other weapons and 
incriminating paraphernalia. He lifted a scene directly from the failed March
40 Pitman, Trial of the Conspirators, testimony of James W. Pumphrey, 
David C. Reed, and Sergeant Joseph M. Dye, 72, 83.
41 Ibid., testimony of Sanford Conover, 28.
42 See Anon., "A Remarkable Lecture," Lincoln Herald. 29, for John 
Surratt’s view on Weichmann’s level of involvement in the conspiracy. He would 
state the Weichmann knew so much because he himself was deeply involved. 
John Surratt would later claim that "[Weichmann] had been told all about it and 
was constantly importuning me to let him become an active member. I refused 
for the simple reason that I told him he could neither ride a horse nor shoot a 
pistol . . .two necessary accomplishments for us."
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abduction plot when Surratt entered the boardinghouse "very much excited" with a 
gun in hand fuming that he would shoot anyone who dared to tiy to gain entrance 
to his room. Seeing only the government’s long arm stretching out for him,
Surratt ranted that his "prospect is gone . . . [his] hopes. . . blighted."43 He 
recalled accompanying Surratt to a Washington hotel where Surratt then made 
living arrangements for Lewis Paine, someone then described to him as "a delicate 
gentleman who was to have his meals sent up to his room." He also recounted an 
evening just prior to the assassination when he, Surratt, Atzerodt, and Herold 
together attended a performance at Ford’s Theatre ostensibly to witness Booth’s 
final stage appearance but in reality to reconnoiter the floor plan for future 
operations there. Finally, Weichmann reconstructed a meeting between Booth,
Dr. Mudd, and Surratt at the National Hotel in Washington during which the 
three of them conducted some mysterious business in the next room. "Booth took 
out an envelope," he explained, "and on the back of it made marks with a pencil.
I should consider it writing, but from the motion of the pencil it was more like 
roads or lines."44 He might as well have said that they were mapping out their 
escape route. Following the testimony of Weichmann, John Lloyd, as he had 
done previously and so effectively with Mrs. Surratt, tightened several loopholes 
through which the defendant might slip.
The case against the conspirators proceeded practically without serious 
challenge until near the end of the trial, when the nearly flawless presentation by
43 Pitman, Trial of the Conspirators, testimony of Louis Weichmann, 118.
44 Ibid., 113-115.
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the prosecution began to show disturbing signs of misjudgment and
mismanagement. During the waning moments of the trial and again within two
years of its conclusion, stories emerged regarding testimony being allegedly
suborned, witnesses perjuring themselves, evidence being manufactured by the
prosecution, and the court creating the illusion that the life of a marginally-
involved woman, Mary Surratt, had been placed in jeopardy in order to force her
fugitive son’s hand.
The first attack was on the allegation of a grand conspiracy choreographed
by the Confederate government. Alleged Confederate insiders Sanford Conover
and James B. Merritt, who had been largely responsible for establishing the
contextual backdrop against which all other conspiratorial events were eventually
held up, were found to be perjurers of the first degree. Originally they had
contacted Holt and Stanton who used both the depth and breadth of their
evidence to strengthen the government’s claim of a broad conspiracy.45 As
witnesses, however, Conover and Merritt could not, in the final analysis, have
been more disappointing to the prosecution. "Their startling claims of high-
ranking Confederate complicity in the assassination," explains one historian, "lost
their impact in the face of their numerous and bold-faced perjuries."46 "It is not
wonderful," summarized an advocate of Mary Surratt,
that the Military Commission, which will live in all history covered with the 
infamy of the murder of Mrs. Surratt, would have received the testimony of
45 William A. Tidwell, April ’65: Confederate Covert Activity in the 
American Civil War. (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1995), 112.
46 Ibid., 113.
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these patent perjurers, Conover . . . and Merritt, but it is amazing that the 
Government should ever, upon their ex parte, uncontradicted statements, 
have based an accusation.47
Then came the allegations of suborned testimony on the part of star 
witness Louis Weichmann. There had already been testimony that Weichmann 
had secessionist leanings, that he had quoted figures to a Confederate blockade 
runner regarding Southern prisoners in camps, and that he had, in fact, "done all 
the he could for the South . . .  as a friend of the South, as a Southern man or a 
secesh sympathizer would."48 Now, word came that Weichmann had also perjured 
himself, and had, in fact, been pressured to do so by agents of the United States 
government who had threatened him with the terrifying specter of death by 
hanging if he did not present their particular version of the facts. Having been 
originally swept up in the government’s efforts to arrest anyone directly or 
indirectly connected with the conspiracy, Weichmann would have been fair game 
for such threats. Now, however, with the execution of the sentence for the
47 W.W. Cleary, "The Attempt to Fasten the Assassination of President 
Lincoln on President Davis and other Innocent Parties," a paper read to the 
Louisville Branch of the Southern Historical Society, n.d., Southern Historical 
Society Papers. Rev. J. William Jones, ed., (Richmond, VA: William Ellis Jones, 
Printer, 1876-1959.), 9:324.
48 Pitman, Trial of the Conspirators. 133. See also Thomas Reed Turner’s 
Beware the People Weeping: Public Opinion and the Assassination of Abraham 
Lincoln (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 161-162 for the 
author’s opinion that Weichmann took a job with the War Department solely to 
pass information onto John Surratt. For a contrasting view on Weichmann’s role 
within the conspiracy, see Otto Eisenschiml, "A ’Study’ of John Surratt?" Journal 
of Illinois State Historical Society. 51 (1958): 183. The author’s opinion: "In truth, 
Weichmann hardly had access to important dispatches for he was a clerk in the 
office of the Commissary General of Prisoners, which contained only the number 
of prisoners on hand which he slipped to Surratt for what they might have been 
worth."
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convicted conspirators imminent, Weichmann, according to one source, 
experienced a serious attack of guilt.
A sixteen count affidavit submitted to President Johnson on 7 July 1867 
detailed Weichmann’s alleged confrontation with his conscience. On that date 
John Brophy, friend of the Surratt family, claimed that Weichmann had made 
disclosures to him regarding his previous testimony and the methods used by the 
agents of the government to gain it. Brophy claimed that Weichmann had told 
him that he had been "threatened with death by Mr. Stanton . . . unless he would 
at once reveal all about the assassination," that "he would rather be hooted at as a 
spy and informer . . . than be tried as a conspirator and have his future hopes 
blasted," and that "he swore to a deliberate falsehood on the witness stand." 
Directly regarding Mary Surratt, Brophy swore that since the trial, Weichmann 
had told him that to his knowledge she herself had no connection with the 
conspiracy and that despite her continual maternal concern and her incessant 
pleading, John Surratt had kept the true nature of his activities from her. 
Summarizing his testimony during the Mary Surratt phase of the trial, Weichmann 
allegedly told Brophy "that he would have presented her in a more favorable light 
had he not been intimidated." Additionally Brophy claimed that Weichmann had 
thought about contradicting Judge Advocate Holt by means of a letter regarding 
these revelations, but that, "he had no confidence in Holt."49 Significantly, this
49 George, "Brophy’s Pamphlet," 20. See Weichmann’s testimony in Pitman, 
120, corroborating Brophy’s claim that Mary Surratt knew little if anything of her 
son’s activities. Weichmann stated that "Surratt once made the remark to [me] 
that if he succeeded in what he called his cotton speculation his countiy would 
love him forever and that his name would go down green to prosperity."
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affidavit, reveals a Brophy expert, had been presented to Mary Surratt’s attorneys
and had then been in the hands of the military commission for two weeks before
the end of the trial, but nothing was done about it.
Mary Surratt’s other chief accuser, John Lloyd, has been held up to a
similarly unflattering light by one writer. Expressing his low regard for the
injustice suffered by the widow Surratt at the hands of the government, he claims
that "[l]ike Weichmann’s, [Lloyd’s] also was the frenzied effort of a terror-stricken
wretch to avoid impending death by pushing forward someone to take his place."50
There is only one other way to evaluate the statements of the witnesses
Weichmann and Lloyd, according to the same writer
The testimony of [Weichmann and Lloyd], suborned as they were alike by 
their terrors and their hopes, perfectly reconcilable with the alternative 
hypothesis, either that the woman in what she did was an innocent dupe of 
the fascinating actor, or that she was unaware of the sudden transformation 
of the long-pending plot to capture, of which she might well have been a 
tacit well-wisher, into an extemporaneous plot to kill.51
What remains, if one subscribes to this theory, is that certain officials of the
government may very well have believed in the innocence of Mary Surratt-or
perhaps in her guilt merely as an accessoryand whether in spite of this or because
of it, had used her as a sacrificial pawn to draw out her fugitive son. Her death
may have been nothing more than an inadvertent conclusion to a chain of events
that had begun with her arrest. Her son’s reluctance to appear before the same
type of proceeding is therefore understandable and may additionally mark the
50 Dewitt, Judicial Murder. 142.
51 Ibid., 142-143.
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genesis of his lengthy sojourn in Europe. Several historians share the belief in 
this scenario. "Mary E. Surratt," states one of them, ". . . suffered the death of 
shame, not for any guilt of her own, but as a vicarious sacrifice for the presumed 
guilt of her fugitive son."52 Mary Surratt was human bait in his opinion. Since the 
government "could not find the son, they held the mother as hostage for him, and 
they clung to the cruel expectation that by putting her to the torture of a trial and 
a sentence, they might force the son from his hiding place."53
Summoning unreliable witnesses such as Weichmann and Lloyd is no 
crime, however. It may be, as it appeared to be in this case, simply a 
manifestation of an unwavering faith in a system that would result in conviction 
regardless of any mismanagement on the part of the government. Manufacturing 
witnesses, on the other hand, is a criminal act. Dewitt claims that Lafayette Baker 
was given that very task during the trial of the conspirators. According to him, 
Baker’s "grand carnival of detectives" were ordered to arrest all suspects and "by 
promising rewards, threats, deceit, force, or any other effectual means, to extort 
confessions and procure testimony to establish the conspiracy whose existence had 
been postulated."54 Baker’s later characterization by the House Judiciary 
Committee appears to render any defense of his integrity useless. "It is doubtful," 
they concluded, "whether he has in any one thing told the truth, even by
52 Ibid., 144. See also Thomas and Hyman, Stanton. 426.
53 Dewitt, Judicial Murder. 16. Found significantly in a chapter entitled "The 
Bureau of Military (In)Justice."
54 Ibid., 7.
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accident."55 Baker’s alleged expediency did nothing to improve the government’s 
already tainted image.
The final, most disparaging, and most unresolved chapter of the trial of the 
conspirators as it concerned the Surratt family details the plea made for Mary 
Surratt’s life following her conviction. When a two thirds vote for Mrs. Surratt’s 
execution was reached, it was only "on condition that five members of the 
commission be permitted to petition President Johnson for a commutation of her 
sentence from death to life imprisonment by reason of her age and sex."56 Judge 
John Bingham drew up the petition, secured the required signatures, and 
presented it to the president. According to Thomas Mealey Harris, a member of 
the commission, the president and the full cabinet "without a dissenting voice" 
upheld the findings of the commission and made no exceptions for Mrs. Surratt.57 
When, on 7 July, Johnson refused to make an exception for the prayer which 
Mary Surratt’s counsel had entered for a writ of habeas corpus, General Winfield 
Scott Hancock, in command of the prisoners, was then directed by Johnson to 
carry out the execution orders already given.58
55 Ibid., 6.
56 Thomas and Hyman, Stanton. 429.
57 Harris, Military Commission. 114.
58 Ibid., 115. Compare this unsympathetic portrait of President Johnson 
toward women with Welles, Diary. 2: 474. In this 4 April 1866 entry Welles 
suggests to the president that Rafael Semmes, Confederate raider of Union 
shipping during the war, should be given unconditional release rather than parole. 
Semmes’s wife apparently had been "annoying [Johnson], crying and taking on for 
her husband." Johnson’s considerations led Welles to remark that the president 
"had a gentle and kind heart, melted by women’s tears."
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Harris’s, interestingly, is the only one of several versions of what happened 
with the petition. Stanton biographers Benjamin P. Thomas and Harold M. 
Hyman claim that during Judge Advocate Holt’s interview with an ailing Johnson 
on 5 July the possibility of clemency was discussed then dismissed by mutual 
agreement. They claim, in addition, that while Holt may have discussed clemency 
with the president, he never showed Johnson the actual clemency petition.59 Holt, 
they maintain, made no reference to the petition in his brief to Johnson or in his 
report to Stanton. Believing that Stanton had nothing to do with this intrigue, 
Thomas and Hyman argue that "the conclusion seems inescapable that Holt, 
determined that the major conspirators should die, willfully concealed the contents 
of the petition from the president."" Exonerating Stanton further, Thomas and 
Hyman believe it unlikely "that the petition could have been omitted from [the] 
published record of the trial without Stanton’s knowledge and consent. And 
complicity in the one (knowledge) implies complicity in the other (consent)."61
William C. Davis’s account of Stanton’s role, in marked contrast to Thomas 
and Hyman’s, does not leave Stanton nearly as unblemished. While not 
addressing Stanton’s specific role in the presentation of the petition to the 
President, Davis claims that Stanton had his own private agenda. According to 
his sources, "[Stanton] swore to secrecy a government prosecutor in the case, John
59 Thomas and Hyman, Stanton. 429-430.
60 Ibid., 430. See also Davis, The Long Surrender. 211 and Dewitt, Judicial 
Murder. 184-186.
61 Thomas and Hyman, Stanton. 432.
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Bingham of Ohio, exacting from him a promise never to divulge his knowledge of 
the backstage maneuvers which had led to the conviction and execution of [Mary 
Surratt]."62
One final unflattering scenario involves the government’s disposition of an
eleventh hour contingency. Conspirator Lewis Paine, on the morning of his
scheduled execution, told General J.F. Hartranft, in charge of the military prison,
that Mrs. Surratt was innocent of any and all complicity in the assassination.
Accordingly, Hartranft sent John Brophy to the White House to make a final
appeal based on Paine’s disclosure, but, in Brophy’s words, "Johnson remained
adamant, took no action, [and] never acknowledged receiving Hartranft’s
communication."63 If Brophy can be believed, Johnson, like Stanton and Holt, was
guilty of decision-making that resulted in Mary Surratt’s execution.
One may now downplay or even entirely dismiss all of the above versions
of the machinations that led to Mary Surratt’s execution as frantic scapegoating,
but in 1865 a stigma of impropriety, if not deceit, was attached to the executive
branch of the United States government. Years later, one writer, moved by what
he perceived as blatant injustice and lost opportunities for clemency, served a
literary indictment of murder to all those who had played major roles in the Mary
Surratt tragedy. He included, in succession
the private soldiers who dragged [Mrs. Surratt] to the scaffold and put the 
rope about her neck, the Major General whose sword gave the signal for
the drop to fall . . .  the nine military officers and the three advocates who
61 Davis, The Lone Surrender. 277.
63 George, "Brophy’s Pamphlet," 17.
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tried and sentenced this woman to death . . .[and] the President of he 
United States, who approved the court, approved its findings, and 
commanded the execution of the sentence.64
Saving the most venomous outpouring for Stanton, Dewitt chastised
the Secretary of War who initiated the iniquitous process, pushed on the 
relentless prosecution, shut his own ears and the ears of the President to 
all pleas for mercy, presided . . . over the scaffold, and kept the key of the 
charnel house, where . . .  the slaughtered lady lay mouldering in her 
shroud.65
With sentiments that strong against certain officers of the American 
government regarding their handling of the Mary Surratt case, it follows that 
those officials involved would want closure to the incident to be engineered as 
quickly as possible in order to begin a healing process. Following the executions 
and following this line of logic, even the gallows at the Capitol Prison was hastily 
disassembled, "as if by some casuistry of the military mind this excising and 
elimination would remove moral stigma and personal involvement."66 Far more 
important to the government and infinitely more difficult for the government than 
the removal of material reminders of their mismanaged military trial, steps had to 
be taken to insure that the memory of the widow Surratt or of her ordeal at the 
hands of the military commission were not resurrected. For John Surratt, who 
had been hiding in Canada for some time now and whose intimate knowledge of
64 Dewitt, Judicial Murder. 135-136.
65 Ibid., 137.
66 Hoehling, Post-Appomattox. 101. The author’s stand on Mrs. Surratt is 
extremely clear. The book, in fact, is dedicated to her: "Her illegal execution by 
the government of the United States endures as a vile blot on the character and 
soul of the nation."
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the conspiracy from an insider’s point of view could easily call into question the 
findings of the 1865 trial, this meant that the government might be willing to 
unofficially arrange for his continued freedom at the price of his continued 
silence. He had, in fact, breached this unofficial gag rule only once when during 
the trial of his conspirators he had attempted to discover the status of his mother. 
Surratt himself would claim that he had indirectly contacted one of her attomeys- 
either Frederick Aiken, John W. Clampitt or Reverdy Johnson--and had been told 
by Johnson to "be under no apprehension as to any serious consequences.
Remain perfectly quiet, as any action on your part would only tend to make 
matters worse. If you can be of any service to us, we will let you know, but keep 
quiet."67 This would seem to explain Surratt’s apparent lack of communication 
with his mother and to absolve young Surratt of any accusations of moral 
deficiency were it not for others who saw different motives for his compliance. 
Louis Weichmann hints at two alternate, but closely related scenarios terminating 
in the same eventual result. He believes that others may have either dissuaded 
Surratt from or even physically deterred him from his mission to rescue his 
mother because the quid pro quo arrangement made with Frederick, one of Mary 
Surratt’s attorneys, Aiken would have required Surratt’s testimony against 
Jefferson Davis-a bargaining chip considered unacceptable to either Surratt or to 
his superiors.68 Lincoln scholar Alfred Isacsson sees the son’s reluctance to clear
67 Anon., "A Remarkable Lecture," 32.
68 Floyd E. Risvold, ed., Louis J. Weichmann: A True History of the 
Assassination of Abraham Lincoln and of the Conspiracy of 1865 (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), 326-327.
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his mother’s name as an indication that John was only concerned with his own 
well-being. "His family training, his schooling, the society he lived in, would have 
demanded a selfless attempt at rescue." John’s inaction, according to Isacsson, 
labelled him as "a coward of the lowest sort."69 Ohio Congressman Albert 
Gallatin Riddle, later asked by Secretary of State Seward to aid in the prosecution 
of John Surratt, recalled this same inertia by John Surratt to the government’s 
offer of an unconditional pardon. Riddle held only contempt for the "wretched 
son whose only response was flight."70
69 Alfred Isacsson, "What Would You Have Done?," a speech given to the 
Lincoln Group, New York City, 24 April 1979. Transcript is in the Surratt Society 
holdings in Clinton, Maryland.
70 Albert Gallatin Riddle, Recollections of War Times: Reminiscences of 
Men and Events in Washington. 1860-1865 (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons,
1895), 340.
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CHAPTER ffl 
THE ODYSSEY OF JOHN SURRATT
On 26 September 1865 George Melly, Justice of the Peace for the borough 
of Liverpool, England, was presented with information that reopened the 
Abraham Lincoln murder case and caused untold consternation in official 
Washington, D.C. On that date, more than five months after the assassination of 
the president and over two months since the execution of the chief conspirators in 
that crime, an informant swore to him that John Harrison Surratt, the sole 
conspirator still at large, had, only the day before, taken refuge within Melly’s 
jurisdiction.1
The bearer of the astounding news, Dr. Lewis McMillan, was the on-board 
surgeon for the steamship Peruvian recently arrived from Montreal. McMillan 
had been enlisted as a traveling companion for the fleeing Surratt by a pair of 
Canadian priests sympathetic to Surratt’s current plight and perhaps to his past 
actions as well.2 They, along with other Confederate operatives had been 
secreting Surratt in Canada since his arrival there following Lincoln’s 
assassination. Introduced to McMillan as Mr. McCarthy, an American who "had 
compromised himself' during the war and who now wished only to flee the
1 Henry Wilding to William H. Seward, 27 September 1865, Congress, 
House, John H. Surratt 39th Cong., 2d sess., 1867, H. R. 9, p. 3. (Hereinafter 
cited as John H. Surratt H.R. 9.)
2 Trial of John H. Surratt in the Criminal Court for the District of 
Columbia. Honorable George P. Fisher presiding. (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1867), testimony of Lewis McMillan, 462, 463, 473.
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country, Surratt had, by the trans-Atlantic voyage’s end, given Dr. McMillan 
audience to an unexpected outpouring of complicity and culpability. It also 
became apparent to McMillan that his companion’s troubles had not been left in 
port. Soon after their departure, Surratt confided to the doctor that he feared he 
was even then being followed. He calmly explained to McMillan while patting his 
revolver that he would resort to drastic measures, if necessary, to insure his 
escape. It eventually became clear to McMillan that McCarthy was far more than 
the mere compromised American he had originally claimed to be. Surratt’s 
careless braggadocio, his naive trust, or his need for unburdening himself led him 
to divulge aspects both trivial and monumental regarding John Wilkes Booth’s 
Washington cabal. This was followed by disclosures concerning Surratt’s own role 
in the Confederate Secret Service, his part in the abortive 1865 plots to abduct 
the president, and his alleged activities in New York prior to, during, and 
immediately after the assassination. Surratt’s eventual revelation of his real name 
probably came as no surprise to McMillan.3
The doctor, no doubt overwhelmed by his new acquaintance’s glib 
revelations, promptly, upon his arrival in Liverpool on 25 September, passed on 
Surratt’s incriminating disclosures along with an extremely detailed physical 
description of Surratt to Justice of the Peace Melly, who, in turn, on 26 
September informed the American Vice-Consul in Liverpool, Henry Wilding, of 
Surratt’s confessions. Though Surratt was not yet in custody, the sense of duty
3 Wilding to Seward, 27 September 1865, John H. Surratt. H. R. 9, p. 3.
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and urgency in Wilding’s subsequent correspondence to Secretary of State William
H. Seward-dated 27 September-is obvious:
. . . [Dr. McMillan] expects a letter or a visit from Surratt in a day or two, 
and has promised to acquaint me with his, Surratt’s, location.
Should there be really anything to [McMillan’s report], and a 
warrant be obtained for Surratt’s apprehension, we should scarcely get him 
delivered up without other evidence than we can obtain here, we should 
have to ask his remand until you could send us the necessary evidence.4
Wilding dutifully sent a copy of the McMillan report to London as well to his
overseas superior, Ambassador Charles Francis Adams. It was Adams perhaps—
because of his proximity to the problem-who was best suited to make any
speculation regarding the possible British response to an American extradition
request.
Adams—along with Seward and Wilding—must have been aware of the 
tenuous dynamics of the unfolding situation. There were at least three variables 
in the equation. First, there was the Irish nationalist movement and its 
detrimental effects on Anglo-American relations. Also known as the Fenian 
movement, it thrived in the heady atmosphere of continued tension between the 
United States and England. Its "campaign of terror" and armed rebellion was, in 
fact, designed to "directly and indirectly . . . provoke an Anglo-American 
rupture."5 Incidents involving demands for political asylum, armed insurrection in 
Canada by Fenians headquartered in the United States, and arrests without 
warrants of Americans in Ireland "suspected to be in sympathy with the Fenian
4 Ibid.
5 Brian Jenkins, Fenians and Anglo-American Relations during 
Reconstruction (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1969), 24.
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movement" strained relations between England and the United States that had not 
yet resumed a state of diplomatic calm since the end of the American Civil War.6
The second and third variables concerned the matter of extradition. 
Specifically, in order for a representative of a foreign government to make a 
demand upon the English government for the surrender of a criminal, the 
petitioner had to be in possession of a charge-specific arrest warrant, have 
documented evidence of the accused person’s criminality, and produce a witness 
capable of identifying the person in question.7 In addition, and most disturbing to 
the Americans, Article X of the 1846 Webster-Ashburton treaty governing 
extradition protocol between the United States and Great Britain held no 
assurance that Surratt’s political offense would be recognized as extraditable and, 
might, in fact, make him eligible for political asylum.8
At the time of Wilding’s dispatch of 27 September to Seward, however, 
Wilding hardly had enough documentation on hand to make a concerted 
application for extradition. Even by 30 September when Wilding had the 
additional knowledge of Surratt’s current whereabouts "at the oratory of the 
Roman Catholic Church of the Holy Cross," a haven for visiting Catholic clergy
6 Martin Duberman, Charles Francis Adams. 1807-1886 (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1961), 326.
7 Thomas H. Dudley to William H. Seward, 6 December 1866, Congress, 
House, John H. Surratt 39th Cong., 2d sess., 1867, H. R. 25, pp. 17-19. 
(Hereinafter cited as John Surratt. H. R. 25).
8 William M. Mallory, ed., Treaties. Conventions. International Acts. 
Protocols, and Agreements between United States of America and Other Powers. 
1776-1907. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1910), 1: 655-656.
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and therefore, he felt, in keeping with Surratt’s acknowledged Catholic 
background, Wilding knew that Surratt was still indeed untouchable. Wilding’s 
closing comment to his follow-up report of 30 September to Secretary of State 
Seward—"I can, of course, do nothing further in the matter without Mr. [Charles 
Francis] Adams’s instructions and a warrant. If it is Surratt, such a wretch ought 
not to escape"-not only epitomizes his sense of mission, but also reiterates his 
perception of the need for expeditious response.9
While waiting for a directive from the home office, Wilding sent one final 
dispatch to Seward on 10 October. He reported that he had just received 
instructions from Mr. Adams in London cautioning him that he "did not consider 
it advisable, with our present evidence of identity and complicity, to apply for a 
warrant for the arrest of the supposed Surratt." As a postscript and perhaps as a 
reminder to Seward of the alleged volatile, unrepentant, and dangerous nature of 
the suspect, Wilding now included a threat allegedly made by Surratt and not 
mentioned in Wilding’s previous correspondence stating that it was Surratt’s desire 
"that he would live long enough to give a good account to Mr. [Andrew] 
Johnson."10 Due in no small part to the often painfully slow intercontinental 
communication system then in use and despite Wilding’s prompt efforts, he was 
now forced to adopt a prolonged attitude of anxious hand-sitting while he waited 
for directives from the home office.
Acting Secretary of State William Hunter, in the absence of both William
9 Wilding to Seward, 30 September 1865, John H. Surratt. H. R. 9, p. 4.
10 Wilding to Seward, 10 October 1865, John H. Surratt. H. R. 9, p. 4.
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Wilding with written instructions. His name clearly appeared on the 13 October 
dispatch sent to Wilding instructing him that "upon a consultation with the 
Secretary of War [Edwin M. Stanton] and the Judge Advocate General [Joseph 
Holt], it is thought advisable that no action be taken in regard to the arrest of the 
supposed John Surratt at present."11 Unfortunately for Hunter, when questioned 
by the 1867 House Judiciary Committee investigating the initial handling of the 
Surratt case, he could only recall receiving Stanton’s and Holt’s "oral opinion[s]" 
regarding the disposition of Surratt, and, those, only indirectly from a 
departmental messenger. He could not produce any written documentation on 
the matter. Neither could he deny, when attempting to justify his department’s 
actions by citing unsuccessful precedents by the United States government to 
extradite criminals from English territory, that the assassination of the President 
of the United States was, in fact, a different and far more serious matter than the 
extradition of the pirates that he had offered in evidence. His final attempt to 
dodge ultimate culpability took the same form as the tactic later employed by 
several of his fellow executive branch officials-denying that he had the authority 
to act in such situations. Specifically, Hunter stated to the Judiciary Committee 
that "all the law questions relating to these matters were canvassed at the Bureau 
of Military Justice (Holt’s bailiwick) and the State Department considered itself
11 William Hunter to Wilding, 13 October 1865, John H. Surratt. H. R. 9, p.
5.
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governed by what might be decided on there."12 Holt (and Stanton as well), 
however, seemed exonerated by Hunter’s own lack of documentation and the 
State Department took all the blame for this first encounter with the fugitive 
Surratt. As the lowest ranking official to explain the subsequent disposition of the 
Wilding reports to the House Judiciary Committee, Acting Secretary Hunter may 
have been the duly-assigned scapegoat.
The State Department, it would appear by this as well as by its subsequent 
action, was totally prepared for an expediency such as the McMillan testimony 
and had quite specific exigency plans in hand. As the dust began to settle from 
this first skirmish with its eager overseas operatives, another diplomatic quandary, 
a pair of communiques from John F. Potter, Consul-General in Montreal, dated 
25 and 27 October, gave the State Department yet another ball to juggle and 
another paper trail to cover. The first dispatch called attention to the fact that 
State Department officials in Montreal had known of Surratt’s departure for 
Europe "some time in September," knew that Surratt was awaiting funds "from 
parties in this city by the hand of McMillan of whom Surratt made a confidante in 
Liverpool," and that Surratt intended at some point to go to Rome.13 Here again 
was information that, if properly and expeditiously acted upon, might result in 
Surratt’s timely apprehension.
Potter’s second dispatch of two days later, largely reiterative of the facts 
first disclosed in Wilding’s earlier correspondence, included the specifics of a
12 Ibid.
13 John F. Potter to Seward, 25 October 1865, John H. Surratt. H. R. 9, p. 5.
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meeting Potter had just completed with McMillan in Quebec, a meeting arranged 
for by Potter when no response was immediately forthcoming from Seward. 
McMillan told Potter about his introduction to Surratt prior to the Peruvian's 
departure "by a person with whom he was acquainted"; he listed and in some 
cases named the persons who secreted Surratt in Canada; and he detailed 
Surratt’s amateurish attempt to disguise his appearance with hair dye, facial stain, 
and eyeglasses. In addition and apparently without fear of recrimination, 
McMillan identified himself as the bearer of funds to Surratt in England from an 
unnamed source in Washington, D.C. The Andrew Johnson threat mentioned 
somewhat incompletely in Wilding’s 10 October dispatch was now chillingly 
expanded to suggest th a t". . . [Surratt] only desired to live two years longer, in 
which time he would serve President Johnson as Booth did Mr. Lincoln. . . ." 
Closing, Potter could not disguise his excitement and concern that an opportunity 
was offering itself for the American government to send an officer to Liverpool 
on the same ship with McMillan to secure Surratt’s arrest and forestall his 
expressed intention to flee to Rome.14
Frederick W. Seward, Assistant Secretary of State, received the first of 
Potter’s dispatches on 26 October and assured Potter rather succinctly and 
belatedly on II November that the matter "[had] been properly availed of."15 To 
the senior Seward’s credit, an indictment was requested on 13 November of James
14 Potter to Seward, 27 October 1865, John H. Surratt. H. R. 9, p. 5-6.
15 Frederick W. Seward to Potter, 11 November 1865, John H. Surratt. H. R. 
9, p. 6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
45
Speed, the Attorney General of the United States, in response to the Potter 
report. Subsequent irregularities by Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton,
Secretary of State Seward, and Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt, however, far 
outweigh this one very regular procedure.
Stanton, in a side-stepping disclosure to the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, did not deny having information concerning Surratt’s supposed 
whereabouts or deny employing persons to establish his whereabouts outside the 
United States, but asserted that any arrest made in a foreign country-as Surratt’s 
would certainly be--was clearly outside the jurisdiction of his War Department. In 
tangential matters, he also claimed that his controversial November 1865 
revocation of the 20 April 1865 reward for Surratt’s (and others’) arrest was 
justified for three reasons: one, the lack of any recent response to the reward 
offer; two, the assumption that any remaining fugitives must surely be out of the 
country where their arrest would be made at the hands of officials of the 
American government who "ought not to have any pretense of claiming the 
reward"; and, three, dropping the reward offer might serve as a ruse to entice 
Surratt into the open by creating a false sense of security to which he might fall 
prey.16 None of these assertions bears the telling, however, when held up to the 
fact that the reward had been dropped after both the Wilding and Potter reports 
had been duly received by the State Department.
Seward, under questioning by the same committee, admitted that
16 Edwin M. Stanton testimony to Committee on the Judiciary, 10 January 
1867, Congress, House, John H. Surratt. 39th Cong., 2d sess., 1969, H. R. 33, p. 3. 
(Hereinafter cited as John H. Surratt. H. R. 33.)
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significant documents regarding Surratt’s case had been temporarily misplaced and 
that despite Potter’s specific request and the reassuring note to Potter that his 
disclosures "had been availed of," no agent was ever sent to Liverpool because, as 
Steward explained, "a pursuit might reveal itself without the end sought being 
obtained."17 Seward seemed comfortable knowing where Surratt was but rather 
uncomfortable doing anything about it.
Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt, defending his rather peculiar actions 
to the same Judiciary Committee, claimed that contrary to the testimony of Acting 
Secretary of State William Hunter, no consultation regarding the securing an 
indictment against Surratt had ever been discussed in his presence. He further 
asserted that despite being made aware, by Hunter, of Justice of the Peace Melly’s 
disclosure regarding Surratt, he was not aware that any official action on his part 
was being sought. Finally, without dropping any names, Holt purported that it 
was a generally held opinion among federal officials that "if any formal demand 
had been made upon the English government for Surratt, that government would 
have followed its precedents-treated the assassination of the President as a 
political offense, and would have refused to deliver him up."18 Holt was definitely 
not going to let the blame come to rest in his lap. He made it clear that his 
advice was there for the asking, but added the disclaimer that he "did not regard 
it as at all within the scope of my official authority either to urge the demand for
17 Senate testimony to Committee on the Judiciary, 10 January 1867, John 
H. Surratt. H. R. 33, p. 6.
18 Ibid., Holt testimony to Committee on the Judiciary, 10 January 1867, p.
10.
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Surratt or not to urge i t . . .  . I supposed [that power] belonged to another 
department of the government."19
With the testimony of Stanton, Seward, Holt, and Hunter, the matter of 
blame had gone full circle and—not surprisingly-no substantive action had ever 
been taken. No officer of the United States government was ever sent to 
Liverpool to arrest Surratt; no detective of the United States government was ever 
sent to Liverpool to determine his movements, and, most damning to those 
implicated, no notification of Surratt’s intention to go to Rome was ever sent to 
the American minister there.20
On the other side of the Atlantic and unaware of the maneuvering caused 
by his initial dispatch, one can only imagine Wilding’s disappointment as he read 
Hunter’s stifling directive and felt Surratt-along with some degree of international 
notoriety for himself-slip through his grasp. Judging from the above 
inconsistencies, it is no wonder that Surratt admitted to have gotten the 
impression-if not the actual w ord-that the American authorities "did not want 
me in the United States." They were, he continued, "willing and anxious for me 
to remain abroad, and hoped I would continue to do so."21 He cites the impunity 
with which he played his cat-and-mouse game with the American consuls in 
London, Liverpool, and Birmingham as evidence of the American government’s
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., report by F. E. Woodbridge, Committee on the Judiciary, 2 March 
1867, pp. 1-2.
21 Risvold, Weichmann. 221.
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desire to let him fall through any convenient or available diplomatic cracks.22
In any estimation, the response of the State Department to the knowledge 
not only of John Surratt’s whereabouts in Great Britain but also of his intentions 
while there appear to be extremely tentative, perhaps lackadaisical, even 
bewildered. It may be argued using the same evidence, however, that these 
actions were an attempt to keep John Surratt at bay until the problem somehow 
took care of itself. While later exonerated (in March 1867) by the House 
Committee on the Judiciary of any "improper motives" in its response, the State 
Department nevertheless was stigmatized by the Judiciary committee’s assertion 
that during this period of first contact with the accused, "due diligence in the 
arrest of John H. Surratt was not exercised by the executive department of the 
government."23 Whether one sees these early actions by the State Department as 
careless and inadvertent lapses in protocol, as uncharacteristic reluctance and 
defeatism, or as carefully choreographed obstruction, the result was the sam e- 
aiding and abetting Surratt’s ability to remain at large.
Surratt, meanwhile, on 12 October, now travelling as John Watson of 
Edinburgh, applied for a passport "over the signature of a banking institution in 
London . . . [which] included some of the most notorious rebel sympathizers in 
England."24 Issued a passport the following day in preparation for his sojourn to
22 Ibid., 446.
23 John H. Surratt, H. R. 33, report of Woodbridge of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, 2 March 1867, p. 2.
24 Report of George H. Sharpe to the Committee on the Judiciary, 19 
December 1867, Congress, House, Assassination of President Lincoln. 40th Cong.,
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the Papal States, Surratt thereafter sailed to Paris where the "nuncio’s vise [sic] 
[was] given gratis."25 The granting of this favor, considered out of the ordinary by 
State Department investigators scouring the continent in 1866 for evidence of 
European complicity, was apparently a deliberate circumvention by the nuncio 
who was so flattered by Surratt’s plans to enter the Papal Guard that he 
sidestepped standard operating procedure. So it was that Surratt, relying again on 
the auspices of the Catholic Church, fell from sight, this time for a period of over 
six months. One cannot, as one historian suggests, discount the role of the State 
Department in this disappearance. Following what one historian described as 
"two months of meaningless correspondence with its representative in England," 
he claims that "the State Department permitted Surratt to lose himself on the 
continent."26
Surratt’s resurfacing months later was every bit as sudden and as 
unexpected as his first appearance. Again the home office of the State 
Department suffered chastisement for its irregularities while again the prompt 
behavior of its consuls appeared above reproach. What clearly marks this second 
phase of Surratt’s flight is its touch of burlesque tragicomedy, its undercurrent of 
irony and its overwhelming oxymoronic sense of choreographed error.
General Rufus King, former Civil War field commander and, subsequently,
2d sess., 1867, H. R. 68, p. 2. (Hereinafter cited as Assassination. H. R. 68).
25 Ibid.
26 William Hanchett, The Lincoln Murder Conspiracies (Urbana and 
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 76-77.
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United States Minister to Rome, eam ed-quite serendipitously-the laurels for 
reestablishing Surratt’s whereabouts. On 21 April 1866 Henri Beaumont de Ste. 
Marie, a private in the third company of the Papal Guard, attested to King that 
his erstwhile college friend from Maryland, John Harrison Surratt (alias John 
Watson), had recently joined his zouave company stationed at Sezze near Rome. 
King’s prompt report to William H. Seward of 23 April was alarming in its 
revelation and uncanny in its resemblance to both the content and tone of 
Wilding’s initial communique to Seward seven months before. Surratt, according 
to Ste. Marie, unburdened himself to him, and—as he had done with McMillan- 
acknowledged his participation in the Lincoln conspiracy. If one may judge the 
additional details that Surratt revealed to Ste. Marie as an assessment of Surratt’s 
level of trust and intimacy with Ste. Marie, then theirs must have been a strong 
friendship indeed. Never mentioned in the discussions with McMillan concerning 
the Lincoln assassination, these conversations introduced a trail of ultimate 
responsibility leading to Confederate President Jefferson Davis and revealed the 
existence of anonymous financial backers for Surratt. King, whether overcome by 
his own patriotic duty or with Ste. Marie’s earnestness, "could not," in his own 
words, "very well doubt the truth of what he told me."27 A customary request for 
instructions closed King’s startling report.
27 Rufus King to Seward, 23 April 1866, U. S. Department of State, Papers 
Relation to the Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1861-1866), 2: 129. (Hereinafter cited as FRUS with 
year and volume number.) Note: Many of the following dispatches may also be 
found in Leo Stock, ed., United States Ministers to the Papal States: Instructions 
and Dispatches 1848-1868. 2 vols. (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University Press, 
1933) and in H. R. 9 and H. R. 25 already cited.
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By 11 May, six days before King’s first dispatch was placed on William H. 
Seward’s desk, King was filing a second one, this one complete with two 
enclosures in Ste. Marie’s hand. At once urgent, melodramatic, even maudlin, 
these enclosures nevertheless demanded the State Department’s immediate 
attention. Ste. Marie advised the utmost speed, lest his zouave company be moved 
into the mountains as was then rumored; he cautioned against corroborative 
overkill ("It is lost time to acquire further proofs."); and, he cleverly tempered 
what might have been construed as a touch of blackmail on his part—a request for 
sufficient funds to purchase his release from Papal service-with just enough 
foreboding concerning his now jeopardized position among the members of his 
company to soften the conscience and loosen the purse strings of the most 
dubious or frugal State Department official.28 Ste. Marie’s second note, dated 7 
May, while nearly devoid of substance regarding Surratt’s status, is, nevertheless, 
significant as a case study of the author’s character. Who but what one historian 
has labeled "a Canadian reward seeker"29 would, at this late date, offer an 
unabashedly belated note of condolence to the memory of President Lincoln?30 
Similarly, who but someone with an ulterior motive would close his brief letter 
with "I long to revisit my native land and the grey hair of my father and mother, 
and wish to make of the United States my last and permanent home."31 Ste.
28 King to Seward, 11 May 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2: 129.
29 Hanchett, The Lincoln Murder Conspiracies. 86.
30 Henri Beaumont de Ste. Marie to Rufus King, 7 May 1866, FRUS. 1866,
2: 130.
31 Ibid.
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Marie, disguising his intentions with glaringly trite sentimentality and exaggerating 
the uncertainty of his personal safety with cloak-and-dagger innuendo, was no 
one’s fool.
The State Department-fortunately for Surratt—again appeared to have 
made contingency plans for his possible reappearance. For a few days following 
17 May when Assistant Secretary of State Frederick W. Seward was first apprised 
of the situation via the receipt of the King dispatch of 23 April, little more 
substantive activity took place than the exchange of interdepartmental 
correspondence among Seward, Stanton, and Judge Advocate Holt concerning 
Surratt’s reemergence, and the making of minor corrections in the names of the 
developing situation’s principals. Oddly enough, it was Ste. Marie’s identity rather 
than his credibility that was seriously questioned. Holt, most significantly and 
most succinctly, thought that if the informant’s identity could once be established, 
"that it can be shown here that he is a man of choice and entitled to credit in his 
statements."32 To that end, communiques up to and including those of 24 May 
provided King—via Holt, Stanton, and Seward—with Ste. Marie’s physical and 
biographical details and demanded, in turn, of Ste. Marie that he practically fill 
out an application for the role of informant, listing full name, former places of 
residence, and a list of references.33 Government priorities thus placed the 
establishment of Ste. Marie’s identity over the establishment of his credibility.
32 Judge Advocate Joseph Holt to Stanton, 19 May 1866, John H. Surratt. H. 
R. 9, p. 10.
33 Holt to Seward, 22 May 1866, John H. Surratt. H. R. 9, p. 10.
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Bureaucracy was, indeed, at times, the fleeing Surratt’s most dependable 
accomplice.
It was not until a 28 May dispatch from William Seward to Stanton that
any documented reference was made to the intricacies of and potential problems
with securing Surratt’s return to the United States for trial. Seward, in the best
fashion of brash nineteenth century American diplomacy, explained that
as we have no treaty of extradition with the Papal government, it is 
proposed that a special agent be sent to Rome to demand the surrender of 
Surratt, should he be fully identified as the individual referred to by Ste. 
Marie, of which there would seem to be little doubt.34
In one strategic, albeit tactless, move, it seemed, Seward planned to quickly close
the door on the nagging Surratt situation. As a counterpoint to this very
aggressive action, Seward, on 25 May, again fell prey to his paranoia concerning
Surratt and officially denied any knowledge of Surratt’s activities to Chairman
James F. Wilson of the House Judiciary Committee that was then rooting out
information that might "implicate any person other than those already tried, in
complicity with the assassination."35 Seward rationalized that to publicize blithely
the State Department’s investigation "might tend to defeat our wish to arrest
Surratt for the purpose of bringing him to this country to be tried."36 The above
efforts delineate, unfortunately, the high water mark in the efficient
34 Seward to Stanton, 28 May 1866, John H. Surratt. H. R. 9, p. 12.
35 Seward to James F. Wilson, 25 May 1866, John H. Surratt. H. R. 9, p. 11. 
In a confidential note to Wilson of the same date (p. 11). Seward in fact 
acknowledged that his office was in possession of papers relevant to Surratt.
36 Ibid.
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implementation of Seward’s executive powers. Hereafter, as during the Liverpool 
scenario, the State Department’s activities became bogged down in paper-shuffling 
and the idiosyncrasies of transatlantic communication in the mid-nineteenth 
century.
The months of June and July 1866 were characterized by lost or
misdirected dispatches from Seward to King which temporarily left the latter in
the dark as to the State Department’s intentions, and by continued and
increasingly stringent demands from Judge Advocate Holt to identify satisfactorily
Ste. Marie. King’s replies to Seward of 19 and 23 June leave no doubt of his
confidence in Ste. Marie’s identity or in his testimony:
Ste. Marie answers exactly to the description given of him in Judge Holt’s 
letter, and is no doubt the same person . . .  I requested him to describe 
Surratt to me, which he did; and it corresponded exactly with the 
description of the witness [Louis] Weichmann at the trial of the 
conspirators.37
Ste. Marie, unwillingly to await passively his fate at the hands of the State 
Department, was simultaneously clarifying his testimony, increasing his perceived 
value as a witness, and bargaining for his release to a civilian life free from the 
present threat of reprisals from what King dubbed "[Surratt’s] wild zouave 
comrades."38 The details of Ste. Marie’s 21 June letter to King-the contents of 
which were then passed along to Seward--seem to satisfy all the particulars 
regarding personal history initially required of him by the State Department. In 
addition, and perhaps genuinely interested in seeing Surratt brought to justice or
37 King to Seward, 19 June 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2: 133.
38 King to Seward, 14 July 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2: 136.
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in seeing no more time wasted in verifying his identity, Ste. Marie made yet 
another series of disclosures regarding Surratt. He disclosed matters concerning 
his former acquaintance with both Surratt and Weichmann while he was teaching 
in Maryland. He included his self-deprecating appraisal of himself as a soldier.
He further indicted Surratt, labelling him "the instigator of the murder . . . [who] 
acted in the instructions and orders of persons he did not name, but some of 
whom are in New York, and others in London." Finally and without any tact 
whatsoever, he reminded King~and indirectly Seward-of his previous 
unappreciated and perhaps ignored 1865 deposition that he had made to Potter 
concerning the Surratt-Weichmann connection.39 Even a self-disclosure by Ste. 
Marie that during the American Civil War he had had prior experience as an 
informer, having turned on his fellow prisoners at Castle Thunder in Richmond, 
and th a t". . . as a result of my services got my liberty," did not deter King from 
trusting in the usefulness and the dependability of Ste. Marie’s testimony.40 One 
wonders if even King, who seems otherwise above reproach, saw in the emerging 
Surratt situation a chance for recognition if not promotion and let this very real 
possibility bias his judgment of his prize informant.
Ste. Marie’s 10 July affidavit, enclosed in King’s 14 July report to Seward 
reveals considerable evidence of still further discussion with Surratt. Ste. Marie 
had, in fact, felt as though he had pushed his inquisitiveness with Surratt to the
39 King to Seward, 19 June 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2:133. This deposition 
contained Ste. Marie’s suspicion that both Weichmann and Surratt were involved 
in treasonous activities.
40 Ste. Marie to King, 21 June 1866, John H. Surratt. H. R. 9, p. 13.
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limit. "More I could not learn," he closed his sworn statement to Seward, "being 
afraid to awaken his suspicions."41 He had now elicited from Surratt information 
disclosing certain particulars of the assassination and the logistics of his own 
escape to Europe. He also made disclosures that would, upon the War 
Department’s viewing of them, rekindle the idea of a murder conspiracy 
engineered by the Confederate hierarchy, a pet theory of Secretary of War 
Stanton, who was unflatteringly described later as someone who "saw, heard, felt, 
and cherished every thing that favored [a Confederate conspiracy] . . . [and] . . . 
would see nothing, would hear nothing, and hated every thing, that in the slightest 
degree mitigated against it."42 Ste. Marie now revealed that Surratt was "protected 
by the clergy, and that the murder [was] the result of a deep-laid plot, not only 
against the life of President Lincoln, but against the existence of the republic, as 
we are aware that priesthood and royalty are and always have been opposed to 
liberty."43
Even Surratt’s alleged poignant and vengeful exclamation to Ste. Marie 
"Damn the Yankees; they have killed my mother, but I have done them as much 
harm as I could, we have killed Lincoln, the nigger’s [sic] friend" was, in itself 
worth the small price that Ste. Marie demanded for it.44 He still, at this point, 
was prepared to testify in person in Washington, explained King, "only asking to
41 King to Seward, 14 July 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2: 136.
42 DeWitt, Judicial Murder. 6.
43 King to Seward, 14 July 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2:136. (Enclosure by Ste.
Marie of 10 July).
44 Ibid.
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have his expenses paid and some compensation made for his time and trouble."45 
King, always willing to plead for Ste. Marie’s cause, argued in a 14 July private 
memo to Seward that "it would be neither difficult nor expensive to procure his 
discharge from the zouaves, [and] ship him . . .  to New York, always providing 
that his presence and evidence are wanted in Washington."46 It is not apparent 
from the above comment whether at this point King suspected a possible 
alternative State Department agenda regarding the disposition of Ste. Marie and 
Surratt. If King required further evidence to substantiate his suspicions, however, 
it would not be long forthcoming.
Using the State Department’s response to the collective Ste. Marie 
disclosures as a barometer, perhaps the most significant revelations that Surratt 
had made to Ste. Marie were, one, that Louis Weichmann—lodger at the Surratt 
boardinghouse, erstwhile suspect in the conspiracy, and eventual star witness of 
the trial of the conspirators—had, while in the employ of the War Department, 
transmitted information to the Confederate government in Richmond, and two, 
that Surratt was in New York-not Washington, D .C .-on the day of the Lincoln 
assassination. As Helen Jones Campbell summarizes this complication in 
Confederate Courier:
The last thing [the War Department] wanted now was evidence that
Weichmann, who would of course be the government’s star witness against
45 King to Seward, 14 July 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2: 136. See Congress, House, 
H. B. Sainte-Marie 40th Cong., 2d. sess., 1867, H. R. 36, pp. 2-4 for Ste. Marie’s 
11 October 1867 application for a portion of the original reward. He eventually 
received $15,000 for his efforts.
46 King to Seward, 14 July 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2: 136.
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Surratt, . . . had participated in [Surratt’s] missions to the south. Certainly 
it did not want a statement that [Surratt] had been ’in New York . . . 
prepared to fly as soon as the deed was done.’ The government needed 
him at the scene of the crime.47
These final disclosures and a thorough understanding of their ramifications 
must have prompted the State Department, in conjunction with the War 
Department, to keep Surratt at bay. His arrest and extradition-and the testimony 
certain to result from his trial—would call into question the source of the 
allegations which sent Mary Surratt to her death, would damage beyond repair the 
veracity of a key person slated to again assume the role of witness for the 
prosecution, and would physically place Surratt at such a distance from the scene 
of the crime that no murder indictment could reach him.
For Rufus King, August ushered in an unexpected diplomatic coup.
Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli, the Vatican Secretary of State, in an interview with 
King on 8 August, intimated that "if the American government desired the 
surrender of the criminal [Surratt] there would probably be no difficulty in the 
way."48 He further intimated that Ste. Marie would be granted his discharge in 
order that he might serve as a witness in the eventual trial. King must have
47 Helen Jones Campbell, Confederate Courier (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1964), 127.
48 King to Seward, 8 August 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2:139. See Welles, Diarv. 2: 
638, for an 11 December 1866 cabinet level debate considering both the 
advisability and the feasibility of granting the Pope asylum in the United States if 
the war with the Garibaldini worsened. Whether Surratt’s extradition was 
regarded by the Pope as the initial phase of a quid pro quo exchange is, however, 
not clear. See also S. William Halperin, Italy and the Vatican at War (New York: 
Greenwood Press Publishers, 1868), xi-xiii for an overview of the diplomatic 
efforts by the Papacy to maintain the integrity of its crumbling empire during the 
period of Italian unification.
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revelled in the thought of both criminal and informant bound for America due to 
his diligence and with few if any major complications. Ste. Marie, perhaps with a 
more realistic assessment of the present situation and its future implications, felt 
moved to remark to one of King’s aides that "too little notice has been taken of 
[my] statements about Surratt."49 When held up to the light of the next two 
months’ behavior by the State Department this comment seems remarkably 
understated. Ste. Marie, like King before him, may have begun to sense that it 
was not in spite of his revelations but because of them that the American State 
Department officials seemed governed by inertia.
It would be convenient to explain the communications lapse dating from 
King’s encouraging memoranda of 8 August to Seward’s tardy replay on 16 
October with a discourse on the limitations of contemporaneous transoceanic 
communication, but that would not account for the entire 57 day doldrum that 
actually occurred. Indeed, during the 1867 House Committee on the Judiciary 
investigation previously cited, several embarrassing irregularities came to the 
surface regarding this belated response. First and foremost was Seward’s absence 
from Washington. Not only was his participation in a month long trip "for the 
west" beginning on 28 August considered untimely in and of itself, but it was done 
with full knowledge of the Antonelli agenda that had been received and routinely 
forwarded to Stanton by Seward the day before he departed.50 Seward later
49 King to Seward, 23 September 1866, John H. Surratt. H. R. 33, p. 8.
50 Seward testimony to Committee on the Judiciary, 21 January 1867, John 
H. Surratt. H. R. 33, p. 7. For more on the reluctance, suspicion, and negativity 
regarding the politically-motivated "Swing Around the Circle," see Welles, Diary.
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denied having ever seen the Antonelli proposal of 8 August before leaving
Washington as the "master of arrangements" for President Johnson’s "Swing
Around the Circle" whistle-stop tour aimed at drumming up Western support for
Johnson’s Reconstruction plan.51 In addition, he stated that as a matter of routine
and efficient protocol
whenever I left the department, it was always with instructions to whatever 
person I left in charge behind me to follow up the investigation about 
Surratt, and to confer, whenever information was received, with the 
Secretary of War or the Attorney General, as the case might be; therefore 
nothing could have been left undone that ought to have been done in 
relation to it.52
Contrasting Seward’s flattering self-portrait of departmental protocol, 
Second Assistant Secretary William Hunter would testify to the committee that he 
had been given "no special orders" by the departing Seward "to give attention to 
the matter of the arrest of Surratt."53 He further asserted that despite the offer by 
Cardinal Antonelli to surrender Surratt unconditionally, it was the general 
impression in the State Department that "[the State Department] was in doubt as 
to whether they would make the application [for extradition] at all, as it might 
form an inconvenient precedent" to which the United States would-in a gesture of
2: 587, Glyndon Van Deusen, William Henry Seward (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1967), 460 and John M. Taylor William Henry Seward: Lincoln’s 
Right Hand (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), 264-265.
51 Seward testimony to Committee on the Judiciary, 21 January 1867, John 
H. Surratt. H. R. 33, p. 7.
52 Ibid.
53 Hunter testimony to Committee on the Judiciary, 4-5 February 1867, John 
H. Surratt. H. R. 33, pp. 10-11.
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reciprocity at some future point in time—have to adhere.54
As a final revelation of departmental expedience and selective memory, 
Seward, in his testimony, could not recall whether or not he had relayed the 
Wilding and Potter papers to President Johnson. He deemed them "matters of 
routine, not requiring special direction" and explained that if they had been 
important enough they would have been brought up "if a convenient opportunity 
offered, [for instance] in a cabinet meeting."55 Clearly, questions regarding 
ultimate accountability and lack of initiative were paramount to the Judiciary 
Committee. Paramount to General King, by comparison, was the nearly two 
month period during which the State Department went incommunicado and how 
the resultant loss of direction affected his ongoing diplomacy with the Papal 
States.
Ste. Marie, meanwhile, it would seem, was beside himself with feelings of 
unimportance and frustration. In a 12 September note to J. C. Hooker, Acting 
Secretary of the Legation at Rome, he again provided evidence of further 
disclosures by Surratt this time pinpointing the source of the assassination plot 
within the Confederate high command. As Ste. Marie remembered the 
conversation, Surratt had told him that "the matter was debated in the rebel 
Cabinet and [Booth and Surratt] were told to act as they thought the best to 
accomplish their design and money was furnished them." Surratt now admitted
54 Ibid.
55 Seward testimony to Committee on the Judiciary, 21 January 1867, John 
H. Surratt. H. R. 33, p. 7.
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that he had been, in fact, "in Washington till all was prepared for the deed," then
fled to Canada via New York. Nor was Surratt planning to stay long in the
service of the Pope according to Ste. Marie. Two more months and he would be
off for the East Indies and eventually return to the United States "in disguise in
three or four more years."56 His revelations finished, Ste. Marie completed his
last paragraph with undisguised disgust, indignation and impatience.
You may make use if you think proper of this statement of [Surratt’s], 
although it appears the Washington Cabinet seems very indifferent on this 
important matter. I shall remain here in Velletri till I get from you or 
General King a decided answer that the whole affair is drop[p]ed to 
nothing, strange as it may appear I know some papers in New York and 
Philadelphia who if the[y] were in possession of this information would 
force the government to act upon it in justice to the memory to President] 
Lincoln.57
Seward, by 10 October, seems to have regained a firm grip on the situation. 
Whether as a result of the recuperative effects of a month of rest and relaxation 
following his bout with the cholera he had contracted while accompanying 
President Johnson on his tour of the west, or of an intense analysis and 
reevaluation of the developing crisis, or of a sudden awareness of the possibility of 
a Ste. Marie leak to the press (or a combination of the three), Seward was now 
prepared to take control. His confidential communique to King of that date was 
explicit, authoritative, and wide-ranging. He thought it critical that King address 
the following: first, employ a confidential person other than Ste. Marie to 
"ascertain by comparison with the photograph herewith sent, whether the person
56 Ste. Marie to J. C. Hooker, 12 September 1866, Stock, Papal States. 382.
57 Ibid.
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indicated by Ste. Marie is really John Surratt"; second, pay Ste. Marie "in 
consideration of the information he has already communicated on the subject"; 
third, determine whether the cardinal’s offer "to deliver John H. Surratt upon an 
authentic indictment, and at the request of this department" was still in effect or, 
that failing, whether the Pope would enter into an extradition treaty with the 
United States; and fourth, secure a guarantee that "neither Ste. Marie nor Surratt 
be discharged from the guards until we shall have had time to communicate 
concerning them after receiving a prompt reply to this communication from you." 
Ste. Marie was, in addition, to be informed confidentially that his appeal for 
relocation to Canada to be with his mother was "under consideration" by the State 
Department.58
Seward closed this dispatch with a postscript explaining that the 
photograph of Surratt mentioned in his first instruction would not be sent until 
the next mailing. At first glance the delay seems a minor setback and, one which 
Seward seemed eager to quickly resolve, but in light of the events of the next 
month, this omission had far-reaching ramifications and again adds to the 
emerging picture of obstruction and private agendas.
King, upon receiving the above dispatch, promptly set about to carry out its 
specifications. Within a day or two, King had spoken with Cardinal Antonelli who 
asserted that Surratt would be delivered to King upon the presentation of proper 
documentation. The cardinal’s anxiety in making this decision, stemming entirely 
from the Papal government’s stand against capital punishment, was held in check,
58 Seward to King, 16 October 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2:129-140.
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sensed King, largely because of the heinous nature of the crime of which Surratt 
was accused and because the cardinal felt—as the State Department had in fact 
earlier concluded-that "under parallel circumstances [the United States] would do 
as they desired to be done by."59 King also secured a promise from Antonelli that 
he would have the Papal minister of war take under his advisement the request 
that Surratt and Ste. Marie not be discharged pending further communication 
from Washington. As to the other two directives, King informed Seward that he 
would see to it that Ste. Marie was paid for his past efforts and that, in addition, 
he would like to "hold out to him the hope of some further remuneration, should 
Surratt be identified and surrendered."60 Tragically, King’s final directive, the 
identification of Surratt, would have to be deferred until a later date. The 
photograph promised by Seward in his 16 October dispatch would not arrive until 
12 November.
King’s private correspondence of 3 November to Seward demonstrated 
King’s eye for detail, his foresight, his empathy for Ste. Marie, and his confidence 
that all was proceeding as planned. Regarding Surratt’s fate, he mused:
How is he to be sent to America? Cannot one of our ships of war 
now in the Mediterranean be directed to come to Civita Vecchia, receive 
Surratt and Ste. Marie on board, and convey them to the United States? 
Would it not be well to ask also for Ste. Marie’s discharge . . .? Am I to 
draw directly on the department, or on Baring Brothers for the sum paid 
St. [sic] Marie and the expense of sending a person to identify Surratt?61
59 King to Seward, 2 November 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2:140-141.
60 Ibid.
61 King to Seward, 3 November 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2: 141.
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Before Seward could officially respond to these matters, however, events took
place that negated their implementation.
Apparently acting entirely without the sanction or the foreknowledge of the
American authorities, Cardinal Antonelli authorized the arrest of Surratt on 6
November. As King came to understand the developments
the arrest was made with the approval of his Holiness, and in anticipation 
of any application from the State Department, as well as for the purpose of 
placing Surratt in safe custody, as with the view to show the disposition of 
the Papal government to comply with the expected request of American 
authorities.62
This authorization worked its way down the Papal chain of command and its final 
terse manifestation to Lieutenant Colonel Allet, commanding the Zouave 
Battalion at Velletri, a post twenty miles southeast of Rome, left no room for 
interpretation: "Cause the arrest of the Zouave Watson, and have him conducted, 
under secure escort to the military prison at Rome. It is of much importance that 
this order be executed with exactness."63 Surratt, meanwhile, as a later report 
from Allet shows, had been expecting trouble, "having obtained knowledge of a 
letter addressed to Zouave Ste. Marie which concerned him probably. This letter, 
sent by mistake to a trumpeter named Sault Marie, was opened by him and shown 
to Watson (Surratt) because it was written in English."64 So, innocently it would 
seem, Surratt was presented with what must have been King’s instructions for Ste. 
Marie that had been mistakenly given to another similarly named zouave who, in
62 King to Seward, 19 November 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2: 143-144.
63 Kanzler to Allet, 6 November 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2:142.
64 Allet to Papal Minister of War, 9 November 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2:144.
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turn, enlisted Surratt as translator. This may explain why Surratt was not on
detachment where Allet expected him to be but rather on leave in Feroli.65 If
Surratt experienced any uneasiness as a result of intercepting this correspondence
obviously not meant for his eyes, his anxiety may - a t  about that tim e-have been
compounded by a wavering conscience. Whether motivated by the desire to
posthumously clear his mother’s name or to bring his private purgatory to some
kind of an end, he was driven to extreme measures. In an 1870 post-trial
interview granted to a Washington Post reporter Surratt attested that:
while in the service of Pius IX . . .  I wrote to one of the most prominent 
Union statesmen . . . telling him who I was and where I was, and asking 
him if it would be safe for me to return to the United States and if I could 
get a jury trial and not undergo a drumhead court martial. He wrote back 
saying that, in his opinion, I could not get a jury trial and advising me to 
remain away from America at least three years . . . .  I determined, 
however, to return and to take my chances of a court martial and was on 
the point of doing so when I was arrested at the instance of Pope Pius IX 
and cast into prison.66
Suffice it to say that the actions of Cardinal Antonelli all but shattered any
dreams Surratt may have had of voluntary martyrdom.
Surratt’s arrest, if one may judge from the subsequent reports, was
considered a rather routine and matter-of-fact affair. Lieutenant Colonel Allet,
Surratt’s immediate commander and the bottom rung in the hierarchy of the local
Papal Guard, had the distinction of being able to tell the Papal minister of war, "I
have the honor to inform you that the zouave John Watson has been arrested at
65 De Lambilly to Allet, 8 November 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2: 145.
66 Risvold, Weichmann. 446.
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Veroli, and will be taken tomorrow morning under good escort to Rome."67 The 
night of 7 November passed with the suspect detained in the battalion prison, 
incommunicado and under heavy guard. All that remained, it would seem, was 
the routine transfer of the accused to Rome.
At four o’clock in the morning on 8 November Surratt, whether indifferent 
to or confident in his fate, prepared for his transfer, in the words of one of the 
officers present, "with a calmness and phlegm quite English."68 Outside and under 
the close scrutiny of six armed guards Surratt begged permission to halt at the 
barracks privies when, in a vault that Allet assured his superiors "savor[ed] of a 
prodigy," he leaped over a balustrade and fell twenty or more feet onto a ledge. 
"[There] the filth from the barracks accumulated . . . and in this manner the fall of 
Watson was broken."69 Surratt, by contrast, minimized Allet’s suggestions of 
athletic prowess or Providence. He claimed that "many and many a time my 
comrades and myself, in hours of idleness, would lean over that precipice . . . .  It 
was an open question as to whether a man could jump from the wall and land
67 Allet to Papal Minister of War, 7 November 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2: 142.
68 De Lambilly to Allet, 8 November 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2: 145.
69 Allet to Papal Minister of War, 9 November 1866, FRUS, 1866, 2: 144; an 
interesting and uncorroborated account of this incident in the anonymously 
written Life. Trial, and Adventures of John H. Surratt, the Conspirator: A Correct 
Account and Highly Interesting Narrative of His Doings and Adventures from 
Childhood to the Present (Philadelphia: Barclay, 1867), 39, ends with a flourish 
begging for speculation: "It is now stated, with what truth I cannot say, that two 
men with an outstretched blanket broke the fall." See William A. Tidwell’s Come 
Retribution: The Confederate Secret Service and the Assassination of Abraham 
Lincoln (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1988), 430, for a second and 
more contemporary opinion that the escape was "contrived."
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safely on the ledge."70 In either event, subsequent patrols yielded nothing 
although one would think that an injured man in a soiled and gaudy Zouave 
uniform would be relatively simple to track down. Surratt’s further admission that 
in the fall he had struck his head on the ledge "with fearful force," enough, in fact, 
to have been "knocked completely senseless" and that he was, nevertheless, 
unharmed by any of the bullets that were "flattening themselves on the bare rock 
unpleasantly near my head" detracts from the martial reputation of his Zouave 
pursuers, and, significantly, raises the question of whether his escape was nothing 
more than a convenient way for the Papacy to extricate itself from an ongoing 
embarrassing situation.71
Exactly one week from King’s last dispatch to Seward, King was now forced 
to admit to Seward that events had gotten completely out of his control.
Intending on 9 November to speak with Antonelli regarding matters totally 
unrelated to the Surratt case, King was informed instead of Surratt’s arrest by 
Antonelli’s orders and of his subsequent escape. "As Veroli is close to the 
frontier," King despondently explained to Seward on 10 November, "it is not at all 
unlikely that Surratt will make good his escape from his Zouave pursuers into the 
Italian kingdom."72
Due to his being kept incommunicado regarding Surratt’s incarceration 
from 7-9 November and the subsequent fruitless search by Papal forces, King
70 Risvold, Weichmann. 447.
71 Ibid., 448.
72 King to Seward, 10 November 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2: 141-142.
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initially suspected complicity on the part of the Papal government or at least laxity 
or untrustworthiness. He therefore chose to relay the salient details of the escape 
to other interested parties through means other than Papal channels. 
Communicating with the Florentine minister George Marsh, for instance, on 9 
November via a note personally transmitted by a trusted consular official, King 
prefaced his non-traditionally delivered dispatch with the explanation that he "did 
not feel at all sure that either a message by telegraph or a letter by mail . . .
would, under the circumstances, escape the surveillance or possible interruption of
the Papal authorities."73 Two days later, to aid in identifying Surratt were he to 
emerge within the Kingdom of Italy, King delivered to Marsh the photograph- 
received belatedly from the State Department that day-which was to have been 
instrumental in Surratt’s identification during his stay in the Papal States.74
By 13 November King’s suspicions had abated somewhat. He wrote to 
Marsh under that date that a Papal internal affairs investigation seemed to 
demonstrate that "on the surface, perfect good faith on the part of the Papal 
authorities, and an earnest desire to arrest the criminal" were evident.75 
Meanwhile Marsh, as if heir to both the problem and its concomitant demands, 
was demonstrating all the energetic and clear-headed foresight that King (and 
Wilding) had earlier exhibited. By 16 November Marsh’s informants had located 
a wounded Surratt at a military hospital at Sora, fifty miles east of Rome. Not
73 Ibid.
74 King to Marsh, 12 November 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2: 123.
75 King to Marsh, 13 November 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2: 124.
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only did Marsh, at that juncture, promptly make a request of the local authorities 
to detain Surratt there, but he also, without the least bit of subtlety, reminded the 
Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Emilio Visconti-Venosta, of "the intense 
horror with which [the Lincoln assassination had been] regarded by the Italian 
govemment"--this, clearly, with a view toward the establishment of a proper 
context within which an extradition dialogue could begin.76
While Marsh could not claim to have irrefutable evidence in hand to prove 
Surratt’s identity or complicity, he did offer, in lieu of hard evidence, a copy of 
the original trial record of the conspirators as prima facie evidence.77 Four days 
later, he was able to send Visconti-Venosta a photograph with an embarrassingly 
frank disclaimer suggesting that "time and the circumstances of Surratt’s life for 
the last eighteen months may have produced some change in his features and 
expression, which will render the likeness between the original and the portrait 
less striking."78 If Visconti-Venosta’s confidence in the apparently unorganized 
and piecemeal efforts by the State Department flagged, it may have been 
bolstered by Marsh’s reassurance that the identity of Surratt, if captured, could 
undoubtedly be established in Rome.79
Anxious for a reply to his initiative regarding extradition, Marsh paid a visit 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where much to his chagrin the Secretary
76 Marsh to Visconti-Venosta, 16 November 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2: 124.
77 Ibid.
78 Marsh to Visconti-Venosta, 17 November 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2: 125.
79 Ibid.
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General, acting in Visconti-Venosta’s absence, left him unsure whether even on 
"proper demand and proof' Surratt would be handed over to American authorities 
without "a stipulation on our part that the punishment of death should not be 
inflicted on him." Marsh relayed this depressing development to Seward on 18 
November, but with an intuitive postscript expressing his confidence that the 
Italian authorities would—despite public opinion decidedly and widely against 
capital or otherwise severe punishment-relent on this issue.80
During these negotiations, King had, on 16 November, dispatched Mr. J. C. 
Hooker to Sora with the photographic and documentary means needed to identify 
and apprehend Surratt. Discovering that Surratt had only briefly remained at 
Sora before continuing his flight toward Naples, Hooker immediately wired the 
Neapolitan consul, Frank Swan, alerting him to Surratt’s approach.81 Swan’s 
diligence, unfortunately, was more than offset by Surratt’s luck and ingenuity. 
Surratt had apparently fallen in with a group of Garibaldini soon after his escape 
who, convinced of the propriety of his flight from the camp of their enemy and 
impressed with his elan provided him with a safe escort to Naples.82 Penniless, 
bruised, in a Papal zouave uniform, and generally arousing suspicion, he was held 
there unofficially by the police for a period of three days at Surratt’s own request. 
Never at a loss for an alibi, Surratt offered to his curious inquisitors plausible 
explanations-pauperism and insubordination, respectively-for his enlistment and
80 Marsh to Seward, 18 November 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2: 121-122.
81 King to Seward, 19 November 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2: 143-144.
82 Risvold, Weichmann. 448.
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his incarceration.83 His normal request to see the British consul being granted, 
Surratt thereafter "complained of his confinement, stating that he was a Canadian, 
and the consul claimed his release as an English subject."84 Surratt himself added 
even more suspense to the drama, claiming later that he had been shadowed by 
two detectives "who did not care to arrest me in Naples in the presence of my 
Garibaldian friends."85 Playing on the sympathies of the consul and "some English 
gentleman," Surratt, travelling now as Watson or Walters, was then able to secure 
and pay for passage on the steamer Tripoli bound for Alexandria.86
Swan’s dispatch to King of 18 November expanded on these developments. 
Despite Swan’s encouraging disclosures, however, that the Tripoli would have to 
stop for refueling at Malta, that the cholera quarantine in force there would 
prevent Surratt’s debarkation, and that he had quickly informed the Maltese 
consul of the developing situation, King’s mood remained black.87 Upon receiving 
Swan’s report, in fact, King was moved to remark, "The probabilities, I fear, now 
are that Surratt will make good his escape."88
When the geographic venue moved from Italy to British-controlled Malta, 
the diplomatic environment reflected a considerable and unpromising shift as well.
83 Swan to Seward, 21 November 1866, John H. Surratt. H. R. 25, pp. 2-3.
84 Ibid.
85 Risvold, Weichmann. 448.
86 Swan to Seward, 21 November 1866, John H. Surratt. H. R. 25, pp. 2-3.
87 Swan to King, 18 November 1866, John H. Surratt. H. R. 9, pp. 29-30.
88 King to Seward, 19 November 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2: 143-144.
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The correspondence, during the period from 19 November to 21 November, 
between William Winthrop, United States Consul at Malta, and R. C. Legh, 
Acting Chief Secretary to the Government, clearly demonstrates that change. 
Winthrop opened the exchange with a request that "the conspirator S urra tt. . . 
may be landed and detained in Malta under a proper guard until I can make the 
necessary arrangements to send him for trial to the United States, where his crime 
was committed."89 A second memo dated the same as the first expressed 
Winthrop's growing anxiety concerning the distinct possibility of a lost 
opportunity. His up-to-date knowledge of the evolving situation was evident in his 
addendum’s reminder that "the steamer Tripoli is nearly ready to leave . . . .  I 
have some important arrangements to make which cannot be done after the vessel 
ha[s] left."90 Aware of the existence of the British extradition treaty with the 
United States and acutely aware of the Tripoli's brief layover in Malta, Winthrop 
expected from Legh no less than a prompt and affirmative reply. The diplomatic 
slap in the face that he received in its place was highlighted by a strict 
interpretation of British law governing extradition in which, as the dispatch made 
abundantly clear, "conspiracy to commit murder [was] not one of the offenses 
included."91 He also received two queries-the answers to which appear to be 
quite clearly found in Winthrop’s preliminary dispatches-one questioning whether
89 William Winthrop to R. C. Legh, 19 November 1866, John H. Surratt. H. 
R. 25, p. 4.
90 Winthrop to Legh, 19 November 1866, John H. Surratt. H. R. 25, pp. 4-5.
91 Legh to Winthrop, 19 November 1866, John H. Surratt. H. R. 25, pp. 5-6.
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Surratt’s crime and the Lincoln conspiracy were one and the same; the second 
asking whether Walters or Watson were, indeed, the conspirator in question. As 
a final diplomatic sting, Winthrop was served an admonition spelling out the 
probable legal consequences of arresting the wrong person.92 One cannot help 
wondering if Winthrop paused to reflect on the bitter irony contained in Legh’s 
formal closing. "I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant."93
Winthrop’s venom was as formal as it was undisguised in the next day’s 
dispatch to Legh: "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication, which reached me yesterday afternoon at four o’clock, just as the 
murderer Surratt was leaving the island in the steamer which brought him.94 He 
also took the opportunity to explain that Legh’s dogmatic approach to diplomacy 
made Surratt’s escape inevitable and that he himself had been, under the 
circumstances, totally prepared to suffer any consequences of someone’s being 
accidentally detained.95
Legh’s rebuttal reflects the man’s lack of imagination, if not intelligence.
Not only is it without any expression of contrition, but, in his admission that 
"there is no person of the name of Watson or of any name like it on board the 
vessel, and that the only person who is dressed as a zouave is a passenger who 
calls himself John Agostine, a native of Candia [Crete]," it became clear to
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Winthrop to Legh, 20 November 1866, John H. Surratt. H. R. 25, p. 5.
95 Ibid.
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Winthrop that his British counterpart had, in all likelihood, fallen prey to one of a 
fugitive’s timeless and least subtle ploys-a name change.96
Winthrop’s closing message to Legh was designed, it would seem, to make 
Legh aware of the magnitude of his faux pas and to differentiate Legh’s sense of 
duty from his own which placed concern over a lost opportunity on a higher plane 
than concern over a possible breach of protocol. "In my opinion," Winthrop 
summarized, "the man who was dressed as a Roman Zouave, by whatever name 
he went, was the person I wanted, and would have arrested, had I the power to do 
it."97 Perhaps to add at least one negative report to Legh’s professional portfolio, 
Winthrop explained to Swan that he had enclosed all of the relevant Maltese 
correspondence in a dispatch to Seward "in the hope that he will give the officials 
in this neighborhood some knowledge of the treaty now existing for the arrest and 
delivery of criminals which they would appear so much to require."98
Winthrop quickly took out double insurance against a repeat performance 
at Surratt’s next destination and communicated with Consul General Charles Hale 
in Alexandria via telegraph by way of Constantinople and by a dispatch delivered 
by the consignees of the Tripoli. His own recent travails notwithstanding, he 
nevertheless explained that it would "not be a difficult matter for Mr. Hale to 
arrest the criminal before he lands, though it may cause him much trouble to
96 Legh to Winthrop, 20 November 1866, John H. Surratt. H. R. 25, p. 6.
97 Winthrop to Legh, 21 November 1866, John H. Surratt. H. R. 25, p. 5.
98 Winthrop to Swan, 20 November 1866, John H. Surratt. H. R. 25, pp. 9- 
10. For a decidedly British point of view, see John H. Surratt. H. R. 25, p. 18.
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identify Surratt, when he is among the seventy-nine laborers who are now on 
board the vessel."99 The following afternoon Winthrop was able to relay to Hale 
the fact that "the man dressed as a zouave hails from Canada, and not Candia. /  
firmly believe this man is Surratt. I think you can track him from his Roman 
dress."100 The next day, 22 November, Winthrop wrote to Seward, again venting 
his disgust with the behavior and attitude of the Maltese authorities as well as 
expressing his opinion that the situation would develop differently in Alexandria. 
Hale, he explained, "having judicial powers can act for himself and not be 
hampered by legal quibbles as I think I have been here."101 Written two days later 
and presumably arriving in Washington on or near the same date as Winthrop’s 
22 November dispatch was an observant and optimistic note from George Marsh 
in Florence:
My present impression . . .  is that the accused would not have been 
surrendered [here], and it would therefore be fortunate if he should be 
found in the Turkish empire, where the extra-territorial jurisdiction of the 
consuls would empower them to arrest and detain him without offense to 
the Turkish government.102
The denouement of the tale of Surratt’s pursuit is rather mundane by 
comparison with its previous unpredictable chapters. Surratt, aboard the Tripoli, 
arrived in Alexandria on 23 November and had to wait out a quarantine period
99 Winthrop to Swan, 20 November 1866, John H. Surratt. H. R. 25, pp. 9-
10.
100 Winthrop to Hale, 21 November 1866, John H. Surratt. H. R. 25, p. 10.
101 Winthrop to Hale, 22 November 1866, John H. Surratt. H. R. 25, p. 3.
102 Marsh to Seward, 24 November 1866, John H. Surratt. H. R. 25, p. 7.
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giving consul Hale ample time to arrange for his apprehension. Betrayed as much 
by his attire as by what Hale called "his American type of countenance," he was 
quickly identified, arrested, and read his rights, all the while, in Hale’s opinion, 
"displaying neither surprise nor irritation."103 This fatalism was later explained by 
Winthrop who reasoned that Surratt, "having been examined at [Malta] on board 
the Tripoli . . . saw very clearly that something was wrong and . . . prepared 
himself to meet any emergency which might arise on his arrival in Egypt."104
Mindful of the difficulties encountered by Surratt’s previous pursuers, Hale, 
in the same correspondence in which he announced Surratt’s arrest, expressed his 
desire to relieve himself of his diplomatic problem as quickly as possible. To that 
end he suggested to Seward on 27 November that an American man-of-war be 
ordered to Alexandria. "I earnestly hope that one may soon come here to receive 
him," he disclosed, a statement betraying his anxiety but belying the actual 
efficiency with which he handled the situation.105 Significantly, Hale was aware of 
the fact that
as the prisoner avowed himself an American, and submitted without 
objection, to arrest by me on my statement that I acted for the United 
States, and especially as he has no paper to suggest even a prima facia [sic] 
claim for belonging to any other jurisdiction, there is no other authority
103 Hale to Seward, 27 November 1866, John H. Surratt. H. R. 25, pp. 13-14. 
For Surratt’s romanticized version of the same incident, see Risvold, Weichmann. 
449.
104 Winthrop to Hale, 6 December 1866, John H. Surratt. H. R. 25, pp. 20-
21 .
105 Hale to Seward, 26 November 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2: 225-226.
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which can rightfully interfere here with his present custody.106 
The only anxious moment for Hale, in fact, occurred when he made an offer to 
the British legal vice-consul in Alexandria to "hear any claims of pretensions 
[Surratt] might choose to put forward."107 Surratt, however, for whatever reason, 
made no effort to seek refuge under the British flag as he had done previously 
and the vice-consul’s visit was never arranged. Having thus taken care, in Hale’s 
words, both to "prevent. . . any pretense that the Egyptian government was taken 
unawares and . . . avoid any embarrassment in my proceeding from unexpected 
objections," Hale could proudly announce to Seward that "the extradition was 
accepted here as a matter of course."108
Held within the quarantine walls until 29 November, "Surratt was 
transferred," Hale reported to Seward on 4 December, "under a sufficient guard, 
from the quarantine grounds to the government prison where he remains in safe 
confinement."109 Here he awaited the arrival of the steamship Swatara that would 
carry him to America.
Surratt’s arrest was met with mixed feelings by officials of the American 
government. Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, requesting that Secretary of the 
Navy Gideon Welles meet him and Secretary of State Seward at the War 
Department on 3 December either did not regard the matter too highly or did not
106 Ibid.
107 Hale to Seward, 27 December 1866, FRUS. 1866, 2: 82-83.
108 Ibid.
109 Hale to Seward, 4 December 1866, John H. Surratt. H. R. 25, p. 17.
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want others to know just how much import he assigned to it. Welles,
summarizing the meeting in his diary, noted that he had just learned "on inquiry
that [the United States government] had not even made out requisition or done
anything as yet [regarding Surratt]." Welles was instructed to telegraph Admiral
Louis M. Goldsborough about sending a vessel to transport Surratt, but the
meeting then quickly moved on to discuss the Bay of Samana proposal by the
Dominicans, a matter which Welles recorded as being "a much more important
subject" to Stanton.110
Both Stanton and Judge Advocate Holt had reasons for not looking
forward to John Surratt’s presence in a courtroom when barely a year and a half
had passed since these men had figured so prominently in his mother’s trial and
execution. As one historian put it, "[over] Stanton’s and Holt’s understandable
objections, John Surratt had been located and returned from Europe. Here was
no mute skeleton in the closet, but a corpus delicti with the inherent ability to
snap open the Pandora’s box of the whole miserable proceedings."111 President
Johnson’s estimation was an entirely different story. To him, and to Welles who
recorded the President’s remarks,
no good could result from any communication with Surratt, and that the 
more reckless Radicals, if they could have access to him, would be ready to 
tamper with and suborn him. The man’s life was at stake; he was 
desperate and resentful. Such a person and in such a condition might, if 
approached, make almost any statement. He, therefore. . . should not be
110 Welles, Diarv. 2: 630-631.
111 Hoehling, Post-Appomattox. 242. For similar appraisals of this 
development, see Dewitt, Judicial Murder. 151, Starkey, Booth. 176, and 
Eisenschiml, "A ’Study5 of John Surratt?", 187.
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allowed to communicate with others, nor should unauthorized persons be 
permitted to see him.112
Nor is one reassured of the real intentions of the Department of State when an
official who played such an integral part in the arrest of John Surratt as Consul
Charles Hale could remark in a pensive and unsure note to Seward on 3
December that "[he] trust[ed] that in ail these measures to secure the arrest and
extradition of Suratt [sic], I have only anticipated the wishes and directions of the
State Department."113
If one subscribes to the theory that the State Department was loath to
acknowledge Surratt’s existence--let alone extradite him—then one must also
assume that Surratt would have done practically all he could to fulfill the role that
reluctant United States government officials demanded of him. He did, in fact,
habitually change his name and, on occasion, alter his physical appearance. His
best efforts, it would seem, were thwarted by chance encounters and by his
continued desire for notoriety. Ironically, and perhaps most significantly, he was
"tracked down . . .  by zealous consular officials . . . who did not understand how
desperately their superiors in Washington wanted him to disappear for good."114
112 Welles, Diarv. 3:31.
113 Hale to Seward, 3 December 1866, Stock, Papal Dispatches. 400-401. 
According to Thomas Reed Turner, this air of reluctance-whether intentional or 
inadvertent-by the government to bring Surratt to trial continued even after his 
arrest. While the author cannot trace to an ultimate source the orders given to 
the captain of the ship bearing Surratt to power the vessel with sail rather than 
coal, he considers the fact that the ship consequently took forty-five days to cross 
the Atlantic quite dilatory and, thus, significant. See Turner, Public Opinion. 228.
114 Hanchett, The Lincoln Murder Conspiracies. 86-87.
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Surratt himself corroborated this view in an 1870 interview in which he claimed 
that, as a result of his discovery by these naive consuls, the State Department had 
no choice "but to express thanks and take measures for having me returned to this 
country for trial."115
The government’s true position on John Surratt would next be tested 
within a confined and legally delineated courtroom. This was in stark contrast to 
the global venue where the first act had been played out.
115 Risvold, Weichmann. 446.
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CHAPTER IV 
TRIAL BY JURY
Prologue: the Milligan Case
On 17 December 1866, between the arrest of John H. Surratt in 
Alexandria, Egypt and his arrival in America for his trial, the United States 
Supreme Court handed down its decision regarding civilian petitioner Lambdin P. 
Milligan. Milligan, a Huntington, Indiana lawyer, described as "an irreconcilable 
opponent of the Civil War" and a "student of constitutional law [who] held 
unshakable views with respect to certain of its provisions," had long argued his 
belief in the sovereignty of states and the dissolubility of the voluntary Union they 
had formed.1 Through his words and actions in support of those beliefs and for 
his association with extremist political groups that shared his ideals, Milligan had 
earned the disdain, suspicion and, eventually, the fear of his enemies.2 Accused 
on 21 October 1864 of conspiracy against the United States for "affording aid and 
comfort to the rebels," "inciting insurrection," "disloyal practices," and "violation of 
the laws of war," he was found guilty by a military commission and sentenced to 
die.3 Execution of the sentence was averted, however, by means of a clever legal 
ruse engineered by Indiana judge David Davis wherein Davis first received 
Milligan’s plea for habeas corpus, then convinced another circuit court judge to
1 Darwin Kelley, Milligan’s Fight Against Lincoln (New York: Exposition 
Press, 1973), vii.
2 Kelley, Milligan’s Fight Against Lincoln, vii.
3 Dewitt, Judicial Murder. 122.
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oppose him on the same issue, thereby forcing a decision by the United States 
Supreme Court. A petition to President Andrew Johnson via Indiana Governor 
Oliver P. Morton followed, requesting that Milligan’s sentence be commuted to 
life imprisonment "thereby allowing a resolution of the issue before the Court 
which would not have been permissible if Milligan were dead."4 Interestingly, 
upon Johnson’s refusal to intervene, it was Secretary of War Stanton, described by 
Milligan himself as a friend, fellow associate of the bar and visitor to his home, 
who eventually engineered the validation of Governor Morton’s petition.5
In a landmark unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that laws of 
war regarding non-military personnel do not apply when civil courts are 
functioning (as they had been during Milligan’s activities in Indiana). The 
decision also specified that "the president could not of his own motion authorize 
. . .  a [military] Commission, and that, as a matter of fact, the Congress had not 
authorized such a Commission."6 While not banning military commissions 
outright, the decision limited their jurisdiction to districts in the immediate 
theatre of war.7
4 Steers, "Military Trial of the Conspirators," 724.
5 Kelley, Milligan’s Fight Against Lincoln. 100.
6 Dewitt, Judicial Murder. 129.
7 Steers, "Military Trial of the Conspirators," 725. Judge George Fisher, 
later to preside at John Surratt’s 1867 trial, expressed his opinion on the Milligan 
case during his charge to the jury. He believed that Americans who were shocked 
by the Milligan pronouncement concerning civil liberties would have been even 
more shocked had a court declared that the president did not have the power to 
convoke such military commissions in time of national emergency. See Trial of 
John H. Surratt. 1370.
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Vilified by the Radical Republicans and celebrated by "a generation of 
young lawyers" who "found the president beyond his legal power in the exercise of 
domestic prerogative," the Milligan case held direct or indirect significance for a 
variety of Americans.8 For Milligan, it meant his release.9 For Sarah F. Mudd, 
whose husband, Dr. Samuel Mudd, was currently serving a life sentence for his 
part in the Lincoln murder conspiracy, the Supreme Court’s decision held out the 
hope for a reprieve. In a letter to President Johnson, she explained the mixed 
emotions with which she received the news. "I was hopeful after the decision of 
the Supreme Court [that the] trial of the Civilians by military Court [would be 
declared] illegal [and that] he would be released. So far I have been 
disappointed."10 For John Surratt, whose activities in Washington, D.C. as part of 
Booth’s sundry plots fell within the geographic and, thus, the legal, parameters of 
the Milligan decision, an entirely different opportunity for justice was afforded 
than was offered to his mother. He would not have to face a military commission 
such as that which had resulted in his mother’s death. For the executive branch 
of the United States government, the decision meant a complete change in tactics 
and strategy. Whereas John Surratt’s fugitive status had been faithfully 
maintained by them for over a year and a half, it now was in the best interests of 
the government to prosecute and convict him. Only a guilty verdict would
8 Kelley, Milligan. 102.
9 Ibid., 105,107. Milligan later sued for $500,000 citing damages "caused by 
trespass and false imprisonment." He eventually was awarded five dollars for his 
travails.
10 Graf and Haskins, The Papers of Andrew Johnson. 10: 632.
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validate the executions of the conspirators in the 1865 trial. In particular, only a 
guilty verdict would stifle the already budding martyrdom of Mary Surratt whose 
indictment, conviction, and execution had been founded on questionable evidence 
and whose government-imposed peril may have been merely a lure to draw out 
her fugitive son. For the president and the majority of his cabinet, the Supreme 
Court’s decision was taken in stride if we may judge from Navy Secretary Gideon 
Welles. "[The Milligan decision] was, I think, no surprise upon any of us, and I 
think not more than one regretted it. The President was gratified."11
For David Miller Dewitt, writing 30 years after the fact, both the 
immediate and long-term ramifications of the Milligan case were abundantly 
evident. Together with the crumbling of Stanton’s Confederate conspiracy theory, 
the Milligan case, in Dewitt’s estimation, "discredited forever the judgement of the 
Military Commission, re-opened wide all questions of testimony, of character, of 
guilt or innocence, and summoned the silent and dishonored dead to a new and 
benignant trial."12 Dewitt and others obviously saw in the Milligan case an 
opportunity to review if not appeal the 1865 ruling by the Commission that 
resulted in Mrs. Surratt’s and the other conspirators’ deaths.
For the prosecution team assembled to convict John Harrison Surratt, the 
case opened the doors to far more problems, barriers, and distractions than it had 
perhaps closed. While the prosecutors’ objective would not be changed by the 
Milligan case, their tactics would have to be carefully monitored and drastically
11 Welles, Diarv. 2: 644.
12 Dewitt, Judicial Murder. 163-164.
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altered. The indictment would have to be perfectly phrased. The jury would have 
to be scrupulously examined for partisan temperament. Witnesses whose 
character, and thus testimony, in the 1865 trial had subsequently come under 
scrutiny would have to be avoided entirely or sparingly used. And, overriding all 
other considerations, the ghost of Mary Surratt must not be indirectly subpoenaed 
by means of offhand remarks, careless allusions, or even well-intentioned 
condolence. Her presence could work only to the detriment of their objectives.
The Trial of John Harrison Surratt 
On 10 June 1867, the opening day of John Surratt’s trial, the head of 
Surratt’s defense team, Joseph H. Bradley, was presented by Judge George P. 
Fisher with the simple and traditional inquiry into whether he was ready to 
proceed with the trial. Fisher was met with a reply that Thomas Mealey Harris, 
one of the nine officers that had tried Mrs. Surratt, took to be conceited, 
deceitful, and tasteless.13 Bradley’s boastful response: "The prisoner is ready, sir, 
and has been from the first" was, in fact, the first of many opportunities for the 
bench to lower its regard for Surratt’s attorneys.14 Judge Fisher, labelled by one 
historian as "guardian of the interests of the War Department" and by diarist and 
cabinet member Gideon Welles as a puppet indirectly controlled by Secretary of 
War Edwin Stanton, seemed bound, as Stanton’s surrogate, to clash with anyone 
whose position on the Surratts or on the government’s estimation of the Surratts
13 Harris, Military Commission. 235.
14 Trial of John H. Surratt. 3.
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ran counter to Stanton’s.15 John Surratt’s defense team, composed of Joseph H. 
Bradley, Sr., Joseph H. Bradley, Jr., and R. T. Merrick, seemed ideally suited for 
that purpose. Displaying both "political opposition to the government" and 
"religious sympathies with Mrs. Surratt," their clash with the presiding judge 
seemed preordained. One writer’s "charitable conclusion on their behalf' was that 
their "sympathies and personal biases so prejudiced their minds that they could 
not bring themselves into a judicial frame for the trial of this case."16 The same 
writer saw in their cleverly and carefully chosen statements a protracted attempt 
to fashion this trial into a retrial of their client’s mother.
During the next few days, the flood of motions proposed by the 
prosecution would probably make Judge Fisher wonder if-stripped of its cocksure 
attitude-Bradley’s opening remark had not been far off the mark. The defense, 
despite its relative lack of funds was, in fact, prepared to go to trial. The 
prosecution, on the other hand, composed of New York attorney Edwards 
Pierrepont, District Attorney for Washington Edward C. Carrington, Assistant 
District Attorney Nathaniel Wilson, and Albert Gallatin Riddle indeed had a few 
irregularities for Fisher to iron out before they were ready to begin their 
presentation of evidence.17 If anyone needed evidence that John Surratt’s trial
15 Shelton, Mask for Treason. 92-93; Welles, Diary, 3: 160.
16 Harris, Military Commission. 266-267.
17 Welles, Diarv. 3:452. In this same entry of 13 October 1868, Welles tags 
Pierrepont as "one of Stanton’s jockey lawyers" and remarked that he "has been 
paid enormous fees by Stanton and Steward." In addition, Welles found him to 
be "a cunning and adroit lawyer, but not a true and trusty man. The Democrats 
of New York let themselves down when they made him one of the sachems of 
Tammany. They are getting justly paid."
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would differ from his mothers, the pre-trial motions and their consideration by 
the judge would have provided them ample assurance. In addition, if anyone 
needed evidence that the government would do anything within its power to bring 
about a conviction of John Surratt, one need not look further than Judge Fisher’s 
decisions with regards to those motions.
The first motion was proposed by District Attorney Carrington who headed 
the prosecution team.18 Insisting that the purpose of his motion was not to delay 
the proceedings, Carrington then "challenge[d] the array of the panel," requesting, 
in other words, that the jury already empaneled for the trial be quashed.19 Citing 
a prior deposition submitted by the Registrar of Washington City, Carrington 
suggested both that the general jury pool of 520 persons and the subsequent jury 
selected from that pool had not been chosen according to the guidelines specified 
in a 16 June 1862 act of Congress regarding jury selection in the District of 
Columbia.20 Following a day and a half of legal wrangling, Judge Fisher decided
18 Welles, Diarv. 1: 56. Welles’s Spring 1861 entry comments on 
Carrington’s appointment over Edwin Stanton as District Attorney for 
Washington. Tellingly, Welles records Postmaster General Montgomery Blair’s 
opinion that the perceived lack of integrity on Stanton’s part was the deciding 
factor in the choice.
19 Motion of Edward Carrington to Judge George P. Fisher, 10 June 1867, 
Papers Relating to the Trial of John H. Surratt. Record Group 21: 
Judiciary/District and Circuit Courts, Criminal Case File 4731, National Archives, 
Washington, D.C. (Hereinafter cited as John Surratt Papers. 21/4731).
20 Deposition of Samuel E. Douglas, n.d., John Surratt Papers, 21/4731. 
Carrington had an additional specific concern that the Registrar for the City of 
Washington had not verified that all the prospective jurors were tax-payers, 
another prerequisite of that act; see also Trial of John H. Surratt. 30, for 
Pierrepont’s response, bom of frustration with the defense’s deliberate obtuseness 
concerning the purpose of the voting act in question: "Why not say, ’Let the 
register and these men go and do as they please about it!’ The law was made
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on 12 June to accept Carrington's motion and the marshall for the District of 
Columbia was ordered to "summon a jury of [twenty-six] talesmen" to act in lieu 
of the quashed juiy.21 It is interesting to note that whereas Carrington’s expressed 
intention to the court was not to cause any delay of the proceedings, he had 
recorded quite different feelings in a pre-trial letter to the Attorney General’s 
office. Agreeing with Judge Pierrepont, he expressed the opinion that it would 
"be inexpedient to try Surratt at the ensuing term of the Criminal Court 
commencing on the 3d Monday of June" and that he would "deem it incumbent 
upon me to decline to proceed with the case." Further, he asked the Attorney 
General "whether it is not my duty to resist any requirement by a judge to 
proceed to the trial of a case in which I am not prepared, or which for reasons of 
public policy, I consider it inexpedient to try."22
Perhaps laying the groundwork for a later appeal, Surratt’s attorneys filed a 
motion on 13 June arguing that the jurors being selected by the marshal according 
to Fisher’s orders would be, like those before them, improperly empaneled.23 
Fisher denied this motion, the first of many requests by the defense to be 
overruled, and the selection of veniremen began. Other than a spate of 
candidates who were dismissed due to illness, non-residency and failure to pay
21 Trial of John H. Surratt, 46, 14. Part of Fisher’s concern centered on 
whether or not other accused persons hanged or otherwise punished for their 
crimes had been convicted by other similarly — and illegally — empaneled juries.
22 Carrington to Pleasants, n. d., John Surratt Papers. 21/4731.
23 Motion to Quash, 15 June 1867, John Surratt Papers. 21/4731; See Trial of 
John H. Surratt. 18-21, for Merrick’s earlier argument that the 1862 act did not 
specifically say that an improperly empaneled jury should be considered void.
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taxes, prospective jurors were relieved primarily for two reasons, those who had 
formed or had expressed an opinion on the case and those who expressed scruples 
concerning the administration of the death penalty.24
On 15 June, Carrington responded with a second objection to the 
empaneling of the jury, this time on the grounds that as the empaneling was 
begun in the present term of the Circuit Court under the direction of Judge 
Fisher who was then sick, he felt that it was "illegal to proceed before [Fisher’s 
replacement] to complete the empaneling of the jury."25 This objection was 
overruled by Judge Wylie, Fisher’s replacement, but not before the defense team - 
sensing yet another delay tactic in the prosecution’s motion-submitted a plea for 
the court to overrule the prosecution’s motion to continue the case until the next 
term. In the first of many emotional appeals made by the defense team, Surratt’s 
attorneys took the opportunity in their argument for a speedy trial to cite details 
of their client’s living conditions since his arrest. "He has been kept in close 
confinement, [has been] wholly excluded from all intercourse with any human 
beings but those who were employed to administer to his absolute needs, [and has 
been] obliged to wear the very dress in which he was arrested."26 Taking care to 
mention the fact that "he has been allowed such indulgence as would properly be
24 Voir Dire List, 20 June 1867, John Surratt Papers. 21/4731; see also Trial 
of John H. Surratt. 52-112, for verbal examination of prospective witnesses.
25 District Attorney Carrington’s Objection to the Empanelling of the Jury, 
John Surratt Papers. 21/4731; see also Trial of the Conspirators. 86, for 
Carrington’s concern that yet a third judge would enter the picture if the case was 
carried over into the next term of Circuit Court.
26 Defense Plea to Overrule Prosecution’s Motion to Continue Case, John 
Surratt Papers. 21/4731.
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deemed permissible toward one charged with an offense as heinous in its 
character as that alleged against him," Surratt’s attorneys saw the need to 
challenge the prosecution’s motion. After all, the challenge continued, whereas 
Surratt was forced by his circumstances to conduct his pre-trial business from 
within prison walls, the prosecution, by comparison, "had the fullest notice and the 
amplest means to prepare for the trial of this cause . . . and now have no 
reasonable ground upon which to ask its further postponement."27 Citing prior 
motions by the prosecution to postpone, the challenge closed strongly: "He is now 
ready . . .  he demands a speedy trial, a trial at this term of this court."28 It 
appears that the challenge was heeded.
Carrington next proposed that the twelfth and final juror not be sworn in 
until Monday 17 June, thereby granting those already selected an unencumbered 
weekend during which they might "settle their business" before the lengthy trial 
began.29 On the surface, this would seem to be a rather innocuous proposal and 
one surely to curry favor with the jury. The senior Bradley, however, took 
exception because this apparent gift by the prosecution to the eleven jury 
members already chosen would result in the case being carried over into the next 
term where it would be heard by Judge Carrier, someone rumored to b e -o f no 
small import to John Surratt--"a coarse, vulgar, Radical in the hands of Stanton."30
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid. Words underlined appear as such in original.
29 Trial of John H. Surratt. 112.
30 Ibid. For Judge Carrier quotation, see Welles, Diarv. 3: 160.
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The above judicial quirk is neatly explained by historian Larry Starkey:
any jury which was not fully impanelled [sic] by the end of the sitting 
court’s term would be dismissed and a new trial date would have to be set, 
following a first-come-first-served docketing rule. In effect, a case 
docketed late in a term would have to quickly impanel its jury or else go to 
the bottom of the list for a trial date during the following term—a delay of 
several months at best.31
With debate swirling chiefly around the legality of sending an empaneled jury
home, an agreement was apparently reached and "just before midnight on the
final day of the old court’s term, Saturday, June 15, the final juror was sworn in."32
With a slate of jurors finally impaneled, Carrington proceeded to read the
four count indictment against the defendant.33 Strikingly similar to the indictment
in the 1865 trial of the conspirators, it differed only in the absence of the word
"traitorously," a necessary omission in light of the resumption of peace before
John Surratt’s trial began, but an omission, nonetheless, that removed any
"political purpose" from the conspiracy.34 The first count charged Surratt with the
murder of Abraham Lincoln. In a conspiracy case, explains one writer on the
subject, "the act of any one of the parties thus conspiring, in pursuance of said
conspiracy becomes the act of all."35 Simply put, all conspirators, regardless of
their degree of participation, share the guilt in equal portions. To validate this
31 Larry Starkey, Wilkes Booth Came to Washington (New York: Random 
House, 1976), 177.
32 Starkey, Booth. 177.
33 Indictment Against John H. Surratt, John Surratt Papers. 21/4731.
34 Harris, Military Commission. 231.
35 Ibid., 230.
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charge, the prosecution had to prove three things: that a conspiracy to murder 
existed, that the murder was perpetrated by one of the conspirators, and that the 
murderer was a member of the conspiracy at the time the murder was 
committed.36
The second count of the indictment claimed that John Surratt "was present 
aiding, helping, and abetting, comforting, assisting and maintaining the said John 
Wilkes Booth" in his assault on Lincoln.37 This charge would require proof that 
Surratt was present at the "time and place" of the murder and that he was, in fact, 
"aiding and abetting" Booth in the murder.38
The third count charged Surratt with cooperating with Booth, Herold, 
Atzerodt, Paine, his mother, "and others to the jurors aforesaid unknown" in an 
assault on Lincoln that resulted in his death.39 Proof of this accusation lay in 
demonstrating that John Surratt had acted in conjunction with the others 
specified.
The fourth and final charge, claiming that Surratt "unlawfully and wickedly 
did combine, confederate, and conspire together feloniously to kill and murder 
one Abraham Lincoln," would require three proofs.40 The prosecution would have 
to demonstrate that there had been a collaborative effort to the group’s members,
36 Ibid.
37 John Surratt Papers. 21/4731.
38 Harris, Military Commission. 231.
39 John Surratt Papers. 21/4731.
40 Ibid.
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that the crime had indeed been perpetrated and that John Surratt had been a 
member of the conspiracy that orchestrated the crime.41 Following the reading of 
the indictment, Surratt’s attorneys, speaking for their client and stealing some of 
Carrington’s thunder (it had been he who had proposed the unencumbered 
weekend for the jurors), proposed that the jury "be allowed to separate till 
Monday morning," a suggestion accepted by the court.42
When court resumed on Monday 17 June, Surratt himself entered a 
petition to the court for a rather special consideration. Pleading that his 
involvement in this capital case had already "exhausted all his means and such 
further means as have been furnished him by the liberality of his friends in 
preparing for his defence [sic]," he asked that he be granted the power "to 
summon his witnesses and to compel their attendance at the cost of the 
government of the United States."43 Judge Fisher, perhaps not wishing to incur 
the disfavor of Stanton who would not want it said that the accused had not been 
afforded every opportunity to acquit himself, ordered the petition to be carried 
out and that "the fees of all such witnesses as may hereupon appear to be 
necessary to the cause of the prisoner . . .  be paid in the same manner as 
government witnesses are paid."44 This would be one of a precious few coups for
41 Harris, Military Commission. 230-231.
42 Trial of John H. Surratt. 116.
43 Petition of the Defendant for an Order to have his Witnesses Summoned 
at the Expense of the Court and Ordering of the Court, John Surratt Papers. 
21/4731.
44 Ibid.
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the defense.
Assistant District Attorney Nathaniel Wilson was chosen to open the case 
for the prosecution. Relatively brief by the later standards of this trial, Wilson’s 
simple but dramatic opening statement contained several salient points each 
linked to a specific charge of the indictment: one, that at 10:20 P.M. on 14 April 
1865, John Surratt was in front of Ford’s Theatre in company with John Wilkes 
Booth whose "cool and calculating malice was the director of the bullet that 
pierced the brain of the President and the knife that fell upon the face of the 
venerable Secretary of State;" two, "that from the presence of the prisoner, Booth, 
drunk with theatrical passion and traitorous hate, rushed directly to the execution 
of their mutual will;" three, that the "companionship" of Booth and Surratt was 
neither "accidental" nor "unexpected;" and, four, that "[John Surratt] is a traitor to 
the government that protected him."45 To jog the collective memory of the jury 
regarding Surratt’s global peregrinations and to assist its members in the 
government’s interpretation of the facts, Wilson closed his statement with a 
reminder that "in law flight is the criminal’s inarticulate confession."46
Judging from the testimony presented by the government, the strategy of 
the prosecution appeared to hinge on the creation of several concentric circles of 
evidence, each more specific and each progressively damning. One might argue 
that the prosecution’s case should have begun with reconstructing the conspiracy 
and its constituent parts, then proceeded to detail the role of the accused within
45 Trial of John H. Surratt. 118-119.
46 Ibid., 119.
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those parts. Foregoing the logical, however, the prosecution began with the 
emotional-establishing John Surratt’s presence at Ford’s Theatre on the day of 
Lincoln’s murder.47 It was alleged that John Surratt was in the presidential box at 
the theatre around noon making arrangements to prevent anyone entering the box 
from the outside later that evening. The man alleged to be Surratt had calmly 
explained to the witness that "[tonight’s] crowd may be so immense as to push the 
door open, and we want to fasten it so that this cannot be the case."48
Sergeant Joseph M. Dye, a witness from the 1865 trial of conspirators, was 
then called on to reconstruct Surratt’s alleged activities at the time of the 
assassination. Dye described the man who joined Booth outside Ford’s theatre as 
someone "neat in appearance" with "a very small moustache" who behaved as in a 
state of "great excitement, exceedingly nervous and very pale."49 Dye informed the 
court that he later positively identified this neatly dressed person as John Surratt 
when he was taken to Surratt’s prison cell.50 Dye’s chief function, however, was to 
cast John Surratt in the role of the Fate of Greek myth who decided how long a 
person should live. Surratt’s role on the night of the assassination, according to 
Dye, was to periodically call out the time to Booth and to let Booth know when
47 Ibid., 133. Bradley, in fact, objected —unsuccessfully — to the 
admissibility of the first day’s evidence on the grounds that his client’s connection 
with the conspiracy had not yet been established.
48 Ibid., testimony of Benjamin Rhodes, 501.
49 Ibid., testimony of Joseph M. Dye, 134-135, 147.
50 Ibid., 148.
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to strike.51 The defense, in cross-examination, failed to successfully challenge 
Dye’s additional claim that not only had he spoken to Mrs. Surratt at her house 
later that same night on his way back to camp, but that he had gained the 
impression from their brief conversation that she knew the nature of what had 
happened at Ford’s Theatre and was only waiting for the verification of it.52
On 21 June, John Surratt’s attorneys petitioned the court for the right to 
recall Dye (and two other witnesses) "for the purpose of further cross- 
examination."53 Apparently it had come to the attention of the defense that Dye 
was then "under bonds to answer in the city of Philadelphia to the charges of 
passing counterfeit money" and that two other witnesses had, since testifying in 
court, recalled specific and relevant dates involving Surratt that had not been 
originally presented.54 Fisher, seeing a "geometrical progression" in recalling 
persons either to verify their veracity or to reorganize their memories, denied the 
motion. Fisher mused over what might take place first if he were to allow such a 
procedure: "the end of this trial or the return of the children of Abraham to the ‘ 
holy city."55
From 18 June to 5 July, a dozen or more witnesses testified to have seen
51 Ibid., 135. The last time that this neatly dressed character called out the 
time was 10:10 P.M., just minutes before Booth fired the fatal shot.
51 Ibid., 148-156.
53 Motion by the Defendant for the Recall of Witnesses, John Surratt 
Papers. 21/4731.
54 Ibid.
55 Trial of John H. Surratt 267-270.
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John Surratt in Washington, D.C. on 14 April, establishing a preponderance of 
evidence designed to stand up to any alibi claiming that Surratt was elsewhere on 
that date. Ranging from those who had known him "since he was a boy" to those 
who recognized him only because he was with Booth-a well-known celebrity-- 
witnesses chronologically traced Surratt’s activities from an early morning trip to 
the barber shop with Booth, Atzerodt and McLaughlin to a mid-afternoon 
meeting with Booth and others at a restaurant or bar to a Pennsylvania Avenue 
rendezvous with Booth at 6:00 P.M. to the dining room of the Surratt 
boardinghouse that evening and finally to the Washington train station.56 Cross- 
examination by the defense yielded mixed success. Several witnesses wavered in 
their certainty of identification and one was chastised by Bradley for not having 
previously told the authorities what he knew.57 The potentially damaging claim 
that Surratt was seen at the Washington train station was downplayed somewhat 
by Bradley who maneuvered the witness into stating that he did not consider 
Surratt’s presence significant enough to report.58 Generally speaking, however, 
the prosecution’s efforts at this point in the trial to place Surratt in Washington 
x on the day in question were largely successful.
Placing John Surratt at the heart of the conspiracy was a relatively easy 
matter as well. While the prosecution relied on several insiders to account for 
major details, it attempted-unsuccessfully-to enter other inflammatory
56 Ibid., 494-495, 158-159, 240, 162-163.
57 Ibid., testimony of Benjamin W. Vanderpoel,.244-245.
58 Ibid., testimony of John Lee, 195-196.
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information into evidence. One cannot imagine the jury giving much credence, 
for example, to Surrattsville resident E.L. Smoot’s testimony that Surratt had told 
him that "If the Yankees knew what he had done, or what he was doing they 
would stretch his neck" after Smoot admitted-under cross-examination-that a 
government official had told him that he would be paid ten dollars a day if he 
"will do what is right."59 Similarly, William E. Cleaver, a veterinary surgeon, 
claimed that Surratt told him that he and Booth "had some bloody work to do" 
and that he was going to kill that "damned old scoundrel" [Lincoln] for ruining 
Maryland and the rest of the country.60 As he had with Smoot, Bradley, during 
cross-examination, negated Cleaver’s testimony with Cleaver’s own admissions that 
he had withheld information at the 1865 conspiracy trial, that he had associated 
with perjurer Sanford Conover-and had, in fact, passed details of John Surratt’s 
activities on to Conover-and with Bradley’s intimation of Cleaver’s pending 
conviction on a rape (some sources say manslaughter) charge Bradley’s accusation 
that Cleaver had sold a horse of his (Bradley’s) without his authority, did nothing 
to enhance Cleaver’s veracity either.61
As expected, the great bulk of incriminating evidence was presented by 
John Lloyd, Louis Weichmann, and Lewis McMillan. Surratt’s erstwhile friend 
Henri Beaumont Ste. Marie added precious little evidence as if the government
59 Ibid., testimony of E. L. Smoot, 190.
60 Ibid., testimony of William E. Cleaver, 204-206.
61 Ibid., 209-211.
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regarded his work as done the moment that Surratt arrived in America.62
As he had done during the trial of the conspirators, Lloyd detailed the 
arrivals and departures of the visitors to the Surrattsville tavern on 11 April and 
14 April 1865. For whatever reasons, Lloyd devalued his testimony this time with 
blurred recollections that provided ample opportunities for extrapolation by the 
jury. Concerning the guns and rope that John had entrusted to him "about five or 
six weeks before the assassination," for example, Lloyd now stated that when John 
Surratt returned two or three days later, he "supposed at that time that [Surratt] 
was going to take those things away and I said nothing to him about them."63 
Regarding the visit of Mary Surratt and Weichmann on the day of the 
assassination to deliver the field glass and to remind Lloyd to be prepared for the 
callers later that night, Lloyd now tempered his own guilt-in a fashion-with the 
admission that he had been drinking heavily prior to Mrs. Surratt’s arrival.
Neither could-or would—Lloyd positively identify the field glass that he had 
allegedly passed on to Booth and Herold when it was placed in evidence.64
Finally, although Lloyd could not deny having overheard the incriminating 
conversation between Booth and Herold regarding their murderous activities in 
Washington as he waited on them and could not deny having given aid and 
provisions to them as they prepared to continue their flight south into Maryland, 
Lloyd never once called Booth by name in all the testimony recounting those
62 Ibid. McMillan’s testimony accounted for 23 pages (461-484), Lloyd’s for 
25 (277-302), and Weichmann’s for 90 (369-459).
63 Ibid., testimony of John Lloyd, 278.
64 Ibid., 281, 288.
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events. Booth now became "the man with the broken leg" or the "partner" of the 
one who did all the talking.65 In fact, the only significant evidence not personally 
impeached by Lloyd himself concerned the 11 April visit by Mrs. Surratt to verify 
her son’s prior delivery of the "shooting irons." His own unsolicited confession 
that on the morning of 15 April he had told everything he knew about the 
conspiracy to a government agent after being informed by that agent that "there 
was money enough in this thing to make both of us rich if I would give him any 
information I possessed" must have, for discriminating jurors, relegated Lloyd to 
the lowest status of mercenary imaginable.66
Weichmann’s testimony, by comparison, unabashedly and directly linked 
John Surratt to the conspiracy charges as detailed in the indictment. According to 
Weichmann, Surratt was a major recruiter for Booth’s activities having personally 
enlisted Atzerodt and perhaps Dr. Mudd. He frequently received telegrams and 
letters—more than one signed with an alias with which he [Weichmann] was 
familiar-from other members of the conspiracy. Other major participants in the 
conspiracy—namely Booth, Paine, and Atzerodt-called on John Surratt at the 
Surratt boardinghouse and he, in turn, called on them at their places of residence. 
According to Weichmann, Surratt seemed at times to toy with his dangerous 
avocation, playing with "bowie knives and revolvers" and flaunting the money that 
he was earning for his efforts. At other times, he took his role quite seriously as 
when he purportedly "struck [me] in the pit of the stomach" when Weichmann
65 Ibid., 284-286.
66 Ibid., 294.
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jokingly took from him a ticket for a private box at Ford’s Theatre on a night 
when Paine and John Surratt with their female companions were planning to use 
those tickets to reconnoiter the place. He often appeared to be serving as a 
liaison between the Confederate hierarchy in Richmond and their counterparts in 
Washington and Montreal. Weichmann also recounted the meeting some time in 
the winter of 1864-1865 between Surratt, Booth, and Dr. Mudd during which the 
three of them excused themselves from his presence for what they called "some 
private business"-either plotting an escape route as Weichmann would intimate 
or, to arrange for John Surratt to act as "the agent for the purchase of [Dr. 
Mudd’s] farm"-as John Surratt would assure Weichmann.67
Neither was Mrs. Surratt safe from Weichmann’s testimony. If anything, 
he implicated her even further in his accounts of the conspiracy, describing her as 
a guardian of motives, actions, and identities. According to Weichmann, she 
reassured him-following the scene with Paine and her son on the bed with 
weapons-that John needed them for protection on his frequent rides in the 
country.68 She wanted Weichmann to consider Booth’s growing acquaintance with 
her son as nothing more than a result of John’s running interference between 
Booth and the people of Charles County that Booth was constantly importuning 
for land. "[They] are getting tired of Booth and they are pushing him off on
67 Ibid., testimony of Louis J. Weichmann, 371, 372, 374, 376, 377, 378, 380,
387.
68 Ibid., 377.
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John," she allegedly explained to Weichmann.69 She also told Weichmann on one 
occasion that a stable operator they frequented . . considers John, Herold, and 
Atzerodt a party of gamblers and sports, and I want him to think so." On another 
occasion, "she appeared very angry" when Atzerodt confirmed to Weichmann that 
the "delicate gentleman" that John had put up at the Herndon House was, in fact, 
Lewis Paine.70
Weichmann’s account of the trips to Surrattsville were expanded as well, in 
particular the trip of 14 April and largely with additions to her dialogue, giving 
the jurors a feeling of malicious intimacy. Preparing to depart on their 14 April 
trip, Weichmann recalled Mrs. Surratt telling him to "Wait . . .  I must get those 
things of Booth’s."71 He described her as being cheerful on the trip to 
Surrattsville, but anxious about arriving back by nine o’clock "to meet some 
gentlemen there."72 Just outside Washington on the return trip, she allegedly 
inquired of some pickets posted there how long they might remain. When told 
that they would be leaving around eight o’clock, Weichmann claimed that she 
replied, "I am glad to know of it"-perhaps thinking of the safety of the fleeing 
assassins.73 When later on they had drawn close enough to the city to witness the 
illumination celebrating the return of the United States flag at Fort Sumter, she
69 Ibid., 372. Booth’s interest in real estate was a front for making 
reconnaissance missions along the planned escape route.
70 Ibid., 383-384.
71 Ibid., 390.
72 Ibid., 392.
73 Ibid., 391.
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allegedly was moved to make the ominous remark, "I am afraid that all this 
rejoicing will be turned into mourning and all this gladness into sorrow."74 Later 
that night when government officers came looking for Booth and her son, 
Weichmann claimed that she confided that she "expected the house would be 
searched."75 John Surratt’s mother, according to the testimony of Weichmann, 
was no innocent or naive errand runner.
Whereas Lloyd practically cross-examined himself and thereby merited 
relatively little attention by the defense, Weichmann’s memory and level 
involvement in the conspiracy underwent serious attack in cross-examination. 
Impeaching his ability to accurately recount relevant material, Bradley reminded 
Weichmann of his frequent inaccuracies with regards to dates of significant 
events—such as plays, introductions, trips, and first meetings—involving not only his 
client but other members of the cabal.76
The defense then focused on raising doubts concerning Weichmann’s 
assertion that he was never more than an intrigued outsider to the activities at the 
Surratt boardinghouse. He admitted—but only with several mitigating disclaimers 
- to  having learned a cipher from a Confederate blockade runner who frequented 
the Surratt house.77 He denied ever having taken information about prisoners of
74 Ibid., 392.
75 Ibid., 393.
76 Trial of John H. Surratt. 410-418, 424-426.
77 Ibid., testimony of Louis J. Weichmann, 441. He claimed that not only 
did he not know that it was a Confederate cipher but that his only use for it had 
been to write "the first two sentences of [a] Longfellow poem."
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
105
the War Department where he worked, but did admit to having said something 
once about his work to the aforementioned blockade runner. He further admitted 
to having personally placed the package containing the field glass in the bottom of 
the buggy prior to the trip to Surrattsville, but claimed no knowledge of its 
contents, saying that it "felt to me like three or four saucers wrapped up together; 
like a glass desert dish."78
The last attempt by the defense to impeach Weichmann involved a series 
of accusations chiefly concerning his past relationship with the United States 
government and his testimony about Mrs. Surratt in the 1865 trial. Regarding his 
role as an informer, he denied that the government had ever threatened to hang 
him if he did not cooperate with them and that he had ever told authorities that 
he had suspected "something was going on" at the Surratt house. Regarding his 
performance at the 1865 trial, he denied that he had said that "he would have 
given a very different testimony if it [had] not been for that which was written 
down for [him]" or that he had ever sworn that he "could have given an 
explanation of Mrs. Surratt’s visit to Surrattsville on the 14th of April which would 
have been greatly in her favor if he had been allowed to." He further denied that 
his current appointment in Philadelphia had been a gift for his testimony and that 
he had been relieved from his most recent job for having opened drawers to 
which he had no authorization. Continuing, he denied that he had ever 
considered himself arrested when because of his intimate knowledge of the 
activities at the Surratt boardinghouse he had been assigned to help track down
78 Ibid., 447.
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Surratt and other conspirators. He considered his association with the other 
officers as more a form of protection and, in fact, thought himself "as much of a 
detective as McDevitt (one of the other detectives) was." He even remembered 
being designated as a "special officer."79
Although the defense had taken the edge off Weichmann’s overall effect 
on the jury, John Surratt would later admit to the residual damage that 
Weichmann left behind. Assured of the fact that Weichmann knew the exact 
extent of the damage he was causing, Surratt would state that he was convinced 
t h a t " . . .  if [Weichmann] was on his death-bed he would send for me and ask my 
forgiveness for the ruin and trouble he has caused me." Assured also of his 
powers of conviction and righteousness, Surratt would also claim that if only once 
he could have caught Weichmann’s eye during the trial, his perjury would have 
ended.80
Dr. Lewis J. A. McMillan, similar to Lloyd in that complicity to some 
degree seemed apparent after his session on the witness stand, nevertheless served 
as one of Surratt’s chief accusers. Whereas the jury may have been negatively 
affected by his admission that he had helped Surratt find lodging in Liverpool, 
that he had reached an agreement with Surratt to "bring him remittance of money 
from Canada," and that he had expected a reward for his original services, his 
testimony was highly charged and gave critical insight into Surratt’s evolving
79 Ibid., 422-424, 441-442, 450, 456.
80 Washington Post 3 April 1898.
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mental state.81 "Nervous and careworn" when McMillan first met him on board 
the Peruvian, Surratt’s confidence grew as the voyage put more distance between 
him and American authorities.82 It was not long, according to McMillan, before 
Surratt shed all pretense of caution and began to reveal details of his complicity. 
"He was quite free [and] seemed to be overflowing with the subject," testified 
McMillan.83 Surratt had freely admitted to him that the abduction plot was 
"concocted entirely by John Wilkes Booth and himself' and that he had joyously 
responded to news of Lincoln’s assassination while in a train depot somewhere in 
New York with the words: "Oh, the story is too good to be true."84 Surratt’s 
outlook on the future, at times rather bleak, was, nonetheless, accurate. He told 
McMillan at one point, in fact, that he "would rather be hung by an English 
hangman than by a Yankee one, for I know very well if I go back to the United 
States I shall swing."85
Addressing alleged predisposition to violence, McMillan reiterated Surratt’s 
alleged threat to President Johnson and detailed two new and chilling occurrences 
about Surratt that may not have seemed out of character to a public that expected 
the worst from him. While arguably irrelevant to the case, testimony was 
permitted alleging one incident in which Surratt and others indiscriminately killed
81 Trial of John H. Surratt, testimony of Lewis McMillan, 476, 481-483.
8* Ibid., 474.
83 Ibid., 480.
84 Ibid., 476, 472.
85 Ibid., 468.
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"five or six Union soldiers or prisoners" following a woman’s taunt that they . . 
shoot the damned Yankee soldiers" and another similar incident in which Surratt 
and others fired on a surrendered gunboat in the Potomac River.86 The 
prosecution’s strategy-perhaps aware that the defense planned to establish an 
alibi for their client-also addressed Surratt’s pre- and post-assassination activities 
in New York and Canada. An array of witnesses traced the defendant’s activities 
in Montreal and his suspected escape route from Washington, with special 
attention paid to the dates of Surratt’s departures and arrivals. It was shown that 
Surratt could not have departed Washington by early train on the morning 
following the assassination because all departures were delayed on the orders of 
General Christopher C. Augur, commander of the Union forces in the 
Department of Washington.87 The register for the St. Lawrence Hotel in 
Montreal was then produced to demonstrate that there was a significant gap from 
6 April 1865 to 18 April 1865 in John Harrison’s [Surratt’s alias] occupancy 
there.88 The bookkeeper from the same hotel narrowed the gap somewhat when 
he demonstrated that Surratt had paid his bill on 10 April, but did not check out 
until 2:45 P.M. on 12 April.89 A conductor for the Vermont Central Railroad 
then recounted an incident occurring between 10 and 20 April 1865 allegedly 
involving Surratt--who feigned a Canadian accent and occasionally slipped out of
86 Ibid., 466-468.
87 Ibid., 524-525.
88 Ibid., 514.
89 Ibid., 166.
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it-and  a second rough-looking man. They both claimed to be "destitute," and that 
if permitted to ride on credit, they would pay what was due upon their arrival in 
Canada.90 Somewhat supporting this testimony as well as standing on its own as 
an apparently significant piece of evidence, Charles H. Blinn alleged to have 
found a handkerchief marked "J.H. Surratt, 2" at the Burlington, Vermont train 
depot on the morning of 18 April. It was discovered where two men, one tall and 
one short, had been given permission to sleep.91
With all major evidence presented, the prosecution had only to fill in 
several inconvenient holes in their testimony and to give the jury additional 
conspiratorial evidence on which to ruminate. Utilizing the same tactic employed 
so successfully in the conspiracy trial, the prosecution made no attempt to disguise 
its efforts to present emotional and speculative evidence. John Surratt’s 
resignation from his job at Adams Express Company on or near 13 January 1865 
was presented in this light. In the eyes of the prosecution’s attorneys, Surratt 
must have resigned in order to free himself for the first abduction attempt. They 
dismissed outright his claim that "his mother was going down to Prince George’s, 
and he wanted to accompany her as her protector."92 Even Lincoln’s son Thomas 
made an appearance. He claimed that in March 1865 at City Point, the defendant 
had attempted to get aboard the steamer on which his father was travelling. One 
can only imagine the effect on the jury of the slain president’s son testifying that
90 Ibid., 168-171.
91 Ibid., testimony of Charles H. Blinn, 174.
92 Ibid., 436-437.
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the alleged conspirator Surratt "wanted to see him real bad." The persistent 
Surratt, according to young Lincoln’s testimony, . . tried twice, I believe, to pass 
in."93 As evidence of Surratt’s intimacy-albeit of a non-criminal nature-with 
other conspirators, several Washington stable workers testified that John Surratt 
presented them with notes or with verbal assurances that Atzerodt or Booth could 
use his horses if they wished.94 Finally, as evidence of the viciousness of the 
conspiracy with which Surratt had been allegedly involved, several witnesses 
including several members of the Seward household recounted the details of 
Paine’s slashing attack on Secretary of State Seward that left the entire Seward 
home in shock.95 With the presentation of these witnesses, the prosecution rested 
its case. It had demonstrated to some degree all four of Wilson’s claims regarding 
Surratt-presence, aiding and abetting, companionship, and treason-made in his 
opening argument. Now John Surratt’s defense team would have a benchmark 
from which to start its case.
In his opening statement for the defense, the senior Bradley listed the 
evidence from the prosecution’s case that he and his team planned to contradict 
with "countervailing testimony," thereby demonstrating their client’s innocence. 
They would demonstrate, in fact, that their client "did not go near Washington, 
that he was not within four hundred miles from Washington at any time after he 
came to Montreal on the sixth of April, until he was brought here on the
93 Ibid., testimony of Thomas Lincoln, 525.
94 Ibid., 216-217.
95 Ibid., 247-265.
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S w a t a r a They also planned to show that their client did not-as the prosecution 
had phrased it--"[weave] his web, as would a spider" between Montreal, 
Washington and Richmond, but had, on the contrary, been only an occasional 
visitor to the Confederate capital.97 The defense also planned a major 
counterattack on the salient points in both Weichmann’s and Lloyd’s testimony, 
demonstrating in the process, that John Surratt had not been a principal in the 
assault on President Lincoln.98 Another phase of the defense plan was to create 
as much distance as possible between their client and the other conspirators.
They claimed that they would demonstrate that their client "had no 
communication with any of the parties who were charged with this offense" and 
that once having been secreted in Canada he had, in fact, been "prevented by 
force from returning to the city of Washington to surrender himself."99
Just as the prosecution had established John Surratt’s presence at Ford’s 
Theatre both during the afternoon and evening of the assassination with an array 
of witnesses, the defense countered with a series of witnesses designed to create 
reasonable doubt in the jury about his alleged presence there. His sighting during 
the afternoon was called into question first by Ford’s Theatre owner John T. Ford 
himself, who contradicted testimony alleging that it was possible for anyone-such 
as Surratt-to have simply walked into the theatre during the afternoon of the
96 Ibid., 542.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid., 534.
99 Ibid., 542.
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assassination. Ford testified that "The doors leading to the vestibule into the 
theatre are always closed . . .  it was an inflexible rule."100 Another Ford family 
member, stating that he himself had prepared the presidential box for Lincoln’s 
visit, swore that he had seen no stranger in the theatre from two until three 
o’clock-the time when, according to the prosecution’s testimony, Surratt 
supposedly was there.101 Another witness claimed that it was the costumer at 
Ford’s Theatre who had announced that "it was ten minutes past ten"-a quote 
attributed by the prosecution to John Surratt on the night of the assassination.102 
Yet another witness, a performer at the theatre, testified that it had been he who 
had been interested in knowing the time that night because he was scheduled to 
sing a "national song" for the president and wanted to know how much time he 
had to prepare.103
Having effectively challenged Surratt’s presence at Ford’s Theatre, the 
defense now attempted to cast doubt on his presence in Washington on 14 April. 
Judging from the amount of time invested in countering Benjamin W.
Vanderpoel’s testimony, it must have been considered by Surratt’s attorneys as 
having the greatest potential for damage. It had been Vanderpoel who claimed to 
have seen Surratt in company with a "thick set, dark-complexioned man . . . [who] 
had a foreign appearance about him" in a "place" near Ford’s Theatre on the
100 Ibid., testimony of John T. Ford, 545.
101 Ibid., testimony of James R. Ford, 553.
102 Ibid., 557.
103 Ibid., 565.
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afternoon of the assassination.104 No fewer than ten witnesses—ranging from a 
policeman covering the Ford’s Theatre district to several witnesses from the 
Metropolitan Hotel, a place that fit Vanderpoel’s description-explained that 
Vanderpoel must simply have been geographically or chronologically mistaken.105
Sergeant Dye’s highly incriminating narrative of his encounter with Mrs. 
Surratt after leaving Ford’s Theatre became an object of attention for the defense 
as well. Whereas Dye would have the jury believe that he spoke with Mary 
Surratt on his way back to his camp following the events at the theatre, the 
defense demonstrated that in all likelihood Dye had spoken to a neighbor of the 
Surratt’s whose structurally similar house was in their neighborhood. Having read 
Dye’s testimony in The Evening Express, the neighbor recalled remarking to her 
friends: "Here is either a misrepresentation or a very strange coincidence. This 
conversation, now purporting to come from another, certainly occurred at my 
house."106 This testimony, along with that of Mary Surratt’s next door neighbor 
who claimed to have been sitting in front of his house smoking from ten to eleven 
o’clock in the evening and that while there he had heard no conversation, 
effectively countered Dye’s claim of a late night incriminating discourse with Mrs. 
Surratt.107
Continuing with its strategy of removing Surratt from the scene of the
104 Ibid., testimony of Benjamin Vanderpoel, 240, 243.
105 Ibid., 632, 635, 638, 783.
106 Ibid., 665.
107 Ibid., 585-587.
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crime, John Matthews, actor at Ford’s Theatre, testified to an incident that would 
help to distance Surratt from criminality as well. Matthews swore that on the 
afternoon of 14 April, Booth, in an agitated state, had given him a letter 
addressed, "Editor, National Intelligencer" to be delivered on the next day. Its 
contents, never read by anyone but Matthews who swore that he afterwards 
burned the letter, revealed Booth’s plans for Lincoln’s murder and his motives for 
doing so. Allegedly, Booth, closing the letter and apparently without remorse, did 
what Jim Bishop labels "a mean thing; an ignoble thing," he signed it "J.W. Booth- 
Paine-Atzerodt-Herold," incriminating them all with one sweep of the pen.108 
Significantly for the Surratts, neither one of their names, according to Matthews, 
had been included in Booth’s testimonial. Pierrepont made quick work of this 
potentially mitigating circumstantial evidence. Judge Fisher, convinced by 
Pierrepont of its inadmissibility, remarked, that "It might have been the very 
object of conspirators to thus screen some of the parties to the conspiracy by 
getting up this agreement."109 Pierrepont next attacked Matthews himself, forcing 
him to admit in cross-examination that he had not wanted the 1865 military 
commission to know of the incident with Booth because he "had understood that 
persons who had been speaking with him on that day had been interrogated."110
Having earlier called John Surratt’s presence in Washington, D.C. into 
question, the next step for the defense was to demonstrate his presence elsewhere
108 Bishop, The Day Lincoln Was Shot. 160.
109 Trial of John H. Surratt. 822-824.
110 Ibid., testimony of John Matthews, 826-827.
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in order to account for his rather lengthy absence from the St. Lawrence Hotel in 
Montreal. The revelations made by the next few witnesses not only adequately 
satisfied that strategy but, in so doing, caused such consternation among the 
prosecution that they decided to change their strategy mid-trial. A series of 
Elmira, New York merchants and tailors testified that on 13-15 April 1865,
Surratt, wearing a belted, pleated Garibaldi coat then currently in fashion in 
Canada, entered their establishments "to speak about getting a suit of clothes" and 
to purchase some shirts.111 Another witness, Dr. Augustus Bissell, claimed to have 
had a conversation with Surratt on 14 April at the Brainard House in Elmira. His 
detailed descriptions of Surratt’s attire and especially of his facial hair were quite 
accurate.112 Bissell’s testimony, however, came under severe attack due to his 
admission that being a physician was merely a "secondary matter." "Speculating" 
on ventures such as the chamber pot business and a combination bar-pharmacy 
currently attracted most of his attention.113
This groundwork for an alibi was then strengthened by the testimony of 
employees at the Webster House in Canandaigua, New York, who produced the 
register for the hotel showing that Surratt-using the name John Harrison--was on 
their register for 15 April.114 The import of this moment was not lost on the
1,1 Trial of John H. Surratt. 723-732, 738-744. See Anon., "A Remarkable 
Lecture," Lincoln Herald. 32, for Surratt’s 1870 Rockville, Maryland speech during 
which he refers to this jacket, saying that he bought it at St. Albans to pass 
himself off as a Canadian.
112 Trial of John H. Surratt, testimony of Augustus Bissell, 888-890.
113 Ibid., 863-871.
114 Ibid., 761.
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defendant. Surratt later alluded to District Attorney Pierrepont’s becoming 
"exceedingly nervous, especially when Mr. Bradley refused to show [the register] 
to him . . .  He evidently saw what a pitiful case he had, and how he had been 
made the dupe of his precious, worthy friend, Edwin M. Stanton."115 Pierrepont, 
apparently recovering, successfully argued that the register’s inviolability and, thus, 
its admissibility, was highly questionable. "If such were allowed, any murderer, 
any assassin could acquit himself," Pierrepont claimed, by fabricating evidence in 
his own favor.116 Judge Fisher consequently disallowed the register. Surratt saw a 
silver lining even in this dark cloud. Commenting on Fisher’s decision, he claimed 
that "had Judge Fisher been one of the lawyers for the prosecution, he could not 
have worked harder against me than he did. But thanks to him, he did more 
good than harm. His unprincipled and vindictive character was too apparent to 
everyone in the courtroom."117
In a parallel situation, the defense planned to subpoena the register at the 
Brainard Hotel in Elmira to demonstrate that Surratt had taken a room there on 
14 April, but after a "very diligent" but unsuccessful search, the register could not 
be produced.118 Surratt had a comment for this development as well. It was "only 
a surmise of mine," he would later say, that "some judge high in position had it
115 "A Remarkable Lecture," Lincoln Herald. 31.
116 Trial of John H. Surratt. 767.
117 "A Remarkable Lecture," Lincoln Herald. 30.
118 Trial of John H. Surratt 782.
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stored away."”9
Brigadier General Edwin G. Lee, described by his descendant Alexandra 
Lee-Levin as "Judah Benjamin’s military attache and as the ranking Confederate 
officer in Canada," was slated to play a major role in establishing Surratt’s alibi.120 
Judge Fisher, however, in response to a series of strident objections by the 
prosecution, would not allow anything of substance from Lee to be entered into 
evidence.121 This was a setback of major proportions for the defense. Regardless 
of any secondary effect on the jury, Lee’s testimony was going to be used by the 
defense to establish John Surratt’s location and specific activities on the day of the 
assassination. Allegedly, Surratt had agreed to go on a reconnaissance mission for 
Lee to "survey the Federal prison’s situation [at Elmira] . . . [and] to ascertain as 
nearly as possible the number of persons who would be involved in a prison 
break. . . ."I22 Surratt himself claimed to have bribed a Union colonel, "suffering 
from a chronic case of ’deadbroke’" into passing him into Elmira’s fortifications.123 
Surratt further claimed that one of his attorneys threatened to resign if Surratt did
119 "A Remarkable Lecture," Lincoln Herald. 30.
120 Alexandra Lee Levin, "Who Hid John H. Surratt, The Lincoln Conspiracy 
Case Figure?" Maryland History Society Magazine 60 (June 1965): 177.
121 Trial of John H. Surratt. 780-781.
122 Alexandra Lee Levin, "This Artful Drama: Gen. Edwin Gray Lee, C.S.A. 
and His Family," unpublished paper in Surratt Society files, 153. For details on 
the conception and evolution of the plan to release prisoners from Elmira prison, 
especially the part to be played by General Edwin Lee, see William A. Tidwell 
with James O. Hall and David Winfred Gaddy, Come Retribution: The 
Confederate Secret Service and the Assassination of Lincoln (Jackson: University 
Press of Mississippi, 1988), 278-281.
123 Washington Post. 3 April 1898.
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not reveal the name of the colonel who let him into prison. Surratt closed the 
incident with an explanation that begs analysis: "It would have ruined him, 
although it would have caused my acquittal."124 Significantly, this would not be the 
last time that this testimony’s admissibility would be discussed.
McMillan’s testimony became the next target. Stephen F. Cameron, an ex- 
Confederate Secret Service agent who had made the Atlantic crossing with 
McMillan and Surratt, was utilized to impugn McMillan’s character and to gain a 
measure of sympathy for the defendant. McMillan, according to Cameron, had 
been told by Surratt about being in Elmira on 14 April and about his first learning 
of the assassination on the morning of the next day.125 In addition, Cameron 
remembered McMillan saying that he believed Surratt to be innocent, and, in fact, 
a victim.126 Cameron’s testimony concluded with his disclosure that McMillan had 
told him that Surratt’s caretakers during the months he was in Canada did him 
inestimable injustice by keeping him so secluded that he was unaware of the 
critical nature of his mother’s situation at the hands of the military commission.127
The testimonies of Weichmann and Lloyd were also attacked. Largely
124 Ibid.
125 Trial of John H. Surratt testimony of Stephen F. Cameron, 793, 794. See 
"A Remarkable Lecture," Lincoln Herald. 31, for Surratt’s response to seeing his 
name in the newspaper as a suspect: "I could scarcely believe my senses. I gazed 
upon my name, the letters of which seemed sometimes to grow as large as 
mountains and then dwindle away to nothing."
126 Trial of John H. Surratt, testimony of Stephen F. Cameron, 793, 794.
127 Ibid., 813. See also Levin, "Who Hid?" 177, 179, for a claim by General 
Edwin Lee that "[only] force on the part of his guardians prevented him from 
returning to Washington and surrendering himself."
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members of the Surratt boardinghouse, this group of witnesses also included 
relatives, friends of the Surratt family, and several police officers involved in the 
case. The Holahan family who resided at the boardinghouse in 1865 were 
indispensable in casting Weichmann and Atzerodt, in Mr. Holahan’s words, "as 
intimate as friends would be," even sharing clothes on one occasion. In Holahan’s 
recollection, Weichmann had considered himself to be "in custody" from the 
fifteenth to the eighteenth or twentieth of April and had, in fact, been "kept all 
night in the station house" following his return to Washington, D.C. from 
Canada.128 A second witness, in fact, James A. McDevitt, verified Holahan’s story 
regarding the arrest of Weichmann.129
Significantly countering previous testimony, Holahan also testified to having 
taken several handkerchiefs from the Surratt house-one of which bore John 
Surratt’s name-before heading north with Weichmann and several officers to 
search for John Surratt. He further claimed to have lost this particular 
handkerchief at the Burlington, Vermont train station on the night of 19 April.130
Weichmann’s mental state came under attack as well. Lewis Carland 
stated that Weichmann had confided to him that he was "very troubled" following 
his presentation of testimony at the conspiracy trial that had been prepared for 
him by the "parties who had charge of the military commission." According to
128 Trial of John H. Surratt, testimony of John Holahan, 669.
129 Ibid., 711, To Weichmann’s credit, McDevitt was forced to say that, "Mr. 
Weichmann . . . went with me willingly in pursuit of the assassins, and was zealous 
and earnest in performing the part allotted to him in the pursuit, and although he 
had every opportunity to escape he did not."
130 Ibid., 669-686. Holahan’s wife would corroborate this.
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Carland, Weichmann had asked Carland to go with him to church to confess 
because "his mind was so burdened with what he had done." Returning, and 
significantly in Carland’s opinion, Weichmann then performed Hamlet’s "Soliloquy 
on Death" for him. It was in light of Weichmann’s apparent anxiety that Carland 
consequently decided to avoid him in the future, considering him, in addition, to 
be "a dangerous man."131 Another witness provided details that in all likelihood 
and, if true, led to Weichmann’s troubles. He claimed to have overheard an 
officer of the government tell Weichmann, under threat of hanging, that he 
needed to testify more than he had already done.132
Since John Lloyd did such an admirable job of calling his own 
trustworthiness into question, the defense went to no great lengths to further 
impugn him. John Clarvoe, called to the stand to challenge him, stated that Lloyd 
had told him that no one could have possibly passed his place on the night of the 
assassination because he had been up all night-sober, and that Lloyd had 
intentionally tried to mislead a party searching for Booth and Herold by sending 
them the wrong way.133
Winding down its case, the defense utilized the testimony of various and 
sundry employees of railroads operating between Washington and New York to 
demonstrate that Surratt could not possibly have been in Washington on 14 April
131 Ibid., testimony of Lewis Carland, 814, 816, 818.
132 Ibid., 820.
133 Ibid., testimony of John Clarvoe, 701-702.
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and subsequently in Elmira on the same day or even the next day.134 Finally, with 
its attacks on the veracity of several key prosecution witnesses, the defense closed 
its case.135
It was obvious that the defense had done some serious damage to the 
prosecution’s case. During the prosecution’s rebuttal phase, in fact, the 
prosecution no longer bothered to argue Surratt’s presence in Elmira. Admitting 
rather that he had been there, they now argued that he could still have arrived in 
Washington by train in time to participate in the assassination. In addition, since 
the prosecution felt itself wavering in its ability to substantiate Surratt’s 
whereabouts on 14 April, they pushed for a "doctrine of constructive presence." 
That is, they claimed that even his alleged presence in Elmira was a part of the 
overall plot-specifically, a role of distraction and confusion.136 To that end, other 
than to call several dozen character witnesses to attack or defend the veracity of 
previous defense witnesses, the remainder of the prosecution’s rebuttal was 
comprised of an array of railroad personnel and ferry operators who testified that 
by means of a bewildering combination of connection and non-traditional routes 
or modes of transportation, the possibility existed for Surratt to have arrived in
134 Ibid., 769-778.
135 The defense obviously considered some witnesses’ testimony far more 
damaging than others if one may judge from the number of witnesses who were 
called at this point to besmirch their character: John Lee (14), Cleaver (10), Ste. 
Marie (2), and McMillan (1); for an especially amusing badinage between 
Pierrepont and a witness in cross-examination, see Trial of John H. Surratt. 
testimony of Benjamin J. Naylor, 627.
136 Turner, Public Opinion. 233.
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Washington by the morning of 14 April.137 At least one attorney for the
prosecution, Pierrepont, seemed unshaken by the implications of the Elmira alibi.
Brimming with confidence, he claimed that "[if] he did not demonstrate, when he
came to review the evidence in the case as is now in, not only that [Surratt] was
not in Elmira, but that he was in the city of Washington on the 14th, and nowhere
else, he would pledge himself never to try another case as long as he lived."138
The defense, for its part, must have been pleased with its efforts at this
stage. After all, their witnesses had established an alibi strong enough to warrant
a drastic change in the prosecution’s confidence if not its strategy. Bradley,
sensing this, pushed even further following the termination of his rebuttal. He
especially attacked the prosecution for its breach of protocol regarding its belated
use of the constructive presence tactic.
"[The prosecution] were bound now by every consideration of justice, by 
every rule of evidence, by everything which can bind a government to put 
the citizen on his guard against false accusations, to introduce their 
evidence in chief, and not to wait to introduce it in rebuttal of evidence 
offered by the defense to meet the case made in chief."139
In addition, Bradley seethed over the prosecution’s current efforts to have
admitted as evidence--in support of the conspiracy charge-the information
concerning the prisoner release at Elmira that the prosecution themselves had
previously been successful in having barred.140
137 Trial of John H. Surratt. 916-930, 935-940, 950-952.
138 Ibid., 1038.
139 Ibid., 1039.
140 Ibid.
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Continuing, Bradley now challenged the linchpin of the prosecution's entire 
case. Bradley’s discourse on the interconnection between railroad timetables and 
the alleged sightings of Surratt in various places on the days immediately prior to 
and following the assassination was succinct and biting. As a court recorder 
remembered his attack, "[he] defied human ingenuity to weld a chain out of the 
proof [the prosecution] had, that would bring the prisoner from Elmira to this city 
on the morning of the 14th of April . . . unless there had been some new 
discoveries in arithmetic."141 Continuing, and exaggerating for effect, he 
demanded to know if "the telegraph was to be used . . .  to [show] that the 
prisoner came here . . .  for they could get him here no other way."142 Gaining 
confidence as he proceeded, Bradley even went so far as to propose that the case 
be given over to the jury without closing arguments by either side or, that failing, 
to forego the option of a closing statement by the defense even if the prosecution 
chose to make one.143
Before proceeding to closing statements, there remained only for Judge 
Fisher to decide whether the court would let stand or strike previously challenged 
evidence. A motion by the defense to dismiss testimony concerning Paine’s attack 
on William Seward was denied despite Bradley’s argument that "the evidence 
must tend to show either that the party charged committed the act himself, or 
participated in the commission of it, or was rendering aid or assistance, or was at
141 Ibid., 1040-1041.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid., 1042. He did, however, reserve the right to respond if he saw fit.
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such convenient distance that he could have rendered aid or assistance"~all of 
which Bradley felt he had demonstrated to the contrary.144 Fisher also denied a 
defense motion to strike the testimony regarding Surratt’s alleged shooting of 
Union soldiers. Bradley had argued that the attack, even if true, did not prove 
anything about Surratt’s feelings toward Lincoln; Pierrepont, countering Bradley, 
argued—more successfully it would seem -that this evidence was necessary to their 
case to demonstrate Surratt’s predisposition to this type of behavior.145 Motions 
to strike evidence concerning telegraphic communication between Elmira and 
Washington, a certain letter allegedly linked to the assassination, and Surratt’s 
connection with Confederate covert operative Jacob Thompson and convicted 
conspirator George Atzerodt, however, were successful.146 On balance, it would 
seem that the prosecution gained the most from this exchange.
Closing arguments, in addition to providing the traditional opportunity for 
summation and clarification, served, in this case, to heighten the already keen 
state of anxiety. The closing statements for all attorneys became a forum into 
which they might reach beyond the confines of exhibition and interrogation and 
enter the realm of rhetoric where they all excelled. Carrington’s role for the 
prosecution was chiefly to address the principles of law on which their case had 
been founded. With a sweeping introductory statement that "[the] gallows upon 
which [Mary Surratt] expired should have been [her son’s] throne," both the tone
144 Ibid., 1060.
145 Ibid., 1069, 1063.
146 Ibid., 1072.
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and direction of Carrington’s summary was established. He first proceeded to
deny Surratt the loophole of accessory by arguing that he had committed an "overt
act," thus making him a principal in the second degree.147 He then bolstered the
constructive presence strategy, citing in particular an argument from the Aaron
Burr conspiracy case wherein it was stated that the party "who performs any part
in the general plan, however minute or however remote from the scene of action,
is constructively present."148 Impersonating John Surratt, Carrington next
presented a sarcastic interpretation of the defense’s argument that their client had
never been party to the assassination.
I only intended to insult, assault, kidnap, abduct, and imprison the 
President of the United States and turn him over kindly and gently to the 
tender mercies of traitors and rebels in arms, who were waging a fierce and 
cruel war against the nation’s life, whose hearts were filled with malice and 
whose hands were reeking with innocent blood. I only intended to insult 
the American nation. I struck at the nation’s heart, but missed my aim and 
only killed a man . . .  it was nobody but Abraham Lincoln, and my sister 
says it was no more to kill him than any negro in the Union army.149
Moving on to the conflicting testimony concerning Surratt’s presence in
Washington on 14 April, Carrington resorted to a metaphorical comparison.
Explaining that "the burden of proof to establish an alibi is by the preponderance
of evidence," Carrington demonstrated the prosecution’s quantitative edge in that
area: "They (the defense) bring up three men (i.e., witness); I send forward three
champions to meet them. They die together. I have got a regiment of ten behind
147 Ibid., 1081.
148 Ibid., 1088-1089.
149 Ibid., 1092.
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and victory perches upon my banner."150 Carrington also made it perfectly clear
that the defense had not effectively shown that Surratt "retired from the
conspiracy and discharged himself from all obligations of their acts." Evidence, in
fact, such as McMillan’s, had demonstrated that he "gloried in his achievements of
crime."151 The District Attorney’s final words to the jury addressed their ultimate
duty: " . . .  [You] must be cruel to be kind. He is a murderer, and deserves a
murderer’s doom."152
Counselor Merrick had the honor of presenting the first of two consecutive
closing statements by the defense. He began by boldly stating that he and his
team had from the beginning of the trial realized that they were competing not
only against the prosecution "that represents the government in its assumed
offended majesty," but against another more subtle force "that represents some
officers of the United States seeking for their own purposes the shedding of
innocent blood."153 One might argue that a third force, discretion, gained the
upper hand for the moment because for some reason Merrick decided not to
further that dangerous premise. Proceeding, and taking as cue perhaps from
Carrington’s mocking impression of John Surratt, Merrick then summarized the
prosecution’s view on their own strategy:
We cannot place in his hands a telescopic rifle that will reach from Elmira 
to Ford’s Theatre. . . . [As] our next best chance, we must go to his honor
150 Ibid., 1047.
151 Ibid., 1148.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid., 1156.
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and tell him that to murder a President is like murdering a King; that it 
has no accessory, that wherever Surratt was, he is guilty of the murder; and 
we will further tell his honor that he dare not decide differently, that the 
voice of the people demands the decision.154
Following this introduction, the bulk of Merrick’s closing statement was presented
in the form of challenges to the prosecution. If Surratt were guilty of treason, he
demanded to see the witnesses as required by the Constitution. If Surratt was an
accessory, he demanded to know how--due to their exclusionary nature-his client
could be a principal as well. If the prosecution meant to charge that Surratt,
while in Elmira, participated in the murder, he demanded to see any mention of
that charge in the indictment. If Surratt was an active member in the conspiracy
after 12 April, he demanded to see evidence of it. If, by some "novel specimen of
jurisprudence," Surratt was responsible for the acts of his associates, Merrick
demanded to know why the prosecution had not "indict[ed] him at once as a
corporate body."155
Merrick, concluding with a reference to Mary Surratt and clearly
addressing the prosecution, clarified who was to blame for her presence in the
court.
You have broken the cerements (graveclothes) of that grave; You have 
brought her before the jury; now close those cerements if you can. She sits 
beside [her son] and covers him with a wing you can never shut. . . . We 
had not said one word to this jury about her, but in bringing her before 
them you disclosed your plan. . . . You may bid the spirit down now, but it 
will not down.156
154 Ibid., 1161.
155 Ibid., 1165-1166, 1167, 1177, 1200, 1164.
156 Ibid., 1194.
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John Surratt’s flight and the implications that the prosecution had attached 
to it provided Merrick with the opportunity to indict the inquisitional system that 
had caused Mary Surratt’s death. "What else could he do?" asked Merrick of the 
jury. "Suspicion of guilt in that day was certainty of conviction. Military 
commissions were organized, not to try, but to condemn . . .  He fled not from 
justice, but from lawlessness.1'157 A rather simple request concluded Merrick’s 
statement: "Gentlemen of the jury, I invoke for the prisoner, not your mercy, but 
your most deliberate judgement."158
Joseph Bradley, Sr., making the second of the two closing statements for 
the defense, spent a remarkably brief period of time with the jury. Speaking in 
quite broad terms, he began by dismissing the first three counts of the indictment 
outright because, as he claimed, they involved a murder for which his client had 
not been present.159 Using as a springboard his demand to know where in the 
indictment was the prosecution’s assertion of Surratt’s whereabouts if he was not 
in Washington, he then launched into a semantic attack on the indictment itself. 
He explained that any such omission as Surratt’s supposed whereabouts "vitiates 
the indictment, and the defendant may avail himself of [that oversight]."160 He 
then drew attention to the fact that according to the indictment and despite any 
cherished feelings that the jury may have had toward President Lincoln to the
157 Ibid., 1211.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid., 1220.
160 Ibid., 1272.
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contrary, his client had been charged with the murder of a private individual, not, 
as the prosecution had alleged, someone of any particular "name or dignity."161 
Bradley’s final tactic was to challenge the prosecution to cite a precedent for their 
mid-trial change of allegations to one of constructive presence. "Where are the 
sources, the authorities for this unique act of legal chicanery?" he asked. "No 
authority has been cited, not a hornbook, not an elementary writer, not a county 
court decision."162 With that, Bradley’s attack on the indictment was complete.
Whether by choice or by lot, Bradley responded next to a clever metaphor 
that the prosecution had used to demonstrate their numerical superiority in 
witnesses that allegedly had seen Surratt in Washington. Obviously referring to 
the intense character assassination to which he and his associates had subjected 
the prosecution’s preponderance of witnesses, Bradley addressed the advantage of 
quality over quantity. "Gentlemen," he posed to the jury, "suppose you were to 
have four pounds of pure gold in one scale and thirteen of false, base metal in the 
other scale; it would be a much better comparison."163
Bradley then charged the jury to make a swift decision to acquit, "that this 
young man may not go forth to the world with any doubt resting upon him by 
long deliberation." His final charge-an unusual but not totally unexpected one 
considering the spiritual presence of Mary Surratt throughout the trial--was a bid
161 Ibid., 1273.
162 Ibid., 1227.
163 Ibid., 1237.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
130
to acquit Mrs. Surratt retroactively as well.164 Convinced of a conspiracy, the 
defense took the opportunity to accuse the government of having withheld 
information that would have saved Mary Surratt’s life. Specifically, the defense 
referred to the absence of President Johnson’s executive clemency plea in the 
published transcript of the 1865 trial which the government had claimed was 
included.165
The prosecution, according to court protocol, would have the last words 
with the jury before the judge’s instructions were given to them. Pierrepont’s role, 
requiring the thoroughness of an historian without the nagging demands of 
historical objectivity, was to present a unified and cohesive version of all the facts 
as the prosecution saw them. In addition, he made it clear that this case would 
not, if he could help it, be viewed as the murder of "the humblest vagabond," but 
as the assassination of a president.166
Pierrepont began his reconstruction of John Surratt’s criminality with the 
entering of his name on the register of the St. Lawrence Hotel on 18 April, 1865— 
a fact with which he considered every other truth to be in harmony. From this 
benchmark, he could proceed both forward and backward in time to encompass 
all of the defendant’s conspiratorial activities. Working forward, he reminded the 
jury of Surratt’s Canadian, European and North African sojourns and mused over
164 Ibid., 1246.
165 Ibid., 1368.
166 Ibid., 1263.
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why an innocent man would take flight.167 Starting then with 13 January 1865, 
Pierrepont began piecing together every shred of the prosecution’s evidence into a 
mosaic of John Surratt’s culpability. Introductions to and meetings with other 
members of the cabal, the arrivals and departures at both the Surratt 
boardinghouse and Lloyd’s Surrattsville tavern, and, of course, the events in 
Washington, D.C. on 14 April were presented in a sequential fashion and 
enlivened with quotations attributed to Surratt, his mother, and others.168
The closing of the prosecutor’s case must have left quite an impression on 
the jury. Not able to let the defense’s accusation of conspiracy regarding Mary 
Surratt’s clemency plea go unchallenged, Pierrepont counterattacked. Rather than 
with a verbal rejoinder, however, he produced trial papers from the 1865 military 
commission that, upon examination by the defense, demonstrated to the court that 
not only was the commutation plea contained in the trial record, but that it had 
not been acted upon by President Johnson.169 He closed simply by admonishing 
the jury to ask for divine guidance in making their decision.170
During Joseph Bradley’s summation, he had cautioned the jury both to 
listen closely to Pierrepont’s closing statement and to heed the judge’s summary.171 
Following Fisher’s highly prejudicial pronouncements, Bradley probably would
167 Ibid., 1254-1257.
168 Ibid., 1265-1363.
169 Hoehling, Post-Appomattox. 294. Hoehling adds: "Holt hurried over later 
in the day to reclaim [the trial record]."
170 Trial of John H. Surratt 1366.
171 Ibid., 1246.
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have liked to retract that directive. Fisher’s instructions to the jury were, in fact, 
responsible for Gideon Welles’ 9 August diary entry which contained the remark, 
"The judge was disgracefully partial and unjust, I thought, and his charge highly 
improper."172
Presented as a list of inferences to serve as guidelines for the jury’s 
deliberation, Fisher’s charge placed him squarely in the camp of the prosecution. 
With regard to Surratt’s alleged criminal activity in the conspiracy that the defense 
had attempted either to downplay or dismiss, Fisher expounded on the magnitude 
of murdering the head of a government, schooled the jury on the concept of 
equally shared guilt by all members of a conspiracy, and explained that the 
prosecution, if they so chose, "may waive the charge of treason against any or all 
the conspirators, and proceed against them for the smaller crime of murder, 
included in the greater crime of treason."173 Alluding to Surratt’s alleged murder 
of Union soldiers and Paine’s attack on Seward that had earlier been points of 
contention between the two parties in this case, Fisher reminded the jury that all 
evidence that tends to demonstrate the conspiracy’s "heinous character" should be 
given proper consideration.174 Citing the defense’s attempt to invoke an overly 
strict interpretation of the indictment, Fisher pointed out that according to
172 Welles, Diaiv. 3: 166-167. Shelton, Mask for Treason. 92, similarly, sees 
Fisher and the prosecution team as "wholly subservient to the War Department." 
See also Eisenschiml, "A ’Study’ of John Surratt?" 188, for a reference to the 
"depths of which the prosecuting attorney, the War Department, and judge 
stooped to bring about Surratt’s conviction."
173 Trial of John H. Surratt. 1377-1378.
174 Ibid., 1377.
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"judicial cognizance," it was unnecessaiy for the prosecution to have either 
"alleged in the indictment [or] proved by witnesses" that Abraham Lincoln was 
President of the United States.175
Casting aspersions on the defense’s apparently successful attempt to 
establish an alibi, Fisher exercised no restraint. Addressing alibis and particularly 
the role played by railroads and timetables in building the alibi in this case, he 
explained that "this is a line of defense always held in little favor by the courts and 
juries" because it is easily propped up by perjury, and because the time elements 
not only are easily mistaken, but "have become almost annihilated by modern 
contrivances driven by the power and speed of steam."176
Fisher’s final stake into the heart of the defense’s case was his statement 
on the "circumstances indicating guilt." He instructed the jury that "flight, 
fabrication of false accounts, [and] the concealment of instruments of violence"-- 
all attributed to Surratt-were indicative of guilt and that a confession "free of 
favor . . . duress or fear [and] made freely and voluntarily"~as Surratt had done 
with McMillan--"is one of the surest proofs of guilt."177 With these words ringing 
in their ears, the jury was dismissed to do its duty. As a footnote and perhaps a 
further indictment of the government’s unwavering stance, a request by the jury 
foreman for a copy of the written evidence was considered reasonable by Bradley,
175 Ibid., 1373.
176 Ibid., 1374.
177 Ibid., 1378.
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objected to by Carrington, and disallowed by Fisher.178
When, on 10 August 1867, the jury announced to the court that it had not 
been able to reach a verdict, John Surratt did not feel exonerated. The vote had 
been almost strictly along sectional lines-four Northern or foreign-born jurors 
voted to convict; seven Southern jurors with a lone New Yorker voted to acquit.179 
When Fisher asked the two parties whether there were any objections to his 
dismissing the jury, Bradley, speaking for Surratt, said that if they were dismissed, 
it was against his client’s "will and protest." Fisher, sensing that further 
sequestering of the jury would produce no change, dismissed them and turned 
John Surratt over to the marshal.180
Whereas in the aftermath of the 1865 trial, there were widespread 
allegations of witness tampering, perjury, and governmental obstruction, only one 
incident of any relevance transpired between the end of the trial and the initiation 
of further action against John Surratt. No sooner had the trial concluded, in fact, 
when, in a manner similar to the 1865 trial, certain irregularities regarding major 
participants came to light. Gideon Welles was present at a 13 August 1867
178 Ibid., 1378-1379.
179 Anon., Adventures of John H. Surratt. 135-136. For a unique assessment 
of the verdict, see James E.T. Lange and Katherine Dewitt, "The TTiree 
Indictments of John Harrison Surratt," an unpublished paper in the Surratt 
Society holdings, 1-2: "The mood of the country was still divided, and Lincoln was 
not yet universally enough admired to prevent Southerners feeling that the 
assassination may have been justified."
180 Trial of John H. Surratt. 1379. See "Judge Fisher’s order striking the 
name of Joseph H. Bradley, Sr. from the roll of attorneys practicing in this court," 
John Surratt Papers. 21/4731 for evidence that long simmering tempers must have 
flared immediately after the jury’s dismissal. See also Turner, Public Opinion.
248, for details on Bradley’s challenging Judge Fisher to a duel.
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cabinet meeting when these developments were introduced. Secretary of State 
Seward laid before the cabinet a paper—"[a] curious document in some respects"— 
from Albert Gallatin Riddle of the prosecution team. Seward, according to 
Welles, was "disconcerted" at its disclosure and even more "annoyed" when the 
president had it read to the group. It "disclosed the fact that Riddle had been 
employed by Seward to hunt up, or manufacture, testimony against Surratt."
Welles was at a loss. "Why the State Department should busy itself in that 
prosecution," he mused, "is not clear." Welles also found it odd that Riddle-along 
with Judge Advocate Holt and Congressman James M. Ashley of Ohio-had, 
according to the document before them, applied to the president for a pardon for 
Sanford Conover for "service rendered in the Surratt trial." After all, Riddle 
himself had clearly stated in the document before the cabinet that Conover "never 
gave the name of a single witness, never furnished him a solitary fact."181
Conover had apparently struck fertile ground with Congressman Ashley. A 
Radical Republican clamoring for impeachment proceedings against President 
Johnson, Ashley had fallen prey to Conover’s tempting offer of information 
incriminating Johnson in Lincoln’s death. Ashley had offered Conover, in return, 
his word to apply for Conover’s pardon. The plan collapsed, however, amid 
squabbling over the blood money for Conover’s alleged evidence and nothing of 
consequence appears to have resulted from it.182
181 Welles, Diary. 3:170.
182 Gene Smith, High Crimes and Misdemeanors: The Impeachment and 
Trial of Andrew Johnson (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1977), 
217-218.
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From the evidence, it appears that Pierrepont took the initiative and began
to prepare for a new trial. In a 31 December 1867 letter to the assistant Attorney
General, Pierrepont commented on the semantics of the past indictment and
suggested how it might be improved.
I thought the indictment against Surratt most excellently drawn-I did not 
see how it could be better. From intimations, however, which have been 
conveyed to me from one of the jurors since the trial, I wish to suggest 
whether an indictment can be formed so that the jurors can find the 
prisoner guilty as an aider and abettor of the conspiracy . . . The juror says 
they did not doubt the guilt, but they wanted to find some verdict which 
relieved them of the necessity of a verdict of guilty of "Murder"-whether 
we can accomplish this I am not prepared to say.183
Exercising caution, Pierrepont pointed out to Secretary of State Seward on 18
May 1868 that after a thorough examination of the available evidence-Sergeant
Dye, for example, could not be located--he thought it in their best interests to let
the case carry over into the next term, "even if the prisoner was bailed."184 With a
realistic outlook on the current developments, he thought that "an acquittal on a
trial now more than probable."185
Joining the debate over a second indictment, Edward Carrington, in a
letter to the Attorney General’s office, agreed with Pierrepont that the case
should be disposed of at the next Criminal Court term beginning on 15 June. He
expressed great concern, however, that Judge Wylie, in contrast to his
183 Edwards Pierrepont to Hon. John M. Binckley, 31 December 1867, 
Papers Relating to the Trial of John Harrison Surratt. Record Group 60: 
Judiciary/District and Circuit Court, Criminal Case File 5920, National Archives, 
Washington, D.C. (Hereinafter cited as John Surratt Papers. 60/5920.)
184 Pierrepont to William H. Seward, 18 May 1868, John Surratt Papers. 
60/5920.
185 Ibid.
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predecessor, Judge Fisher, would certainly rule that "in order to convict the 
prisoner of murder, the jury must be satisfied from the evidence that at the time 
the murder was committed, the prisoner was near enough to render physical 
assistance if called upon."186 In addition, with "no hope of securing [Sergeant 
Dye’s] attendance at the next term," the outlook for the prosecution seemed 
unpromising.
Rebounding with a new strategy, the prosecution "resolved to procure a 
new indictment for a minor offence [sic], and accordingly, at the June term the 
Defendant was indicted under the 2nd section of the act of July 17, 1862 for 
conspiracy to murder, to abduct, etc."187 It was their plan first to postpone the 
case based on the murder indictment until the conspiracy to murder case had 
been presented, then "move to continue" the more serious case. When the 
defense objected, Carrington suggested that they "indict the prisoner for 
conspiracy [to murder] and enter a nolle prosequi (motion declining to prosecute) 
to the present indictment which charges him with murder." Ever mindful of 
public opinion, Carrington suggested that his plan would "avoid a long, tedious 
and expensive trial which would result either in an acquittal or another hung 
jury."188
Undaunted by an exasperatingly non-committal response from the Attorney
186 Edward Carrington to Attorney General’s office, 9 June 1868, John 
Surratt Papers. 60/5920.
187 Albert Gallatin Riddle to Seward, 9 October 1868, John Surratt Papers. 
60/5920. See Indictment: United States vs. John H. Surratt, John Surratt Papers. 
60/5920 for the full text of this second indictment.
188 Riddle to Seward, 9 October 1898, John Surratt Papers. 60/5920.
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General to a request for permission to proceed, or barring that, some guidance, 
Carrington continued with his efforts to convict. He even went so far as to 
"secure two separate indictments of Surratt from two separate grand juries on the 
treason charges."189 He may never have been aware of the fact, however, that "the 
District of Columbia had a two-year statute of limitations on every crime but 
fraud or murder. The treason (conspiracy) indictment gave the last date of 
Surratt’s offenses as of April 15, 1865 . . . and was not voted as a true bill until 
June 18, 1868, over three years later."190 Judge Fisher had no choice. He 
dismissed the case and later dismissed, as well, an attempt to appeal his decision. 
The remaining treason indictment suffered a unique and ironic fate, according to 
one source.
On November 5, 1868, the Grand Jury [sic] foreman, knowing of the 
decision in the previous case, crossed out the words ’true bill’ on . . . 
treason indictment #6594, and endorsed it ’ignoramus, ’ meaning ’we 
ignore.’ This [was] a fitting epitaph for the Government’s [sic] efforts to 
prosecute John Surratt.191
189 Lange and Dewitt, "Three Indictments," 3.
190 Ibid.
191 Ibid., 4.
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS
Neither a jury nor history has exonerated John Harrison Surratt. His 
activities during the waning months of the American Civil War, both in his official 
capacity as courier for the Confederate government and in his association with 
John Wilkes Booth’s cabal, remain somewhat undefined and a matter of scholarly 
contention. His flight, capture, extradition, and trial, on the other hand, are well- 
documented and are thus open to greater scrutiny and more accurate assessment.
His mother’s trial by a military commission differed from his own eventual 
trial in its adjudicatory format, the scope of the context within which the cast was 
set, and the inclusion of treason in the indictment. Far more significant for this 
study, Mary Surratt’s trial and her exploitation by the government as a means to 
draw her son out of hiding served as a catalyst for his continued flight.
It is naive to assume that the United States government’s attitude toward 
and treatment of the fugitive John Surratt were serendipitous, spontaneous, or 
disjointed. Its consequent behavior-reconstructed from the correspondence to 
and from Secretary of State William Seward-ffom the moment of John Surratt’s 
discovery in Liverpool to the time of his arrest in Alexandria, forms a pattern far 
too overt to be treated as mere random instances of poor judgment as the 1867 
House Judiciary Committee would later find. That committee’s decision, based 
on its examination of State Department correspondence and on the testimony of 
the officials involved, stated simply that the State Department had not acted in an 
expeditious manner in its response to knowledge of John Surratt’s whereabouts
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and intentions. These findings, however, did not address the potential harm that 
John Surratt might initiate if arrested, extradited and tried. The Judiciary 
Committee’s report contained no reference to possible motives for the State 
Department’s actions.
Whether executive branch officials feared that John Surratt would implicate 
high-ranking American officials in the Lincoln conspiracy, that his testimony might 
seriously contradict the evidence presented by key witnesses from the 1865 trial of 
the conspirators-Louis Weichmann being chief among these witnesses-or that 
Surratt’s very presence in court would refresh the collective American 
consciousness of the proceedings that had resulted in his mother’s death, steps 
were indeed taken by Secretary of War Stanton and Secretary of State Seward to 
prolong John Surratt’s fugitive status. Stanton’s revocation of the reward for John 
Surratt’s arrest after he became aware of Surratt’s arrival in England takes on an 
entirely different aspect when the above motives are considered. So do Seward’s 
inertia regarding the Antonelli extradition proposal and his tardy responses to 
overseas consuls requesting instructions for coping with the emerging Surratt 
situation take on the aspect of conscious obstruction. The conclusion of 
government ineptitude offered by the Judiciary Committee weakens and a 
government obstruction argument emerges when governmental self-preservation is 
factored into the equation. John Surratt’s presence in America was viewed as a 
detriment to the well-being of the American government and he was consequently 
allowed to travel as he pleased.
The farce, however, had one final act. John Surratt’s arrest and extradition
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eventually became a begrudged reality due to the persistence of State Department 
consular officials who were unaware of these private agendas regarding Surratt. A 
corresponding attitude shift by the American government then occurred in 
response to his arrest. With the salutary neglect of John Surratt no longer an 
option, his conviction became the revised objective and a prosecution team was 
then assembled at least one member of which (Pierrepont) had connections with 
both Stanton and Seward. Only Surratt’s conviction at their hands would uphold 
the 1865 military commission’s verdict and, by extension, its very justification.
Only a conviction, in addition and in particular, would insure that John Surratt’s 
trial would not become a seance for his mother, summoning her for a retroactive 
albeit posthumous retrial and acquittal.
George Fisher, Stanton’s associate who presided at the John Surratt trial, 
was, for the prosecution, an ideal arbiter of justice, if one may judge by their later 
aversion to re-trying Surratt during another judge’s term. Fisher’s performance, 
throughout the trial, punctuated by his denial of motions proposed by the defense, 
his condoning of the prosecution’s constructive presence argument, and his 
attempt to cast the jury in his own image and likeness during his final charge to 
them, gave the appearance, collectively, of a prejudicial attitude against the 
defendant. When, following the hung jury, further attempts to indict John Surratt 
ran afoul of a statute of limitations, the United States government terminated 
their efforts to convict him.
The John Surratt case, with its multinational scope, provides insights into 
the evolving protocols of the State Department regarding the extradition process,
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the ongoing Fenian problem, and Italian unification. Within its chronological 
setting, the case demonstrates the efforts of the United States government to 
contend with the conflicting agendas of Reconstruction and constitutional 
mandates. In its largest sense, however, the John Surratt case exemplifies the 
attitudes which governments adopt and the actions which they implement in order 
to preserve the status quo.
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DRAMATIS PERSONAE
ADAMS, Charles Francis U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain
AIKEN, Frederick Counsel for Mary Surratt at 1865 trial
ALLET, Lt. Col., Commander of John Surratt’s Zouave Battalion
ANTONELLI, Giacomo C. Cardinal, Secretary of State, Papal States
AVERILL, William W. Consul General, BNAP (7 December 1866)
BAKER, Lafayette C. Chief of Washington detectives
BENJAMIN, Judah P. Secretary of War, Confederate States of America
BRADLEY, Joseph H. Sr. Chief Consul for John Surratt’s defense
BRADLEY, Joseph H. Jr. Consul for John Surratt’s defense
BROPHY, John Friend of the Surratt family, witness at Mary Surratt’s trial
CARRINGTON, Edward C. District Attorney at the trial of John Surratt
CHEW, Robert S. Chief Clerk, State Department
CLAMPITT, John W. Counsel for Mary Surratt at 1865 trial
CONOVER, Sanford Witness and convicted perjurer at trial of conspirators
DAVIS, Henry Winter Maryland Congressman
DAVIS, Jefferson President, Confederate States of America
DOUGLASS, Samuel E. Justice of the Peace for the City of Washington, DC
DUDLEY, Thomas H. Consul General, Liverpool
DYE, Joseph M. Witness at both 1865 trial and at John Surratt’s trial
FISHER, George P. Judge for the John Surratt trial
GOLDSBOROUGH, Louis M. Admiral, United States Navy
GOODING, David S. Marshal for the District of Columba
HALE, Charles United States Consul General, Alexandria
HISS, Hanson Reporter, Washington Post
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HOLAHAN, John T. 
HOLT, Joseph 
HOOKER, J. C. 
HUNTER, William 
KANZLER,_______
KING, Rufus 
LAMBILLY,
LEE, Edwin G.
LEGH, R. C.
LLOYD, John M.
MARSH, George P. 
MCMILLAN, L. J.
MELLY, George 
MERRICK, R. T.
MILLIGAN, Lambdin K. 
PIERREPONT, Edwards 
POTTER, John F.
RIDDLE, Albert Gallatin
R O U X ,__________
SEWARD, Frederick W. 
SEWARD, William H.
SPEED, James 
STANTON, Edwin M.
STE. MARIE, Henri B. de 
SWAN, Frank 
TOWNSHEND, Edward D. 
VENOSTA-VISCONTI, Emilio
Boarder, Surratt boardinghouse, Washington, DC 
Judge Advocate General, U.S.
Acting Secretary of the Legation, Rome
2nd Assistant Secretary of State, United States of America
General Minister of War, Papal States
United States Minister, Rome
Captain of zouave detachment that arrested Surratt
General, Confederate States of America
Acting Chief Secretary to the Government, Malta
Witness at 1865 trial and at John Surratt’s trial
United States Minister, Florence
John Surratt’s trans-Atlantic travelling companion, informant 
Justice of the Peace, Liverpool, England 
Counsel for John Surratt’s defense 
Plaintiff, ex parte Milligan case
Assosciate Counsel for the Prosecution at John Surratt’s trial 
Consul General, BNAP (11 Nov 1865)
Associate Counsel for the Prosecution at John Surratt’s trial
Minister of War, Papal States
Acting Secretary of State, United States of America
Secretary of State, United States of America
Attorney General of the United States
Secretary of War, United States of America
Zouave, American acquaintance of John Surratt, informant
United States Consul, Naples
Assistant Adjutant General
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Italy
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
150
WEICHMANN, Louis 
WELLES, Gideon 
WILDING, Henry 
WILSON, Nathaniel 
WINTRHOP, William
Witness at both 1865 trial and John Surratt’s trial 
Secretary of the Navy, United States 
Vice Consul, Liverpool
Assistant District Attorney, member of prosecution team 
United States Consul, Malta
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
151
VITA
Thomas M. Martin 
1037 Westover Avenue 
Norfolk, Virginia 23507
PERSONAL
Born February 26, 1950, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Married, no children.
EDUCATION
B.A., Wake Forest University, 1972
Major: History. Education Block Courses, 1973.
TEACHING POSITIONS
1985 - 1996: Teacher, Norfolk Public Schools
1994 - 1996: Social Studies Department, Chair
1983 - 1984: Teacher, The Williams School, Norfolk, Virginia
1976 - 1982: Teacher, Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Schools
RECOGNITION
1993: Inclusion in Who’s Who Among America’s Teachers 
1988: Teacher-of-the-Year (schoolwide)
1978: Teacher-of-the-Year finalist (schoolwide)
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVmES
Presenter:
"The Use of Editorial Cartoons in the Classroom."
"Implementing a First-Person, Role-Assumption Journal."
"Designing Long-Term Simulations for the American History Class." 
"Creating Your Own Audio-Visual Presentations."
Participant: Curriculum Development Committees
PROFESSIONAL/OTHER ASSOCIATIONS
National Association for Teachers of History 
Phi Alpha Theta
Portsmouth Area Civil War Round Table
Ninth Virginia Volunteer Infantry (a Civil War re-enactment group)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
